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Biotechnology has the potential to transform industry, including
pharmaceuticals, and agriculture.! The Biosafety Protocol [hereinafter
Protocol], adopted by over 130 states in Montreal, Canada, on January
30, 2000, defines modern biotechnology in the context of regulating the
international trade of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This
regulation takes place through the application of "(a) In vitro nucleic
acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or (b) Fusion
of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiologi-
cal reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques
used in traditional breeding and selection."' The Protocol defines a liv-
ing organism as "any biological entity capable of transferring or repli-
cating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and vi-
* This is an adapted version of my presentation at a panel entitled, "Genetically Modified
Food: Friend or Foe," which I chaired, at the International Law Weekend of the American
Branch of the International Law Association at New York, on November 6, 1999. I am
grateful to Martha Keister, the International, Comparative and Foreign Law Librarian at
the University of Denver College of Law, and William Goldstein, General Counsel, Ma-
harishi University of Management, Fairfield, Iowa, for their invaluable help in obtaining
several documents from international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Editor's Comment: This article has not been revised since summer 1999.
"" Vice Provost, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director
of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver, College of Law.
1. In 1987, the National Academy of Sciences released its study regarding the poten-
tial of biotechnology. NAS, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGINEERED
ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: KEY ISSUES (1987). See also U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1991).
2. Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, UNEP, Pt. Two, Annex to decision EM-I13: Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 3(i), U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 (2000) [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
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roids."3 It defines a living modified organism as "any living organism
that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through
the use of modem biotechnology."4 Thus, a GMO or transgenic product
is created by inserting foreign genes from one organism into another,
thereby crossing species barriers. Thus, genes from viruses, bacteria
and animals may be planted in grains, fruits and vegetables.
Genetic modification (GM) or manipulation in agriculture, under-
taken by what is commonly known as genetic engineering, is aimed at
increasing the quantity of world food supplies and improving their qual-
ity by enhancing beneficial traits, such as making crops resistant to in-
sects or herbicides and reducing their dependence on pesticides. Two
examples are insect-resistant corn and Roundup-Ready soybeans, which
are impervious to Roundup herbicide, manufactured by the giant bio-
tech firm Monsanto, the largest producer of GM seeds. Major substan-
tive issues related to the creation and use of and trade in GMO products
include the threat to biological diversity, economic considerations, intel-
lectual property issues, ethical and religious concerns, risks to human
and animal life or health, consumers' right to know, and food security.5
The security interest, may be affected in several says, such as further
consolidation of control over the methods of food production in the
hands of a few large firms, excessive use of chemicals because of the in-
creasing resistance of crops to herbicides, and reductions in crop diver-
sity.
6
While all these issues are important, in this paper I will focus the
discussion primarily on 1) the attempts internationally to regulate the
trade in GMOs by the adoption of the Biosafety Protocol, and 2) regula-
tion of GMOs in Europe. The first section will briefly describe the con-
troversy. The second section will discuss the regulatory practice in the
United States. The third and fourth sections will describe and analyze
the Biosafety protocol and GMOs' regulation in Europe, respectively,
before the final concluding section.
II. THE CONTROVERSY
The use of biotechnology in agricultural practices has increased
substantially in the United States and other major food exporting coun-
tries. These exporters are also the foremost proponents of the biotech-
3. Id. at art. 3(h).
4. Id. at art. 3(g).
5. See Center for International Environmental Law, Implications of Proposals to
Consider Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) at WTO-Draft Discussion
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nology industry and operate as the so-called "Miami Group"7 . To illus-
trate, 50 percent of soybean and one-third of corn crops in the United
States in 1999 were grown from GM seed, and almost all canola oil in
the US is made from genetically altered rape seeds.8 Similarly, in Ar-
gentina, the world's largest soybean exporter, GM soybeans accounted
for approximately 70 percent of the 1998-99 soybean crop.9
The controversy surrounds the genetically modified crops because
of the potential long-term risks to human health and the environment
caused by the release of GMOs into the environment. Proponents claim
that GM foods are beneficial because of their higher nutrient value and
because of their capacity to substantially increase food production to
feed the world's growing population. On the other hand, critics argue
that the potential risks cannot be dismissed. Among unanticipated out-
comes, the new genes might jump to other crops or species, or even to
people. For example, unexpected toxins or allergens may be introduced
into crops through genetic engineering, thus causing unforeseen allergic
reactions in humans. In 1996, scientists genetically engineered soy-
beans to incorporate a gene from Brazil nuts that enhanced the soy-
beans' protein content. Subsequent testing showed that the protein in-
troduced could trigger allergic reactions similar to those caused by
Brazil nuts." A plant with genes resistant to insects or herbicides could
spread that gene through pollination, thus creating "super weeds.""
Recent laboratory studies have shown that the pollen of genetically al-
tered corn can kill caterpillars of the monarch butterfly, that the lives of
ladybirds are shortened when they are fed aphids living on GM crops,
and that lacewings, natural predators of insect pests, are killed when
they are fed corn borer worms raised on genetically altered corn
plants.'"
Consumer resistance to GM foods in Europe has been intense.
United States exports to Europe of corn and soybeans, both genetically
modified and conventional, have declined from nearly $3 billion in 1996,
7. The Miami group, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile and Uru-
guay, was named after the city where the group first met to promote free trade in GMs
8. See Ruth Walker, Safety Rules for Genes and Food, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 25, 2000, at 1. Andrew Pollack, 130 Nations Agree on Safety Rules for Biotech Food,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al.
9. See Ben Christie, Tweaked Beans Do Not Faze the Farmers of Argentina, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at 34.
10. See Peter N. Spotts, The Brave New World of Biotechnology and Beyond,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 28, 1999, at 17.
11. See David Nicholson-Lord, GM Foods: The Natural Result of Genetic Change,
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 12, 1999, features section; Andrew Pollack, We Can Engi-
neer Nature. But Should We?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 16.
12. See Robert C. Cowen, New Findings Say Genetically Altered Corn Can Poison the
Soil, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Dec. 2, 1999, at 2; Paul Brown, From Gung-ho to Accep-
tance of Legitimate Concerns, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 28, 2000, at 6.
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when American farms began shipping biotechnology crops to Europe, to
about $1 billion in 1999.13 While European regulators have not ap-
proved any new GM seed strains for nearly two years, "[pilanting, im-
porting or selling genetically altered seeds or foods has virtually
stopped, because farmers will not plant the seeds, consumers will not
buy the foods, and stores decline to stock them."14
A major controversy was sparked when scientist Arpad Pusztai, at
Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen, Scotland, reported on British
television that transgenic potatoes damaged the health of rats by stunt-
ing their growth and injuring their immune systems. 5 He was fired
and silenced. Subsequently, however, the British medical journal, The
Lancet, published a peer-reviewed paper co-authored by Pusztai in
which he repeated the finding. 6 According to polls, only one percent of
Britons think that there is any value in GM plants, and ingredients
from these plants are called "Frankenstein food" by several British
newspapers. 7 It is ironic that at a kitchen at Monsanto's Britain fac-
tory only GM-free meals are served. 8 Bowing to consumer concern,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote in late February 2000:
There is no doubt that there is potential for harm, both in terms of
human safety and in the diversity of our environment, from GM foods
and crops. It's why the protection of the public and the environment is,
and will remain the Government's over-riding priority.
Testing [of GM food ingredients] has been tightened by this govern-
ment even further. I can promise that no GM food will be put on the
market here without going through the most rigorous safety assess-
ments in the world.
We also recognize the genuine fears over the impact of GM crops on
13. See David Barboza, In the Heartland, Genetic Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2000, at C6.
14. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Protests on New Genes and Seeds Grow More Passionate in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at Al.
15. For a short report, see Joel Bleifuss, No Small (Genetic) Potatoes; A British Re-
searcher Raises Doubts About Genetically Engineered Food, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 10,
2000, at 2.
16. See id. See also Geoffrey Lean, Exposed: Blair's Hypocrisy Over GM,
INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 5, 2000, at 13 ("The [British] Government has also refused
to repeat research by Dr. Arpad Pusztai, which suggested that eating GM potatoes dam-
aged the health of rats, even though it was financed by the official bodies in the first
place.")
17. See McNeil. Jr., supra note 14; Warren Hoge, Britons Skirmish Over Genetically
Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at A3. "A new MORI poll says 79 percent of
the British public think that genetically modified crop testing.., should be stopped. Ma-
jor food manufacturers, supermarkets and fast food chains have already announced the
removal of all genetically modified ingredients from their products sold in Britain." Id.
18. See Michael Mccarthy, GM Food Banned in Monsanto Canteen, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 22, 1999, at 7.
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our environment and wildlife. That is why no GM crops will be grown
commercially in this country until we are satisfied there will be no un-
acceptable impact on the environment.
We have insisted that products containing GM foods on shop shelves
have to be labeled. And anyone eating in a restaurant has a legal right
now to ask whether the food they serve contains GM ingredients. And
we are leading the fight to have labeling extended in Europe.
' 9
The Minister for the Cabinet Office in Britain, Mo Mowlam, had
earlier said in December 1999 that in 2000, the government would an-
nounce new rules on labeling of additives and flavorings as well.2 0 In
Wales, there has been a movement toward declaring that region of
Britain a GM-free zone.2 ' Because of the backlash against GM crops,
the biotechnology industry is unable to find enough British farmers
willing to grow GM crops even for a trial period. 2
The concern has now spread beyond Europe to many other coun-
tries. For example, the Washington Post reported in January 2000 that
in Japan,
[i]n the five months since the labeling requirement was announced, a
major supermarket chain has started identifying its genetically modi-
fied products. The Asahi and Kirin Beer Companies said they will
switch entirely to non-genetically modified ingredients. And Japanese
soybean farmers, who do not use any genetically modified seeds, are
enjoying a huge demand for their beans--even at three to four times
the price of imported American ones.2
In Canada, McCain Foods, Ltd., a major potato producer and a
leading supplier of French fries to Burger King, says that it will not use
gene-altered potatoes. ' Similar developments have occurred in several
other countries, including Brazil, 5 Mexico2 and South Korea.
19. Tony Blair, The Key to GM is Its Potential, Both for Harm and Good,
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 27, 2000, at 28.
20. See Martha Linden, Mowlam Promises Tougher GM Rules, INDEPENDENT (Lon-
don), Dec. 18, 1999, at 11.
21. Fran Abrams, Wales Set to Throw GM Policy Into Chaos, INDEPENDENT (London),
Mar. 13, 2000, at 5.
22. See Paul Brown, et al., U-Turn By Blair on GM Food, GUARDIAN (London), Feb.
28, 2000, at 1.
23. Kathryn Tolbert, In Japan, It's Back to Nature; Consumers Add Non-Modified
Products to Shopping Carts, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2000, at A8. See also Takehiko No-
mura, Japanese Press For Labels on Their Tempered Tofu, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
25, 1999, at 7; Melody Petersen, New Trade Threat for U.S. Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1999, §1, at 1.
24. See Barboza, supra note 13, at C6.
25. See Jack Epstein, Brazilians Boil Over Ban on Altered Beans, CHRISTIAN SCI.
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A major controversial issue is whether genetically modified foods
are "substantially equivalent" to their natural counterparts. The con-
cept of "substantial equivalence" is the basis for US regulators not to
treat such food differently from conventional food. Critics, however, ar-
gue that a GM food's being chemically similar to a conventional food "is
not adequate evidence that it is safe for human consumption."2 They
contend that, while this "approach might seem plausible and attrac-
tively simple... it is misguided, and should be abandoned in favor of
one that includes biological, toxicological and immunological tests
rather than merely chemical ones."29
The concept of substantial equivalence has never been properly de-
fined; the degree of difference between a natural food and its GM alter-
native before its "substance" ceases to be acceptably "equivalent" is not
defined anywhere, nor has an exact definition been agreed by legisla-
tors. It is exactly this vagueness that makes the concept useful to in-
dustry but unacceptable to the consumer. Moreover, "the reliance by
policymakers on the concept of substantial equivalence acts as a barrier
to further research into the possible risks of eating GM foods."30
At an international conference on genetically modified crops in late
February 2000, held in Edinburgh, Scotland, under sponsorship of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and funded
by the British government, there was a clash of views on the safety of
GM foods.31 At the conference the assumption of "substantial equiva-
lence," as employed by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
testing GM foods and thus allowing speedy commercialization of GM
crops throughout the United States, was challenged by an FDA scien-
tist, Dr. Linda Kahl. In a memo, she said, "The process[es] of genetic
engineering and traditional breeding are different, and according to the
technical experts in the [FDA], they lead to different risks."32
The concern with potential risks of GM foods has spread to the
United States, as well. Some food and beverage companies and several
grocery chains have decided not to carry GM foods. To illustrate, Ger-
ber and Heinz baby foods have announced that they will not use geneti-
MONITOR, Aug. 25, 1999, at 1 (In June 1999, a federal judge banned sales of Monsanto's
Roundup Ready soybean seeds until the government sets biosafety rules). Australia and
Singapore have also begun regulating GMOs. See Id.
26. See Petersen, supra note 23, at 1.
27. Id.
28. Erik Millstone, Eric Brunner & Sue Mayer, Beyond 'Substantial Equivalence,' 401
NATURE 525 (Oct. 7, 1999).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Michela Wrong, Differences Widen on Use of Modified Foods, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 29, 2000, at 14.
32. Quoted in Jack O'Sullivan, US "Covered Up Warnings from Its Scientists on Dan-
gers of GM Foods," INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 29, 2000, at 2.
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cally altered corn or soy ingredients because of public concern about
safety.' In January 2000, Frito-Lay, Inc., told the farmers who grow
the corn used in its snack foods not to use genetically engineered seed
for this year's planting.' Whole Foods Markets, a chain of 104 natural
foods supermarkets, has committed itself to not using GM ingredients
in its Whole Foods brand or private label products.35 Over 30 farm
groups across the country have warned their members that planting
GM crops might be risky to their livelihoods because of the unpopular-
ity of such crops with consumers, and because farmers could be vulner-
able to "massive liability" from damage caused by the spread of biologi-
cally modified pollens.36 A study by the American Corn Growers
Association published in February, 2000, showed a sixteen percent drop
in sowings of GM maize across the US Midwest. 7
The battle against GM crops has, however, apparently led Mon-
santo to renounce the use of "terminator" genes in their plants, by
which the next generation of seeds is rendered infertile, thus preventing
farmers from saving seeds from year to year.38 In mid-December 1999,
several plaintiffs, five farmers in the US and one in France, filed a
class-action lawsuit in US district court in Washington against Mon-
santo.39 They alleged fraud and violations of US anti-trust laws, claim-
ing that the defendant had: (1) defrauded them by telling them that GM
33. See Alex Salkever, Are These New Bio-Crops Safe?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 5, 1999, at 3; Laurent Belsie, New Genes Meet a Wary Market, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 8, 1999, at 1; Eating Well: What Labels Don't Tell You (Yet), N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter Eating Well]. A leading brand of baby food, Earth's Best, a
division of the Hain Food Group, also announced in January 2000 that it would not use
GM ingredients. See Florence Fabricant, Food Stuff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at F2.
See also David Barboza, Modified Foods Put Companies in a Quandry, N.Y. Times, Jun. 4,
2000, sec. 1, at 1.
34. See Eating Well, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. See William Claiborne, Biotech Crops Spur Warning; 30 Farm Groups Say Con-
sumer Backlash Could Cost Markets, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1999, at All.
37. See Michela Wrong, Modified Crop Sowings to Fall, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 23,
2000, at 6 (In late March 2000, the U.S. Department of Agriculture released a survey
showing that "biotech corn planting could be down 24 percent from a year ago and soya-
beans could be down 9 percent); David Barboza, Farmers are Scaling Back Genetically
Altered Crops, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 1, 2000, at 5.
38. See generally James Erlichman, GM Foods: Fighting for the Future of Our Food,
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 12, 1999, from Features section; John Vidal, The Seeds of
Wrath; Thousands Will Demonstrate Today at a Meeting of the Leading Economic Powers,
GUARDIAN (London), Weekend Page, June 19, 1999, at 10; Ending a Genetic Food Fight,
Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 28, 1999, at 20.
39. See John Schwartz, 6 Farmers in Class Action vs. Monsanto; Lawsuit Questions
the Company's Testing of Genetically Modified Seeds, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1999, at El;
Henry Miller, The Unexpected Arm of the Bio-Police, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 1999,
at 10; Scott Kilman, Monsanto is Sued Over Genetically Altered Crops, WALL. ST. J., Dec.
15, 1999, at A3.
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seeds were safe and that the public would accept GM crops, because the
company should have known that adequate standards of testing do not
exist in any state and hence such safety could not be assured; and had
(2) conspired to monopolize the world's market for GM agriculture by
patenting genes and requiring that farmers "license" their seeds instead
of buying them outright. Earlier, in May 1998, the Alliance for Bio-
Integrity filed a lawsuit against the FDA seeking mandatory safety
testing and labeling of all GM foods. The plaintiff alleged that current
FDA policy, under which GM foods are authorized to be marketed with-
out testing and labels, violates the Agency's statutory mandate to pro-
tect public health and to provide consumers with relevant information
about the foods they eat.40
Finally, shareholders of several corporations have called for share-
holder votes to halt the development and sale of GM food and crops un-
til they are tested on a long-term basis and are shown to be safe to both
humans and the environment.41
40. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, Landmark Lawsuit Challenges FDA Policy on Geneti-
cally Engineered Food, Press Rel., (visited 3/27/00) <http://www.biointegrity.org> (copy on
file with the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy). See also Alliance for Bio-
Integrity, Statement of Steven M. Druker, Lawsuit Uncovers Disagreement Within FDA
Over Safety of Biotech Foods (visited March 27, 2000) <http://www.biointegrit.or>:
The FDA's records reveal it declared genetically engineered foods to be safe
in the face of broad disagreement from its own experts-all the while claim-
ing a broad scientific consensus supported its stance. Internal reports and
memoranda disclose: (1) agency scientists repeatedly cautioned that foods
produced through recombinant DNA technology entail different risks than do
their conventionally produced counterparts and (2) that this input was con-
sistently disregarded by the bureaucrats who crafted the agency's current
policy, which treats bioengineered foods the same as natural ones.
Id. In October 2000, a federal judge upheld the Food and Drug Administration's policy on
genetically modified food, dismissing the lawsuit, stating that the government did not
have to follow procedures for public notice and comment or file an environmental impact
statement because there has been no formal regulation announced by the agency. See
Andrew Pollack, Judge Upholds F.D.A. Policy on Genetically Altered Foods, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 2000, at C18.
41. See Mary Dejevsky, Big US Firms Face Investors' Revolt Over GM Foods,
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 15, 2000, at 13.
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III. THE U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK42
A. Introduction
The United States has no special laws that specifically apply to GM
foods. The biotech approval process involves three departments: the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However,
biotech companies are only required to consult the FDA as they bring
new biotech products to market, so long as the added genes do not sub-
stantially change the nature of the foods. Labeling is also not required.
Environmental groups and consumer activists demand that extraordi-
nary steps be taken to ensure the safety of GM food, since the technol-
ogy is totally novel and is practically transforming our food supplies.
Unlike several states that apply process-oriented approaches,
thereby implementing new biotechnology laws to regulate GMO re-
leases,43 the US regulates GMOs under already-existing statutes. For a
decade since the mid-1970s, the National Institute of Health (NIH) was
primarily responsible to ensure genetic engineering safety and hence
established guidelines for research involving recombinant DNA in
1976." Subsequently, in 1986, the Coordinated Framework for Regula-
tion of Biotechnology was issued by the Office of Science Technology
Policy,45 prescribing jurisdiction over biotechnology regulation among
several federal agencies. Under the Framework several general princi-
ples apply: (1) existing laws are to regulate biotechnology;46 (2) the
products of biotechnology and not the process are to be regulated; 7 (3)
the safety of a biotechnology product is to be determined on a case-by-
case basis;4" and (4) a coordinated effort is to be undertaken between all
the agencies involved in regulating biotechnology.
49
The following discussion will address the roles of major agencies in-
42. For a thorough review, see T. Morath, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.
Regulation of Products Derived from Biotechnology (1998) [hereinafter Morath]. See also
Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, Policy In Flux: The European Union's Laws on
Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
243, 248-52 (1999); Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and Into the Field: Harmonization of De-
liberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
1160 (1993).
43. See Kim, supra note 42, at 1169-77.
44. For a discussion of NIH's role, see id. at 1178-79.
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cluding the EPA, USDA and FDA in regulating biotechnology. The sec-
tion will conclude with a case holding that a mandatory law may be un-
constitutional.
B. The Environmental Protection Agency
The current procedure calls for the EPA to approve pesticides de-
rived from biotechnology and bioengineered plants that contain Bacillus
thuringiensis ("Bt"), which is toxic to certain maize pests.50 Two stat-
utes are applicable to regulating the release of GMOs-the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)5" and the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).52 Under the former, a manufac-
turer is required to register a pesticide, including plants with pesticidal
qualities, with the EPA before selling it in the US market.53 The EPA
performs two main regulatory functions. First it establishes maximum
tolerance levels for pesticide residues in foods. Second, before new mi-
croorganisms, which include intergeneric organisms derived through
biotechnology, can be manufactured or imported, the EPA must be noti-
fied in accordance with the Toxic Substances Control Act.5
Because of the rising concern over the safety of biotech crops, the
EPA responded to the Cornell laboratory study showing that GM pollen
could kill monarch butterfly caterpillars by announcing new regulations
to take effect in the spring of 2000. These new regulations, inter alia,
ask farmers "to voluntarily protect butterflies by planting traditional
corn around the edges of Bt corn fields. That would create a buffer to
prevent toxic pollen from blowing into butterfly habitats."55 It also re-
quired farmers to plant at least 20 percent of their crops as non-Bt corn.
The purpose of this requirement is to slow the evolution of resistance to
the Bt toxin, a natural insecticide available to organic farmers."'
C. The U.S. Department of Agriculture
The USDA's regulation of the release of GMOs is done under its
50. See Morath, supra note 42, at 1; Novartis Seeds-Approval of a Pesticide Product
Registration, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,935, 43,935 (1999).
51. 7 U.S.C. §§1 3 6-13 6y.
52. 21 U.S.C. §§301-395.
53. See Morath, supra note 42, at 1. According to a draft notice published August 9,
2000 (65 Fed. Reg. 48,701(2000)), the EPA is expected to issue a final rule classifying the
agency's procedure of regulating genetically engineered plant pesticides while exempting
from federal oversight traditional plant breeding. EPA to Make Final "Core Components"
of Regulation Covering Transgenic Plants, 23 Int'l Env. Rep. (BNA), Curr. Rep., Aug. 16,
2000, at 644.
54. 15 U.S.C. §2603(d).
55. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, E.P.A. Announces New Rules on Genetically Altered Corn,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2000, at A13.
56. See id.
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Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS), insofar as the
GMOs are genetically engineered microorganisms derived from plant
pests." Those developing a new GMO plant must submit a petition to
APHIS showing that, based upon field trials, the plant is safe and poses
no risks as a plant pest. 8 APHIS's task is to conduct an environmental
assessment to determine the GMO's possible effects on human health
and the environment.59
APHIS will issue a "determination of non-regulated status" if it
finds that the GMO is not a plant pest.60 Then, the GMO may be re-
leased into the environment, that is, planted. From 1992 to 1998
APHIS provided non-regulated status to 36 genetically modified
plants. 1
In March 2000, the Department of Agriculture proposed strict rules
prohibiting the use of GM ingredients in products carrying the organic
label. The new rules, which could take effect by the end of 2000, ad-
dress concerns about the use of three processes, genetic engineering,
sewage sludge, and irradiation, in the production of food products that
", 62are labeled "organic. This revision of the 1995 USDA rules would
have established a nationwide certification program for organic foods.
Presently, in order for raw products to be considered one hundred per-
cent organic, "they must be grown or manufactured without added hor-
mones, pesticides or synthetic fertilizers.'
D. The Food and Drug Administration
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorizes the FDA to
ensure the safety of most foods, which includes foods derived through
biotechnology. ' It requires that new additives in food be demonstrated
safe through standard scientific testing prior to their marketing.6
However, biotech companies producing GM foods need not obtain ap-
57. See Morath, supra note 42, at 1 (APHIS' authority is under Federal Plant Pest
Act (7 U.S.C. §§150aa-150jj) and the Plant Quarantine Act (7 U.S.C. §§151-167)).
58. See Morath, supra note 42, at 5.
59. See id. at 4.
60. See id. at 1.
61. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.D.A., Crop Lines No Longer
Regulated by USDA, (visited March 27, 2000) <http:/ www.aphis.usda.dov/biotech/not
reg.html>, cited in Stewart & Johanson, supra note 42, at 250 n.38.
62. See New Rules on Organic Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at A28.
63. Id. See also Strict Rules to Limit Genetic Engineering on Organic Foods, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at 1 ("The [new rules] indicate an about-face in the agency's attitude
on organic farming and represent one of several steps it is taking to help small and me-
dium-sized farmers, who have received comparatively little attention from the agency for
decades.")
64. 21 U.S.C. §§301-395.
65. See id. §321.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
proval from the FDA to introduce such foods into the US market, and
no prior testing is required, as the FDA considers them sufficiently
similar to conventional foods, and they are thus "generally recognized
as safe." Hence, the FDA does not regulate GMOs differently than their
conventional counterparts. However, companies do usually consult the
FDA before marketing their products, and the FDA has issued guide-
lines to assist the companies in this regard." If it is discovered through
consultations that a new product raises health concerns, the FDA may
require under the FFDCA that a pre-market review be performed.67
Those introducing the food product into the market are under a legal
obligation to ensure that the food is safe.' Thus the responsibility for
ensuring food safety is on the producer, who could be criminally liable
for introducing an unsafe food into the marketplace.69 The FDA could
also stop the food's distribution if it is proven unsafe.
Since the US considers GM foods to be substantially equivalent to
those produced through traditional breeding methods,"0 no labeling is
required for GM foods. There could be exceptions, however, when a GM
food product has a significantly different nutritional content or if it
might pose a health risk.7 One example would be where a GM food
product contained a protein derived from a peanut, in which event the
FDA might require labeling to warn consumers who are allergic to pea-
nuts that the product contains such proteins.7'
On the subject of GMO food safety, however, in late 1999, the FDA
decided to hold public meetings. At the first, hearing held in November
1999, both proponents and opponents were vocal in advocating their re-
spective positions,7' the former claiming that the FDA had done an ex-
emplary job in approving GM food and crops in the US as safe, and the
latter arguing that the release of GMOs into the environment poses
risks that are "potentially irreversible, untraceable and uncontrolla-
ble."74 Also in November, Rep. Dennis Kucinich and several co-sponsors
introduced a bill in the U.S. House, the "Genetically Engineered Food
Right to Know Act," specifically citing as one of its threshold findings
that "Federal agencies have failed to uphold Congressional intent by al-
lowing genetically engineered foods to be marketed, sold and otherwise
66. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984, 22,984.
67. Id. at 22,987-22,989.
68. Id. at 22,988.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 22,991.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See generally David Barboza, 2 Sides Square Off on Genetically Altered Food, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A30.
74. Id.
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used without labeling that reveals material facts to the public."75 Sen.
Barbara Boxer introduced the Senate version in February 2000,76 and
Rep. Kucinich introduced a new House bill, the "Genetically Engineered
Food Safety Act."77 This new piece of legislation refers to the failure of
federal agencies to uphold congressional intent of the Food Additives
Amendment of 1958 by allowing genetically engineered foods to be
marketed, sold and otherwise used without requiring pre-market safety
testing addressing their unique characteristics."8
In some states, such as Colorado and Oregon, citizens' initiatives for
state laws on the subject of mandatory labeling have been undertaken.
On May 3, 2000, the FDA announced that it would strengthen its poli-
cies regarding GM foods and would develop guidelines for companies
that want to label such foods." Biotech companies will henceforth be
required to give a four-month advance notice to the FDA before market-
ing new GM food, providing the agency and the public with the research
finding ensuring the new food's safety.80 Food producers could now vol-
untarily label food as free of gene-altered ingredients."
In the Fall of 2000, the FDA confirmed the presence of unapproved ge-
netically engineered corn in some grocery taco shells and announced
plans to begin testing other corn-based products as well for contamina-
tion.82 Aventis CropScience, S.A., the developer of the corn, known as
StarLink, which was approved in 1998 for use as animal feed but not
for human consumption because of concerns that it might cause allergic
reactions, agreed to voluntarily cancel its marketing license "at the
strong urging" of the EPA, according to the agency.83 Kraft Foods was
75. H.R. 3377, 106th Congress, 1st Session, Nov. 16, 1999, Sec. 2, para. (3).
76. S. 2080, 106th Congress, 2d Session, Feb. 22, 2000.
77. H.R. 3883, 106th Congress, 2d Session, Mar. 9, 2000.
78. Id., Sec. 2, para. 7.
79. See Proposed Collection and Comment Request at 65 FED. REG. 25491, May 2,
2000. See also Melody Petersen, U.S. to Keep Closer Watch on Genetically Altered Crops,
N.Y. Times, May 4, 2000, at A23, col. 5.
80. See John Dillin, White House Enters the Biotech Food Fight, Christian Science
Monitor, May 5, 2000, at 1; Rick Weiss, U.S. to Add Oversight on Biotech Food, Wash.
Post, May 3, 2000, at Al.
81. See Weiss, supra, note 75; Andrew Kimbrell, The F.D.A. Chickens Out, N.Y.
Times, May 8, 2000, at A23, col. 2.
82. See generally Nikki Tait, Taco shell recall puts biotech product testing under
strain: Consumers reacted calmly to evidence of an unapproved corn but the episode
raises important questions, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 11, 2000, at 14. See also Marc
Kaufman, FDA Will Widen Probe of Biotech Corn Misuse, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 2000, at
813.
83. See Andrew Pollack, Aventis Gives Up License to Sell Biotech Corn, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 2000, at C5; Firm Agrees to Withdraw Biotech Corn; EPA Had Sought Removal
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
prompted to recall over 2.5 million boxes of shells sold under the "Taco
Bell" brand.'
E. A Vermont Case Holds That a Mandatory Labeling Law May Be
Unconstitutional
In Vermont a group of trade associations challenged the state's
1994 law mandating the labeling of milk and milk products from cattle
treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin (r-BST) a drug produced
through recombinant DNA technology to increase cows' milk produc-
tion. 85 The purpose of the law was to protect the interest of consumers
who have a "right to know" about the foods they consume.8 The FDA
had determined that milk obtained from cows treated with r-BST posed
no threats to human health. The challenge to the law was based on the
rationale that the right of those dairy producers "not to speak," i.e., not
to label, is protected under the First Amendment. The district court
held that Vermont had a substantial interest in informing consumers of
the use of r-BST in dairy products sold in the state." On appeal, the
Second Circuit overturned the lower court, stating that the "dairy
manufacturers' constitutional right not to speak is a serious one" and
that Vermont's law "requires them to speak when they would rather
not."88 It further said that, in a commercial context, "consumer curiosity
alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of
even an accurate, factual statement,"8 and since Vermont had demon-
strated "no cognizable harms," it held that the statute would likely be
found unconstitutional and remanded the case for injunction.90
IV. THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL
A. Events Leading Up To The Biosafety Protocol
After five years of informal discussions and negotiations, represen-
tatives from over 130 states met in Montreal, Canada, from February
24 to 29, 2000, and finalized the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
from Market After Latest Discovery in Taco Shells, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 2000, at A13.
84. See Andrew Pollack, Kraft Recalls Taco Shells With Bioengineered Corn, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 2000, at Cl; Barnaby J. Feder, Companies Act to Keep Bioengineered
Corn Out of Food, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2000, at C2; Marc Kaufman, Biotech Corn Fuels a
Recall; Unapproved Variety Used in Taco Shells, Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 2000, at Al.
85. International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F.Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1995).
86. Id. at 248-49.
87. Id. at 253-54.
88. International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 74.
90. Id.
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Convention on Biological Diversity.9' The Protocol is aimed at protect-
ing the environment from the potential risks caused by the transbound-
ary transfer of living modified organisms (LMOs), including GMOs, cre-
ated by modern biotechnology. The Biological Diversity Convention '
and Agenda 21, 9' an Action Plan calling for sustained economic growth
through international cooperation, both adopted at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (the "Earth
Summit") in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, address safety issues concern-
ing GMOs.
Although there are several related articles in the Biological Diver-
sity Convention, which call for the signatories to either share technolo-
gies or provide remuneration as reparations to a developing country for
genetic materials taken out of such country, the one specifically appli-
cable to safety issues is article 19.95 The debate around article 19 cen-
tered on whether biotechnology as a process should be regulated. The
US objected to the proposed regulation of biotechnology, contending
that as a process it was not a threat to biological diversity. Article
19(4), as a compromise, obligates each party:
directly or by requiring any natural or legal person under its jurisdic-
tion... [to] provide any available information about the use and safety
regulations required by that Contracting Party in handling such organ-
isms, as well as any available information on the potential adverse im-
pact of the specific organisms concerned to the Contracting Party into
which those organisms are to be introduced."
In addition, Article 19(3) calls upon the parties to consider the need
for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures. In
particular, advanced informed agreement, in the field of the safe trans-
fer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from
biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity."
Regarding the introduction of living modified organisms, the Con-
vention obligates each party, as far as possible and appropriate to,
91. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2.
92. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biological Diversity Convention].
93. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1, at 12 (1993).
94. See, Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 92, arts. 16, 20, 21.
95. See id. art. 19 (paragraphs (1) and (2) address the participation of the developing
countries in biotechnological research and access to such countries "on a fair and equita-
ble basis" to the "benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources pro-
vided by" them. These, however, will not be discussed here.
96. See id. art. 19(4).
97. See id. art. 19(3).
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[elstablish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks
associated with the use and release of living modified organisms result-
ing from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental
impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health.98
The United States, however, did not sign the Convention, contend-
ing that the text was "seriously flawed in a number of important as-
pects."" The US found "particularly unsatisfactory the text's treatment
of... technology transfer and bio-technology.""°
Chapter 16 of Agenda 21 entitled "Environmentally Sound Man-
agement of Biotechnology," states that Agenda 21's goal is to foster in-
ternational principles for the environmental management of biotechnol-
ogy and to promote sustainable applications of biotechnology. 10' Among
other chapters, chapter 14 provides for the sharing of research and
plant genetic resources among nations."°' Chapter 15 aims at improving
the conservation of biological diversity and supporting the Biodiversity
Treaty. 3 Finally, Chapter 19 addresses the issue of risk management
of toxic chemicals and may also apply to certain biopesticides and other
hazardous products of biotechnology."
It was pursuant to the Article 19(3) mandate of the Biodiversity
Convention that the discussions on the drafting of a Protocol had begun.
Thus, although between July 1996 and February 1999 the ad hoc work-
ing group on biosafety, established by the parties to the Convention,
had held six meetings,' a final consensus on all points had not been
reached on the draft at the earlier session of the parties, which met in
Cartagena, Colombia, from February 22-24, 1999. Since the Cartagena
session had been convened before the negotiations on the draft text of
the Protocol could be concluded," it ended in an impasse. Several
groups presented proposals at the session, including the European Un-
98. Id. art. 8(g).
99. Declaration of the United States of America, attached to the Nairobi Final Act,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 842, 848, para. 3 (1993).
100. Id. para. 4.
101. See Agenda 21, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), ch. 16, at 218 (1993). The
final program areas in biotechnology include establishing enabling mechanisms for the
development of and the environmentally sound application of biotechnology. Id.
102. Id. ch. 14.57(d), at 195: "To take appropriate measures for the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits and results of research and development in plant breeding between
sources and users of plant genetic resources."
103. Id. ch. 15, at 210.
104. Id. ch. 19, at 315.
105. UNEP, Convention on Biological Diversity, Conference of the Parties to the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, Draft Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/L.2/Rev. 1, para. 28, Feb. 23, 1999
[hereinafter Cartagena Report].
106. Id. para. 22.
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ion,'°7 the Miami Group, 10 8 and the third on behalf of the "like-minded
group of countries."'09 The meeting adjourned, deferring the solution for
the next meeting in Montreal. " '
The period between the Cartagena meeting and the resumed ses-
sion in Montreal provided members with an opportunity to continue in-
formal discussions. Although there was concern that the Montreal ne-
gotiations might also collapse, meeting a similar fate as those at
Cartagena, the Montreal session succeeded with the parties reaching an
agreement, to the surprise of many negotiators."' As The Economist
reported, while the Cartagena session had failed because of the opposi-
tion of the Miami Group, "the softening-up process that has occurred
during the past eleven months-the consumer and producer revolt, and
the vacillation about the technology by the purveyors themselves, seems
to have made these countries more amenable to a deal.""'
B. Content and Analysis
The Biosafety Protocol reflects the commitment of the international
community to provide for safety in biotechnology and is, indeed, a his-
toric attempt to reconcile economic and trade policies with environ-
mental concerns. It incorporates the precautionary principle in the
process of decision-making, and underscores the need to enhance the
capacity building of the developing states to ensure biotechnology
safety.
The Protocol establishes that strict "Advanced Informed Agree-
ment" procedures be applied to LMOs, including seeds, plants, live fish
and other organisms, that are to be intentionally introduced into the
environment. The exporter in these cases is required to provide de-
tailed information to each importing country in advance of the first
shipment, and the importer must then authorize the shipment. This
procedure is designed to ensure that recipient countries have both the
opportunity and the capacity to assess risks pertaining to the products
of modern biotechnology.13 However, this procedure does not apply to
the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs if they are "not likely
107. Id. Annex II.
108. Id. Annex III.
109. Id. Annex IV.
110. For the contents of the Draft Protocol on Biosafety, see id. Annex to decision EM-
1/3.
111. See Edward Alden, Greens and Free-Traders Join to Cheer GM Crop Deal, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 2000, at 11; Pollack, supra note 8; John Burgess, Trade Rules
Set on Food Genetics; Compromise Gained on Labeling Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2000,
at Al.
112. A Conventional Argument, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 95.
113. See Biodiversity Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 7-16; 25-26.
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to have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical diversity, taking also into account risks to human health."
14
The Protocol, however, applies to neither pharmaceuticals," 5 nor to
commodities such as soybeans or maize, intended for direct use as food,
feed, or processing. 6 These were among the contentious issues pri-
marily responsible for the failure of the Cartagena meeting to reach an
accord on the Biosafety Protocol. The United States, although not a
party to the Convention on Biological Diversity and hence not an official
participant at the Cartagena and Montreal meetings, expressed its con-
cerns through its allies in the Miami Group, and was the major oppo-
nent of any regulation pertaining to food commodities and pharmaceu-
ticals in the proposed Protocol.
The procedure calls for a party that decides to place on the market
an LMO commodity "that may be subject to a transboundary movement
for direct use as food or feed, or for processing," to inform the parties
through the Biosafety Clearinghouse."' The Biosafety Clearinghouse is
established under the Protocol to:
(a) Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and
legal information on, and experience with, living modified organisms;
and
(b) Assist parties to implement the Protocol, taking into account the
special needs of developing country Parities, in particular the least de-
veloped and small island developing States among them, and countries
with economies in transition as well as countries that are centers of
origin and centers of genetic diversity." s
Another contentious issue on which a compromise was eventually
reached was the labeling of any commodity shipment containing GMOs.
The European Union and developing countries sought provisions for
clear labeling by exporters of any shipment of commodities containing
GMOs. To illustrate, at the Cartagena meeting, the European Union
had submitted its proposal under which an exporter would be required
to clearly indicate as Living Modified Organisms commodities "intended
for direct use as food, feed or processing.""9 The United States and
other exporting countries had claimed that such labeling would be im-
possible for bulk commodity shipments where grain is mixed from many
114. Id. art. 7(4).
115. Id. art. 5: "[Tlhis Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement of liv-
ing modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed by
other relevant international agreements or organizations."
116. Id. art. 11.
117. Id. art. 11(1); Annex II (information required to be given under article 11).
118. Id. art. 20(1).
119. Cartagena Report, supra note 105, Annex II, para. 2(2)(c).
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different sources.
12 0
As it stands, Article 18, paragraph 2(a) now reads:
Each Party shall take measures to require that documentation accom-
panying:
a) Living modified organisms that are intended for direct use as food or
feed, or for processing, clearly identifies that they "may contain" living
modified organisms and are not intended for intentional introduction
into the environment, as well as a contact point for further informa-
tion. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par-
ties to this Protocol shall take a decision on the detailed requirements
for this purpose, including specification of their identity and any
unique identification, no later than two years after the date of entry
into force of this Protocol.'2'
Thus, there is no specific identification required of the type or na-
ture of GMOs and there is a two- year period following the Protocol's
ratification by fifty states when it will enter into force, 22 before any fur-
ther action can be taken regarding the commodities.
Article 7 of the Protocol exempts "living modified organisms in-
tended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing" from the advance
informed agreement procedure." States are to develop their own na-
tional regimes.
12
Another contentious issue regards the incorporation of the precau-
tionary principle in the Protocol, embodied as Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development'2 at the 1992 Earth
Summit. Calling for wide application of the precautionary approach,
the Principle adds that where there is a threat of "serious or irreversi-
ble damage, lack of full certainty shall not be used as a reason for post-
poning cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion."' 26  At Cartagena, the Miami Group took the position that
reference to the precautionary approach in the Protocol must be simply
noted, rather than that the Protocol state in its objective that it is in ac-
cordance with the precautionary approach. 27 In addition, the Group
120. See Alden, supra note 111.
121. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2, art. 18(2)(a). See also id. paras. 87-88 for a re-
port on the parties' adoption of the above paragraph as an amendment.
122. Id. art. 37.
123. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
124. See id. arts. 10-16; 25-26.
125. UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1993)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
126. See, Rio Declaration, supra note 125, principal 15.
127. Cartagena Report, supra note 105, Annex III, para. 4(a).
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wanted to delete any reference to the precautionary approach from the
decision procedure.12
The Miami Group was unsuccessful in its attempt. The Protocol
reaffirms the precautionary approach in its preamble and retains the
language: "[iun accordance with the precautionary approach contained
in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment..., the objective of this Protocol is ... ,,129 Furthermore, the lan-
guage contained in the decision procedure is unequivocal:
[1]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific in-
formation and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse
effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustain-
able use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into
account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from tak-
ing a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living
modified organism in question ... in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects.
30
The same language is also used pertaining to the procedure for LMOs
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing.13
Finally, the question of the relationship between the Protocol and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) was resolved by noting in the
preamble that the Protocol would not be subordinate "to other interna-
tional agreements," which in this context, meant primarily the WTO.
The point of contention was that under trade rules it was not the pre-
cautionary approach but certain scientific evidence that would deter-
mine if an importing country could block the shipment of a GMO. To
illustrate the applicable law, the Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures requires that measures that are un-
dertaken by an importing country and designed to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life, must be scientifically supported and verifiable.1 32 It
may be recalled that at the WTO meeting in Seattle in the fall of
1999,1n no decision could be taken about the regulation of biotechnology
under the WTO processes.
The Protocol provides for risk assessment" and risk manage-
ment.13 5 The Biosafety Clearinghouse is designed to assist parties in
128. Id. para. 4(b)
129. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1.
130. Id. art. 10(6).
131. See id. art. 11(8).
132. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures, GATT Doc.
M.T.N./FA II-A1A-4, art. 2.2 (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 69, 70 (1995).
133. On the Seattle meeting, see, e.g., Ved Nanda, Battle in Seattle, DENVER POST,
Nov. 30, 1999, at llB.
134. Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2, art. 15; Annex III.
135. Id. art. 16.
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implementing the Protocol, with special attention to the needs of devel-
oping countries. 136 Special provisions address capacity-building of de-
veloping countries, including appropriate scientific and technical train-
ing; risk assessment and risk management for biosafety; and the
enhancement of technological and institutional capacities in biosafety.'
3 7
The importing country may make its decision by taking into account
"socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of living modi-
fied organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological di-
versity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to in-
digenous and local communities."'3 8 As to liability and redress for
damage resulting from transboundary movements of LMOs, the Proto-
col postpones any decision to the first meeting of the Conference of the
Parties.19 Every five years the parties are to assess the effectiveness of
the Protocol. 40 The Protocol does not allow any reservations. "'
As the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram, Klaus Topfer, said after the adoption of the Protocol, it "was a
historic event that gave the right signal for future global cooperation." 2
As the first treaty to recognize GMOs as distinctive and apply the pre-
cautionary principle, it certainly is an important step forward in the
development of international environmental law.
V. REGULATION OF GMOs IN EUROPE
A. Introduction
The European Union has undertaken extensive measures to regu-
late GMOs, mainly in response to consumers' concerns with the poten-
tial hazards of GMO foods and crops. In addition, many European
states have unilaterally imposed even more stringent regulations. Four
European laws will be discussed here: Council Directive 90/220/EEC of
April 23, 1990, on the deliberate release of GMOs into the environ-
ment;4 3 Regulation No. 258/97 of January 27, 1997, the Novel Foods
Regulation;' Commission Directive 97/35/EC of June 18, 1997, amend-
ing Annex III of Directive 90/220/EEC, to require the labeling of prod-
136. Id. art. 20(b).
137. Id. art. 22.
138. Id. art. 26.
139. Id. art. 27. The Conference of the Parties is to serve as the meeting of the Parties
to the Biosafety Protocol. Id. art. 29.
140. Id. art. 35.
141. Id. art. 38.
142. See Biosafety Protocol, supra note 2.
143. See generally 1990 O.J. (L 117).
144. See 1997 O.J. (L 43).
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ucts that contain GM~s;45 and Council Regulation No. 1139/98 of May
26, 1998, concerning the compulsory indication of the labeling of certain
foodstuffs produced from GMOs.4 6
B. Council Directive 90/220
In the preamble to Council Directive 90/220, the Council of the
European Communities provided its rationale for prescribing a legal
framework specifically regarding the deliberate release of GMOs: (1) the
need to take preventive action; (2) the potential effects of GMO releases
on the environment which may be irreversible; and (3) the need to ap-
proximate the laws of the member states to ensure that the likely un-
equal conditions of competition or barriers to trade because of disparity
between member states' regulations of products containing GMOs do
not adversely affect the functioning of the Common Market."7 The Di-
rective seeks to provide "a high level of protection throughout the
Community" on health, safety, environmental and consumer protection
and to ensure the safe development of industrial products utilizing
GMOs."4' Thus, the objective of the Directive is to approximate the laws
of the EU member states on the placing into the market of products
containing GMOs that are intended for subsequent release into the en-
vironment.4 9
The Directive obligates each member state to take "appropriate
measures" to avoid adverse effects on human health and the environ-
ment from the deliberate release or placing into the market for the de-
liberate release of GMOs.1' Each member state is to designate the
competent authority responsible for the implementation of the Directive
and to ensure that such authority takes appropriate control measures
for such implementation.1 5' The Directive provides distinct yet similar
norms and procedures regarding the deliberate release of GMOs into
the environment for research and development purposes 152 and for plac-
ing products containing GMOs into the market.'53
145. See Commission Directive 97/35/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 169), June 18, 1997 (it should
be noted that in April 1994, Council Directive 90/200/EEC was amended by Commission
Directive 94/15, 1994 O.J. (L 103), which changed Annex II, "Information Required in the
Notification").
146. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1139/98 of May 26 1998, Concerning the Compulsory
Indication of the Labelling of Certain Foodstuffs Produced From Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms of Particulars Other Than Those Provided For in Directive 79/112/EEC, 1998
O.J. (L 159).
147. See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1994, pmbl.
148. Id.
149. 1990 O.J. (L 117), art. 1.
150. Id. art. 4(1).
151. Id. art. 4(2), (3).
152. Id. arts. 5-9.
153. Id. arts. 10-18.
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Before deliberately releasing a GMO for research purposes, the
person proposing such release must notify the competent national au-
thority within the pertinent territory of the risks involved and the con-
ditions and the environment in which the release is to take place."5 The
competent authority must examine the notification, evaluate the risks
and give its written consent as a prerequisite for release.'55 After com-
pletion of a release, the person is to send to the competent authority the
result of such release regarding any risk to human health or the envi-
ronment. 5 ' The competent authorities are to send to the Commission a
summary of each notification, and the Commission in turn is to forward
these summaries to other member states.157 The competent authorities
are to then inform the other member states and the Commission of the
final decision whether the notification is in compliance with this Direc-
tive, thus allowing the release or rejecting the notification in the event
that the release does not fulfill the Directive's conditions.1
8
The procedure is similar for the deliberate release of a commercial
GMO product. The manufacturer or importer of a GMO is to notify the
competent authorities of the member state where the GMO is to be
placed into the market for the first time. 59 The requirements for such
notification are listed in Annex II."6° A risk assessment must be con-
ducted concerning the possible effects on human health and the envi-
ronment. 16' The notifying party must also provide its "Proposal for La-
beling and Packaging." 62 The competent authority of the member state,
after receiving a notification, is required to examine it for compliance
with the Directive, "giving particular attention to the environmental
risk assessment and the recommended precautions related to the safe
use of the product."'6 The competent authority is also required to for-
ward the dossier to the Commission with a favorable opinion, or reject
the proposed release within 90 days of receiving the notification."M A
release requires written consent by the Commission and the other
member states."
The Commission is then to inform the competent authorities in
154. See id. art. 5(1), (2).
155. See id. art. 6.
156. Id. art. 8.
157. Id. art. 9(1) and (2).
158. Id. art. 9(3); pursuant to art. 6(2) conditions.
159. See id. art. 11(1).
160. See id. Annex II.
161. Id. art. 11(1).
162. Id.
163. Id. art. 12(1).
164. Id. art. 12(2).
165. Id. art. 11(5).
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other member states, forwarding the dossier.'" In case of no objection
from any others, the competent authority that received the original no-
tification is to give its consent for the release, informing the Commis-
sion and other member states.1 67 However, if there is any objection from
the competent authority of another state, the Commission is to submit
the proposed measures to a committee composed of the representatives
of the member states and chaired by the representative of the Commis-
sion."' The Commission is to "adopt the measures.., if they are in ac-
cordance with the opinion of the committee." 6 However, if they are not
in accordance with the opinion of the committee or if no opinion is de-
livered, the Commission is to forward the proposal to the Council, which
will decide by a majority vote.7 ° If the Council does not act within a pe-
riod of three months, the Commission is to adopt the proposed meas-
ures.17 1 If the Commission has taken a favorable decision, the compe-
tent authority that had received the notification is to give its written
consent to the placing of the GMO product and is to inform the other
member states and the Commission that it has done so. 72 After such
written consent the GMO product may be used without further notifica-
tion throughout the EU. 73 No member state of the EU is to "prohibit,
restrict or impede the placing on the market of products containing, or
consisting of, GMOs which comply with the requirements of this Direc-
tive ."
The Directive authorizes provisional restrictions by a member state
on the use and/or sale of GMOs in its territory if there are "justifiable
reasons" to consider that such product "constitutes a risk to human
health or the environment." 75 Finally, intellectual property rights re-
lating to the data received are to be protected by the Commission and
the competent authorities are not to divulge to third parties any confi-
dential information notified or exchanged under this Directive.'76
The Commission decisions approving GMO products for release
pursuant to the procedures prescribed under Directive 90/220 have
caused considerable concern and controversy in member states and in
the European Parliament. 17  There have been several attempts to
166. See id. art. 13(1).
167. Id.
168. Id. arts. 13(3), 21.
169. Id. art. 21.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. art. 13(4).
173. Id. art. 13(5).
174. Id. art. 15.
175. Id. art. 16 (1).
176. Id. art. 19(1).
177. For a discussion of these developments, see Stewart & Johanson, supra note 42, at
259-68.
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strengthen prior prescriptions regarding the release of GMOs and to ex-
tend the scope of European regulations regarding GMOs. A few impor-
tant developments will be noted here.
C. Regulation No. 258/97
On January 27, 1997, the European Union adopted Regulation
Number 258/97. The new regulation applies to GMOs in processed
foods likely to be purchased by consumers. It is aimed at providing a
uniform law for novel foods throughout the European Union. 7 ' The
regulation applies to foods "which have not hitherto been used for hu-
man consumption to a significant degree within the Community, 79 in-
cluding food products containing GMOs within the meaning of the prior
Council Directive 90/220/EEC, food produced by but not containing
GMOs, and foods "with a new or intentionally modified primary molecu-
lar structure. "'"°
The procedure for approval is similar to the one established in the
1990 Council Directive discussed above, insofar as the one seeking to
introduce the novel food into the European Union must submit a re-
quest to the member state in which the product is to be placed into the
market for the first time and also to the Commission. ' The request to
the member state is to specify how the product is to be labeled, 8 2 indi-
cating whether because of the food's characteristics it is no longer
equivalent to an existing food.' Scientific assessment is to determine
whether a food is not equivalent to an existing food, and thus novel."
The purpose is to inform the final consumer through labeling that
GMOs are present in the food or that the food "may contain" GMOs
which is to be labeled as such.' There are detailed provisions regard-
ing the assessment of such food and the role of the Commission to au-
thorize measures proposed by the applicant, 8 6 and also for provisional
restrictions, which may be imposed by a member state if the food poses
risks to human health or the environment.
8 7
178. For the legislative process leading to the adoption of this regulation, see id. at
275-78.
179. Commission Regulation No. 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43), art. 1(2).
180. Id. art. 1, paras. (2)(a)-(c).
181. See id. art. 4(1).
182. See id. art. 6(1).
183. See id. art. 8(1)(a).
184. See id.
185. See id. art. 8(1)(d).
186. See id. arts. 6-7, 13.
187. See id. arts. 12-13.
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D. Commission Directive 97/35/EC8M
After having gained experience with the placing of GMOs into the
market since the issuance of Council Directive of 1990, the Commission
considered it necessary to amend Annex III to that Directive, which
contains the additional information required in the case of notification
for placing GMOs into the market.
This must include in a label or an accompanying document an indi-
cation that the product contains, or consists of genetically modified or-
ganisms. In the case of products to be placed on the market in mixtures
with non-genetically modified organisms, information on the possibility
that the genetically modified organisms may be present, is sufficient. 9
It should be emphasized that the amendment does not require GMO
products and non-GMO products to be segregated.
E. Council Regulation No. 1139/1998190
As the Novel Foods Regulation, which mandates labeling, did not
apply retroactively, the Council adopted a new regulation to apply to
"foods and food ingredients which are to be delivered as such to the fi-
nal consumer.., produced, in whole or in part," from genetically modi-
fied soybeans and genetically modified maize, 19' which had been earlier
authorized under Directive 90/220/EEC. The Council identified as one
of the purposes of the new regulation the necessity to adopt uniform EU
labeling rules for these products"9 because several member states had
unilaterally taken measures on labeling and there was concern that
"differences between those measures [could] impede the free movement
of those foods and food ingredients and thereby adversely affect the
functioning of the internal market."193 The Council also felt it:
necessary to ensure that the final consumer is informed of any charac-
teristics or food property, such as composition, nutritional value or nu-
tritional effects or the intended use of the food, which renders a food or
food ingredients no longer equivalent to an existing food or food ingre-
dient; [and] for that purpose, foods and food ingredients produced from
genetically modified soyabeans or from genetically modified maize
which are not equivalent to conventional counterparts should be sub-
ject to labeling requirements."
It further said that labeling requirements are to be based on scien-
188. 97/35/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 169).
189. Id. Annex III, C.
190. 1998 O.J. (L 159).
191. Id. art. 1(1).
192. Id. pmbl, para. 4.
193. Id.
194. Id. para. 9.
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tific evaluation,'95 and should not be "more burdensome than necessary
but sufficiently detailed to supply consumers with the information they
require. " "9
The regulation is not to apply to "food additives, flavourings for use
in foodstuffs or extraction solvents used in the production of food-
stuffs." 197 The additional specific labeling requirement includes the re-
quirement for the words "produced from genetically modified soya" or
"produced from genetically modified maize," as appropriate.9 8 It is to
appear in the list of ingredients, a footnote to the list, or some other
clear location on the product, where the food consists of more than one
ingredient. Where no list of ingredients exists, the words "produced
from genetically modified soya" or "produced from genetically modified
maize," as appropriate, is to appear clearly on the labeling of the food.' 9
These labeling regulations are minimum requirements and produc-
ers are not precluded from including any additional information about
their products on the label, "such as the absence of foods and food in-
gredients produced from genetically modified soyabeans and maize, or
the presence of such foods and food ingredients in cases where it is not




Subsequent to the adoption of this regulation, the Commission an-
nounced in Decision 98/613/EC on October 21, 1998,21 that it intended
to remove the exemption contained in Council Regulation 1139/98 for
food additives and flavorings genetically modified or produced by ge-
netic engineering.
In June 1999, Europe's environment ministers agreed on even
tougher controls on GMOs by introducing new "risk assessment" rules
to monitor scientific evidence and to provide for a clear label that reads:
"This product contains genetically modified organisms," for products
containing more than a certain percentage of GM ingredients, and sub-
stituting a reapproval process for all new GM plants and seeds ap-
proved for sale instead of the currently available permanent consent
195. Id. para. 10.
196. Id. para. 12.
197. Id. art. 1(2).
198. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
199. Id. art. 2(3)(b).
200. Id. pmbl, para. 20.
201. Commission Decision 98/613/EC, concerning a draft Decree of the Republic of
Austria on the identification of genetically modified additives and flavourings used as food
ingredients, 1998 O.J. (L 291).
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mechanism.202
Among other developments, on January 12, 2000, the European Commission pro-
posed the creation of an all-Europe food safety agency, which envisions the crea-
tion of an advisory body of scientists, unlike the US FDA, which is an in-
dependent agency. °3 And in March 2000, the Commission continued its
de facto moratorium on authorizing GM products as it deferred for six
months a decision on two Swede rapes and one fodder beet, although all
these products had been approved as safe by EU scientists."' No new
authorizations have been granted since October 1998 and fourteen ap-
plications are still awaiting approval. 5 However, in July 2000, the
European Union announced that the European Commission was con-
sidering ending the two-year moratorium on licensing GM products af-
ter tighter licensing laws are approved by the EU governments and the
European Parliament, although environmentalists and some govern-
ments are likely to oppose such a plan."2
VI. CONCLUSION
The potential benefits of GM food and food products notwithstand-
ing, the concern with safety has steadily grown and is currently intense
in Europe, although it is also prevalent in many other parts of the
world. The Biosafety Protocol is a promising regulatory step interna-
tionally, but European regulations are more effective.
Perhaps the creation of a new world body to monitor biotechnology
should be seriously considered. Such a proposal, with the proposed
functions of such a body being to monitor the multinationals and advise
governments on consumer safety and ethics, was offered by several
eminent scientists at the Edinburgh conference on GM food safety held
in late February 2000. Sir John Krebs, who chaired the conference,
said
[w]e need industry, regulators, scientists, consumers, and we need to
consider ethics, values and beliefs, issues of world trade, intellectual
property rights, and exploitation of the developing world. By ironing
out these problems and reaching a consensus, then politicians can de-
cide the way forward.0 7
202. See Stephen Castle, EU Agrees on Tougher GM Food Control, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 26, 1999 at 10.
203. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Europe Plans Advisory Unit on Food Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at A10.
204. See Mike Smith, EU Defers Modified Products Approval-Genetically Changed
Foods De Facto Moratorium Stays, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2000, at 12.
205. See id.
206. See Mike Smith, Europeans at odds over modified food: Environmentalists will
resist Brussels' plans to ease curbs, Fin. Times (London), Jul. 14, 2000, at 1.
207. See Paul Brown, Call for World to Police GM Science, GUARDIAN (London), March
1, 2000, Home Pages, at 6k.
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It is imperative that the world community undertake the regulation
of biotechnology in a coherent and consistent fashion, because the po-
tential risks are enormous and possibly irreversible.

HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT"
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT**
When the Rome Conference adopted the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998, it included as a war crime the
causation of "widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural
environment."' Such "greening" of international humanitarian law
promises heightened sensitivity to the environmental consequences of
warfare as we enter the new millennium. The ICC Statute provision,
however, is but the most recent example of a growing environmental
consciousness vis-A-vis military operations that first began to surface
over two decades ago.
This article catalogues those aspects of international humanitarian
law that safeguard the environment during armed conflict: it is in-
tended primarily as a primer for those new to the subject.2 As will be-
come apparent, humanitarian law has focused scant attention directly
on the environment. Instead, it relies on conventional and customary
humanitarian law that has only recently been recognized as having en-
vironmental consequence for the bulk of its environmental play. Fol-
lowing a brief review of the historical context from which the law
emerged, discussion turns to four types of relevant norms: 1) specific
environmental provisions in humanitarian law; 2) limits on the use of
particular weapons capable of causing environmental damage; 3) non-
. Based on remarks at the 1999 Sutton Colloquium, "International Environmental
Law & Policy," University of Denver College of Law.
.. Professor of International Law, George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Faculty member, International Institute of
Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy. The views expressed in this article are the author's
in his personal capacity and should not be construed as representing those of the Mar-
shall Center, Department of Defense, or any other organization.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 8.2(b)(iv),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (visited May 11, 1999) >, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
2. See ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVES (Carl Bruch ed., 1999)(including an in-depth analysis); PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT (Richard Grunawalt, John King, and Ronald
McClain eds., 1996); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental
Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
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environment specific treaty law which may safeguard the environment
in certain circumstances; and 4) customary humanitarian law offering
environmental protection. Although the article's tenor is primarily de-
scriptive, in order to stimulate further reflection, the final section pro-
vides an abridged assessment of the applicable normative environment;
it suggests that while the environmental component of international
law governing warfare is not vacuous, there is certainly room for
improvement.
THE ADVENT OF CONCERN OVER THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT
Recognition that armed conflict encroaches on the environment
hardly represents an historiographic epiphany.3 Thucydidies, for in-
stance, recounts the laying to waste of Athenian fields by the Spartans
during the annual sieges of Attica in the Peloponnesian Wars.4 In 1672,
the Dutch opened their dikes in order to stem the tide of the advancing
French forces in the Third Anglo-Dutch War.5 During the Boer War,
the British Commander, Horatio Kitchener, engaged in a ruthless
scorched earth campaign in which farms were burned to deny Boer
forces the sustenance on which they relied.6 In the next century, the
rich Romanian oilfields were attacked by British Colonel Norton Grif-
fiths in order to preclude them from falling into the hands of the invad-
ing Central Powers of the First World War. Romanian oil was again
targeted during the Second World War, particularly through the famous
1943 air raids against Ploesti.8 Of course, the two incidents which
caused the greatest environmental calamity in the history of armed con-
flict were the atomic bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in August of 1945. An eyewitness vividly captured the
tragic extent of the destruction better than sterile statistics ever could.
3. A discussion of past environmentally destructive acts during armed conflict is
found in the Commentary to the Additional Protocols. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 666-67 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY].
4. See, e.g., THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR §§2.19, 2.23, 2.47, 2.55, 2.57,
3.1, 3.26, 4.2, & 7.1 (Robert Strassler ed., Free Press 1996).
5. On this and other environmentally destructive incidents of warfare, see ARTHUR
H. WESTING, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: THE MILITARY IMPACT ON THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT (1980), at 14-19, tbl. 1.2 (setting forth "ecologically destructive wars").
6. BRASSEY'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 125 (Franklin D.
Margiotta ed., 1994). The British also placed some 120,000 Boer women and children into
concentration camps, whereby approximately 20,000 died. Id.
7. CHARLES R.M.F. CRUTTWELL, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, 297-98
(1934).
8. See generally JAMES DUGAN & CAROLL STEWART, PLOESTI: THE GREAT GROUND-
AIR BATTLE OF 1 AUGUST 1943 (1998).
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Within a few seconds the thousands of people in the streets and the
gardens in the center of the town were scorched by a wave of searing
heat. Many were killed instantly, others lay writhing on the ground,
screaming in agony from the intolerable pain of their burns. Every-
thing standing upright in the way of the blast, walls, houses, factories,
and other buildings, was annihilated .... Horses, dogs and cattle suf-
fered the same fate as human beings. Every living thing was petrified
in an attitude of indescribable suffering. Even the vegetation did not
escape. Trees went up in flames, the rice plants lost their greenness,
the grass burned on the ground .. .
These and countless other environmentally destructive operations
did not occur in a complete normative vacuum. On the contrary, the
historical record recounts multiple efforts to set standards limiting de-
struction of the environment during armed conflict. In Deuteronomy,
as an example, Moses instructs the people of Israel on methods of siege
warfare.
When you lay siege to a city for many days, making war against it
to capture it, you shall not destroy its surrounding fruit trees by cutting
them with an axe; you may eat their fruit, but you must not cut them
down. Are the trees of the field people, defenders of the city, that you
should lay siege to them? Those trees, however, that you know are not
fruit trees you may cut down and use to build siege works against the
city that is warring against you, until it falls.' °
Prohibitions on laying waste to civilian food sources were also ar-
ticulated by the Diaspora scholar Maimonides and the Rabbi Ishmael,
1
and Hugo Grotius, in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, cites to ancient authorities
such as Philo and Livy, who urged limits on the despoliation of "inani-
mate things."" Nevertheless, despite significant humanitarian law
codification during the 19d' and 20' centuries, it was only in the after-
math of the Vietnam conflict that serious attempts were mounted to
impose conventional law limits on the environmental damage resulting
from hostilities.
The Vietnam War represented a watershed in the symbiotic rela-
tionship between warfare and the global citizenry. This was very much
9. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR 11616 (David G. McCullough
ed., 1966).
10. Deuteronomy 20:19-20 (Modern Language Bible).
11. Leslie Green, What Is-Why Is There-the Law of War?, in THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 141, 146 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green
eds., 1998). See also Guy Roberts, Judaic Sources and Views on the Laws of War, 37
NAVAL L. REV. 221, 231 (1988); Leslie Green, The Judaic Contribution to Human Rights,
28 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1990).
12. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs, bk. III, ch. 12, at 365 (Louise R Loomis
trans., 1949).
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the case with respect to warfare's environmental consequences. A ma-
jor causative factor in this shift was direct targeting, and manipulation,
of the environment by US forces to achieve tactical and operational ob-
jectives. For instance, to counter North Vietnamese and Viet Cong use
of forests and dense vegetation as cover for attacks and sanctuaries to
melt into, the United States cleared nearly three-quarters of a million
acres of land using the Rome Plow, a heavy tractor with large blades at-
tached. It also dropped herbicides over huge expanses of South Viet-
nam. Similarly, in a futile attempt to arrest the flow of supplies south-
ward along the Ho Chi Minh trail, the US military seeded clouds,
hoping that the ensuing rain would render the track impassable.3
Such operations would not alone have riveted international atten-
tion on the subject of environmental destruction during combat; history
had witnessed far more devastating operations in past conflicts without
noticeable distraction. However, the targeting of the environment and
its use as a means of warfare was taking place in the first widely tele-
vised armed conflict. Suddenly, the civilian population watched the war
nightly with great interest.and horror. This fact coincided with a grow-
ing antiwar sentiment, both in the United States and abroad. It also
occurred contemporaneously with the rise of environmental conscious-
ness more generally; recall that the first "Earth Day" was celebrated in
1970. Thus, with Vietnam, the environment was visibly being placed at
risk for an unpopular cause during a period in which sensitivity about
the environment was at a new high.
The first environmental legal standards for armed conflict resulted.
In 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was
adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Devel-
opment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flict. 4 It contained two provisions, discussed infra, addressing damage
to the environment during armed conflict. ' 5 For a variety of reasons,
the United States has elected not to ratify Additional Protocol I, al-
though it does recognize much of it as reflective of customary interna-
tional law."6 As the protocol was being negotiated, a second effort was
13. See ARTHUR H. WESTING, ECOLOGIcAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND
INDOCHINA WAR (1976) (referring to the war's environmental impact).
14. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I].
15. On the history and progress of the Conference, held between 1974 and 1977, see
PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY supra note 3, at xxix - xxxv; NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 1-13 (Michael Bothe, Karl Partsch & Waldemar Solf eds., 1982).
16. The ICRC Organization web site (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.icrc.
orglunicc/ihl eng.nsf/web?OpenNavigator> (listing the Parties of the ICRC to-date). Al-
though Additional Protocol I was not ratified by certain States, many its provisions, but
not including the environmental provisions, are considered declaratory of customary in-
ternational law. For a non-official, but generally considered authoritative, delineation of
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underway to limit use of environmental modification as a weapon. The
consummation of this labor was the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD). 7 Whereas Additional Protocol I addressed dam-
age to the environment caused by military operations, such as that
caused in Vietnam by the Rome Plow and the use of herbicides,
ENMOD was designed to foreclose attempts to employ the environment
as a means of warfare, as in the cloud seeding program.
Little else of relevance to the topic occurred until the 1990-91 Gulf
War. The environmental destruction of that conflict quickly refocused
the attention of the international community on warfare's environ-
mental aspect. In the days preceding commencement of the Coalition
air campaign, Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials threatened
Kuwaiti oil fields if Coalition forces attacked.18 When the Coalition did
attack on January 17, 1991, the Iraqis made good on their promise. By
the end of the conflict, they had deliberately spilled between seven and
nine million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf and set 508 oil well
heads ablaze, 82 of which were damaged in a manner that caused oil to
freely flow from them.' 9 Although the Iraqi rationale for these actions
remains uncertain, most commentators, as discussed, characterize them
as violations of international humanitarian law.2
The academic and policy communities reacted quickly to the events
they witnessed. The first serious exploration of the topic came in June
1991 with a conference co-sponsored by the London School of Economics
and the British Center for Defense Studies, at which Professor Glen
Plant offered a notional fifth Geneva Convention on the Environment
for consideration. Subsequent conferences were sponsored by the Ca-
those considered declaratory, see Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 419 (1987). See also
INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAw DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAw DEPLOYMENT DESKBOOK, tab 12
and Comments by Abraham D. Sofaer in Agora: The US Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.784 (1988).
17. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [herein-
after ENMOD].
18. In fact, they actually practiced anti-oil operations by detonating six wells and set-
ting basins of oil ablaze in December 1990. William M. Arkin, The Environmental Threat
of Military Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 2, at 116, 119.
19. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR 625 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
20. Id. See generally PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 2.
21. See Glen Plant, Elements of a 'Fifth Geneva' Convention on the Protection of the
Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF
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nadian Ministry of External Affairs (Ottawa),22 the International Coun-
cil of Environmental Law and the Commission on Environmental Law
of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (Munich),2 the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Na-
val War College (Newport),24 and the Smithsonian Institution, Envi-
ronmental Law Institute, and the Kuwait Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Sciences (Washington).25 The United Nations also addressed the
matter. In Resolution 687, the Security Council held Iraq liable for
"any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage, and the de-
pletion of natural resources" caused by its invasion of Kuwait. 6 It sub-
sequently established the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC) to adjudicate claims against Iraq to be paid out of a fund capi-
talized by a levy on Iraqi oil exports and frozen Iraqi assets. Some 100
countries have filed claims with the UNCC for environmental damage
amounting to more than $250 billion; only recently have the claims be-
gun to be adjudicated.2 8 For its part, in 1991 the General Assembly
asked the International Committee of the Red Cross, which had already
decided to convene a meeting of experts to consider the issue of envi-
ronmental damage in warfare, to provide a report on the subject to the
Assembly. 29 The report, reproduced as an appendix to this article, came
in the form of Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict. Although
the Assembly did not formally adopt the Guidelines, it did urge individ-
ual States to consider incorporating them into their humanitarian law
guidance to armed forces. 30  A number of States, among them the
United States and Germany, have included limited guidance on envi-
WAR 37, 43 (Glen Plant ed., 1992) (citing the full text).
22. Id. (publishing the Proceedings).
23. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LAW CONCERNING THE
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT, FINAL REPORT OF THE
CONSULTATION OF DEC. 13-15, 1991 (containing the Summary).
24. Id. (publishing the Proceedings).
25. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 2.
26. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45h Sess., 2981' mtg., para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
27. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46' Sess., 2987' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991). On the work of the Commission, see Ronald J. Bet-
tauer, The UN Compensation Commission-Developments Since 1992, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
416 (1995); John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission - A New Struc-
ture to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1993); Hazel M. Fox, Repara-
tions and State Responsibility, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH
LAW 261 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993); Conrad K Harper, Opening Address: The Symposium on
the Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Operations Other Than
War, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 8.
28. Jay Austin and Carl Bruch, The Greening of Warfare, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 32, 33.
29. G.A. Res. 417, U.N. GAOR, 46' Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 319, U.N. Doc.A/46/49
(1991).
30. See G.A. Res. 49/50, U.N. GAOR, 49' Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/50 (1995).
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ronmental law in their humanitarian law manuals, albeit not to the de-
gree reflected in the ICRC Guidelines.
3
In 1996 international attention again turned to the environmental
consequences of warfare, this time in the context of an International
Court of Justice case regarding the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In
its advisory opinion, the Court opined, after considering the relevant
humanitarian law and peacetime environmental norms, that "[tihe ex-
istence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment."32 Although it rejected
assertions that environmental norms alone could deprive a State of its
right to self-defense, the ICJ emphasized their importance during mili-
tary operations: "States must take environmental considerations into
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pur-
suit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is
one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in confor-
mity with the principles of proportionality."33 The Additional Protocol I
provisions on the environment were singled out as "powerful con-
straints for all States having subscribed" to them,' a curious charac-
terization given the fact that it appears clear the use of nuclear weap-
ons was not meant to be governed by the Protocol.35 While the opinion
31. See, e.g., Federal Ministry of Defense of the F.R.G., Joint Services Regulations
(ZDv) 15/2, § 401 (1992), reprinted with commentary in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 111-14 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) [hereinafter GERMAN MANUAL];
U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M), 8.1.3 (1995). There is a cooperative ef-
fort underway to draft a joint law of armed conflict manual for U.S. forces and the envi-
ronment is expected to be addressed. The influential San Remo Manual drafted for the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law by a group of internationally renowned ex-
perts in naval warfare and law also deals with harm to the environment. INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAw, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, $ 11, 34, & 44 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed.,
1995).
32. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. (Advisory Opinion),
(General List 95), 29, 35 I.L.M.809, 1343 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
33. Id. 29.
34. Id. 71 31.
35. In its introduction to the Draft Protocol submitted to the Diplomatic Conference
in 1973, the ICRC stated that "[piroblems relating to atomic, bacteriological and chemical
warfare are subjects of international agreements and negotiations by governments, and in
submitting these draft Protocols the ICRC does not intend to broach these problems."
ICRC Draft, in NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 15, at 188. Ex-
cept for a statement by India, there does not seem to have been any dissent on this point.
Id. at 189. Some countries, such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom,
issued declarations at the time of signature to the effect that the Protocol did not encom-
pass the use of nuclear weapons. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 704-18 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988) (referencing the texts of the Declarations). The
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is only advisory in nature, and although its ultimate holding on the is-
sue of using nuclear weapons proved controversial, 6 the sections ad-
dressing environmental damage illustrate the distance the subject has
traveled from the periphery towards core humanitarian law.
The most recent forward progress in safeguarding the environment
during armed conflict is the prohibition on "widespread, long term and
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated" found in the ICC Statute. This Statute was not signed by the
United States, albeit for reasons unrelated to its environmental provi-
sion, and will not come into effect until 60 States have ratified it.3 7 Yet,
its importance with regard to environmental damage during armed con-
flict cannot be overstated, for it articulates both a substantive norm and
sets forth an enforcement methodology.
The ICC effort is timely. As this article is being written, US forces
are engaged with NATO allies in an international armed conflict in
Yugoslavia. Again, the environmental impact of the use of force has
drawn world attention. There is uneasiness over pollution of the Da-
nube River, particularly from the release of oil into the waterway,38 and
the Russian Energy Minister transmitted a letter in late April to US
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson expressing concern that environ-
mental damage would result if NATO forces struck Yugoslavia's Vinca
Institute of Nuclear Science.39 As always, mutual recrimination tends
to be the order of the day. For instance, in response to a question re-
garding Yugoslavian claims that attacks on petro-chemical plants were
causing an environmental disaster, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea ar-
gued:
On the environmental front, yes, I've seen some rather dramatic
statements particularly from people in Yugoslavia on this but I haven't
seen many protests from people in the surrounding countries and there-
fore if this environment ecological impact were as great as is being
claimed I think there would be a lot more reports, a lot more calls from
people outside Yugoslavia in the surrounding countries than has been
United Kingdom ratified Protocol I in January 1988. At that time the U.K declared that
"[ilt continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the rules introduced
by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weapons [and that they] do not regulate
or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons." See INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS,
Mar. 1998, at 186 (reprinting the text of the Protocol).
36. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court of Justice and the Use
of Nuclear Weapons, NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., Spring 1998, at 91.
37. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 126.
38. Danube River Ecosystem Caught in Balkan War, ENVIRONMENT NEWS SERVICE,
May 7, 1999 (visited May 10, 1999) <http://ens.lycos.com/ens/mav99/1999L-05-07-
05.html>.
39. Judith Miller, Monitoring of Serbia's Enriched Uranium to Resume, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1999, at A10.
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the case so I think there is a great deal of exaggeration here and I don't
have any evidence, I've seen no reports of either any long-term damage
to the environment from these operations.
On the other hand, let's not forget that when our pilots fly over
Yugoslavia and see a lot of smoke, the smoke is coming from all of these
burning villages in Kosovo and if you're talking about environmental
damage, I think the "scorched earth" policy applied to Kosovo, the de-
struction of livestock, the destruction of rivers and roads and communi-
cation routes, the destruction of the agriculture, the slaughtering of a
large percentage of the cattle and the livestock, is going to be much
more significant in the long term and incidentally require a lot more
money to fix than the repair of some oil refineries.0
Yugoslavia brought this matter before the International Court of
Justice in cases against the United States and certain of its NATO al-
lies alleging a breach of the obligation not to resort to the use of force,
as well as various aspects of the jus in bello. Among the declarations it
is seeking from the Court are that:
[Bly taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, the United States of America has acted against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable
damage; [andiby taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted
uranium, the United States of America has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited
weapons and not to cause far-reaching health and environmental dam-
age.41
40. Transcript of Press Conference Given by Mr. Jamie Shea and General Giuseppe
Marani in Brussels, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 3, 1999, available in LEXIS-NEXIS, News
Group File.
41. Application Instituting Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force, General List No.
114 (1999) (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketliyus/
iyusframe.htm>. In Oral Pleadings, one Yugoslavia representative argued,
That NATO action is intended not only against the Yugoslav army and police force, but
also against the people as a whole, is shown not only by the savage attacks on the civilian
population using the most sophisticated weapons and explosives, but also by other sys-
tematic forms of endangerment of the lives and health of the Yugoslav people. This is at-
tested to in particular by countless attacks on chemical plants and oil refineries and in-
stallations (some facilities have been pounded dozens of times). These attacks have
already caused the environmental catastrophe, air pollution and poisoning of rivers.
Large quantities of released poisonous substances and oil slicks are bound to have disas-
trous consequences also for the broader neighbourhood of Yugoslavia. Oil installations
and refineries in Pancevo and Novi Sad, chemical plants in Belgrade, Pancevo and other
places are targeted almost on a daily basis.
Statement of Miodrag Mitic, Oral Pleading, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Legality of
Use of Force, May 10, 1999, CR/99/14 (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.ici-
cii.orgicjwwwidocket/ivus/iyusframe.htm>.
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In Oral Pleadings, the United States did not respond to the sub-
stance of the allegations, but rather contested both jurisdiction and the
inappropriateness of provisional measures in this case.42
While the facts, law, and available remedies may be in dispute in
the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia, there should be little question that
in the future environmental harm will continue to characterize armed
conflict, and may well take on further strategic and political impor-
tance. The allegations bandied about in this conflict are apt evidence
that belligerents fully understand the political and moral capital in-
volved in charging an opponent with environmental destruction.
THE NORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT
As noted, specific environmental norms applicable in armed conflict
are of relatively recent vintage. Indeed, it was not until 1977 that the
environment even merited express mention in humanitarian law. Nev-
ertheless, there is a plethora of international law, humanitarian and
otherwise, that offers either direct or indirect protection of the envi-
ronment from the harmful effects of combat.
A. Environment Specific Norms
Additional Protocol I. In 1965 the International Committee of the
Red Cross began work to update humanitarian law, most significantly
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The effort was in part a recogni-
tion that the nature of war was changing, and, to remain effective, the
law governing its conduct needed to evolve as well. It culminated in the
production of two conventions designed to update humanitarian law;
Additional Protocol I addresses international armed conflict, whereas
the second, Additional Protocol II, applies to non-international armed
conflict.43
42. Oral Pleading, United States of America, Legality of Use of Force, May 11, 1999,
CR199/24 (visited May 11, 1999) http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/docket/iyus/iyusframe.htm.
43. Additional Protocol I applies to situations referred to in Common Article 2 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions: "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by any one of them." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
Non-international conflict is governed by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, id., art. 3 and Additional Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
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Additional Protocol I was the first instrument to provide direct pro-
tection to the environment during international armed conflict. It did
so through two provisions.
Article 35 - Basic Rules
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 55 - Protection of the Natural Environment
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environ-
ment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protec-
tion includes a prohibition of the uses of methods or means of warfare
which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the
natural environment and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the
population.
Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited.
Interestingly, the preliminary draft prepared by the ICRC for con-
sideration at the Diplomatic Conference was silent on the subject.
However, in light of the Vietnam experience, several delegations urged
inclusion of an environmental provision; this pressure bore fruit in the
form of Articles 35(3) and 55."
An obvious question is why two articles. The ICRC Commentary to
the Protocol explains that while "Article 35(3) broaches the problem
from the point of view of methods of warfare, Article 55 concentrates on
the survival of the population, so that even though the two provisions
overlap to some extent, and their tenor is similar, they do not duplicate
each other."5 Thus, in a sense, the former is "Hague law," whereas the
latter is "Geneva law;" 35(3) limits methods and means of warfare, 55
creates a protected object, the environment.46
tions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 11 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1442
(1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol III.
44. Committee III of the Conference established an informal working group, "Bio-
tope," to handle the environmental issues. This group recommended the two articles sub-
sequently incorporated in the protocol. See PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
663.
45. Id.
46. The designation "Geneva Law" refers to that portion of the law of armed conflict
addressing protected classes of persons or things - civilians and civilian objects, prison-
ers of war, the sick or shipwrecked, medical personnel and facilities, etc. It is distin-
guished from "Hague Law," which governs methods and means of combat. For a discus-
sion of the international instruments which fall into each category, and of those which
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A careful look at the "elements of the offenses" reveals that the two
articles respond to very different concerns; the distinction between
them is more significant than might appear at first blush. Article 35(3)
requires that the damage be caused by a method or means of warfare
and imposes a scienter/intent requirement not dissimilar to the "in-
tended the natural consequences" standard of US criminal law. Once
the scienter element is satisfied, one need only move along a continuum
of environmental damage until the widespread, long-term and severe
threshold is met. This standard has elsewhere been labeled an "intrin-
sic value approach," for the sole question beyond knowledge is severity
of damage to the environment qua the environment." The environment
is valued without regard to its human benefits, and protected without
factoring in any human consequences, whether positive or negative.
Contrast this with the "anthropocentric approach" of Article 55.
The scienter element is identical to that contained in Article 35(3), as is
the quantum of harm. However, the prohibition only applies when the
environmental damage "prejudice(s) the health or survival of the popu-
lation." It is not the environment that is being protected so much as the
human reliance thereon. Restated, whereas Article 35(3) values the en-
vironment in and of itself, Article 55 retains the human-centered ap-
proach of humanitarian law generally.48
By excluding the human factor, Article 35(3) represents a radical
departure from traditional humanitarian law formulae. Arguably, the
norm would apply even in cases where human suffering results from
adherence. For instance, if a particular avenue of attack through an
unpopulated but ecologically fragile region would likely result in the Ar-
ticle 35(3) level of environmental damage, military forces might be
obliged to route an advance through a more densely populated area,
thereby increasing the likelihood of incidental injury to civilians or col-
lateral damage to civilian property. Article 55 is also expressed along a
continuum. A strict textualist reading of the provision might suggest
that so long as human suffering resulted - any human suffering - ac-
tions causing environmental harm would be forbidden if the severity
and scienter requirements were met, even when the extra-
display elements of both, see FREDERIC DEMULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR
ARMED FORCES 3-4 (1987).
47. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 69-70.
48. Note that Article 55 refers to the "population" without use of the adjective "civil-
ian." The official record makes clear that this was intentional, that the goal was to extend
the protection to the whole population since the damage was to be long-term. See 15 Offi-
cial Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and development of Inter-
national Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 360 [hereinafter O.R.]. The term "health" is
used in the provision to provide protection beyond that needed for bare survival. Effects
that would pose a serious blow to health, such as congenital defects, degeneration or de-
formities would, therefore, be encompassed within the meaning of the provision. Id. at
281.
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environmental human detriment outweighed it. However, it would be
absurd to read an anthropocentric norm in a fashion that permitted
such a result. Clearly, the intent is to protect those aspects of the envi-
ronment upon which humans depend.
Regardless of the Hague-Geneva distinction (one that is useful con-
ceptually), violation of Article 55(1) is essentially a lesser-included of-
fense of Article 35(3) in terms of normative force."9 Any separate value
of Article 55 may well lie in the "care" language of the first sentence.
Article 35(3) prohibits causing damage, whereas 55(1) imposes a stan-
dard of care. The care requirement would presumably apply equally to
the attacker and the defender. For instance, a defender might destroy
extensive oil fields and dump existing reserves in order to keep this
valuable resource from falling into enemy hands. If the resulting envi-
ronmental harm, measured in human terms, exceeded Article 55's ac-
ceptable threshold, such action would be forbidden. Given the text of
the article (which includes a prohibition), it is by definition a breach of
the standard of care. This is but one possible interpretation; unfortu-
nately, the Commentary sheds no light on this issue.
Of greater significance is the prohibition on reprisals against the
environment.' A belligerent reprisal is an unlawful, but proportionate,
act taken to compel one's adversary to desist in its own unlawful course
of conduct. Thus, Article 55(2) does not prohibit a response to enemy
action in the form of an attack on the environment, but instead merely
an unlawful one, that is, one which violates the standards of Articles
35(3), 55(1), or one of the other norms described infra.
Particularly troublesome with regard to both articles is the quan-
tum of harm prohibited. Unfortunately, the terms "widespread, long-
term and severe" are not defined in the Protocol, nor is the negotiating
history much assistance in unraveling their meaning. During discus-
sions, some delegates referred to "long-term" as a period measured in
decades, but such an interpretation is far from dispositive." Even it if
was, there was no indication as to the meaning of "widespread" or "se-
vere." This is especially problematic given the fact that the standard is
articulated in the conjunctive, i.e., that damage will not be prohibited
unless it violates all three standards.2 Aside from the interpretive di-
49. The issue of distinguishing between the two articles was a point of controversy.
The United Kingdom, for instance, took a narrow view. Specifically, the UK interpreted
Article 35(3) as a mere reiteration of Article 55. See 6 O.R., supra note 48, at 118.
50. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 44, art. 55(2). On reprisals, the classic work
is FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERANT REPRISALS (1971).
51. 15 O.R., supra note 48, at 268. Additionally, there was mention that the type of
damage contemplated was greater than that experienced on French battlefields during
the First World War. Id. at 269
52. In their humanitarian law guidance, some States have attempted to remedy the
omission. For instance, the German Manual defines the quantum of damage necessary as
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lemma posed by such definition legerdemain, the required three-part
test clearly sets a very high standard of harm before the articles are vio-
lated.
The United States opposes the environmental provisions of Addi-
tional Protocol I on the ground that they are excessively broad. 3  Of
course, this means that the United States opposes an interpretation of
either Article 35(3) or 55 as reflective of customary international law.
ENMOD. Whereas Additional Protocol I addresses damage to the
environment, ENMOD limits modification of the environment as a
method or means of warfare. A reaction to operations such as the cloud
seeding of the Vietnam War,' the United States is not only a Party to
this Convention, but it has also renounced environmental modification
techniques as a matter of policy.55
The operative provision of the Convention is the first article.
Article I
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist,
encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organi-
zation to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1
"a major interference with human life or natural resources which considerably exceeds
the battlefield damage to be regularly expected in a war." See GERMAN MANUAL, supra
note 32, § 403. In its Operational Law Handbook, the United States Army Judge Advo-
cate General School assets that long-standing should be understood as decades, wide-
spread "probably means several hundred square kilometers.. .(and) severe can be ex-
plained by Article 55's reference to any act that 'prejudices the health or survival of the
population." INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 14-19 (1998). The "widespread" definition is taken from that employed in
ENMOD. This is an interesting approach given the Understanding appended to ENMOD
(see n. 62 and accompanying text) disclaiming any intention for its definitions to apply to
other instruments, an unstated but obvious reference to Protocol I. More important from
the perspective of the overall development of the environmental law of war is the Army's
reference to human "health and survival." To use this standard in setting an Article 35(3)
threshold is to come down firmly in the anthropocentric camp.
53. See Matheson, supra note 16, at 424.
54. This certainly came through in the Senate hearings on the Convention. See Envi-
ronmental Modification Treaty: Hearings on the Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Hearings to Hear Testi-
mony on the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
55. See James P. Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert
Storm, NAvAL WAR COLL. REV. 61, 64 (1992).
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of this article."
There are two definitional issues implicit in this article. The first
concerns those actions that fall within the ambit of the phrase "envi-
ronmental modification technique." Fortunately, the Convention itself
defines the relevant activity. By Article II, it includes "any technique
for changing - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes
- the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its bi-
ota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space."57 An
Understanding included in the report transmitted with the Convention.
to the United Nations General Assembly clarifies the provision's reach.
It cites the following as examples of phenomenon that could be caused
through environmental modification: "earthquakes, tsunamis, an upset
in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns
(clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms);
changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the
state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere."'
The Understanding goes on to note that each "would result, or could
reasonably be expected to result, in widespread, long-lasting or severedestruction, damage or injury."" Thus, causing one of them, without
more, would be forbidden. It further emphasizes that the list is not ex-
haustive;6° any environmental modification generating the requisite
level of harm would suffice to violate the prohibition.
The second issue concerns definition of the phrase "widespread,
long-lasting or severe," a phrase left curiously undefined in Additional
Protocol I and neglected in that convention's negotiating record. In
ENMOD, by contrast, each term is defined in an Understanding regard-
ing Article I. "Widespread" encompasses several hundred square kilo-
meters, "long-lasting" is "a period of months, or approximately a sea-
son," and "severe" involves "serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets."6' Note
that the definition of long-lasting differs dramatically from the "dec-
ades" hinted at during the Additional Protocols Conference. This sug-
gests that ENMOD adopts a lower threshold of harm than Protocol I.
So too does the fact that the ENMOD quantum of harm is articulated in
the disjunctive; violation of any of the three tests would be sufficient to
56. ENMOD, supra note 17, art. I.
57. Id. art. II.
58. Understanding Relating to Article II, Report of the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31" Sess., Supp. No. 27, at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976),
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 36, at 168.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Understanding Relating to Article I, Report of the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31' Sess., Supp. No. 27, at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/31127 (1976),
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 36, at 168.
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breach the standard. Similarly, while Protocol I refers to "damage," the
ENMOD Understanding extends the prohibition to mere disruption.
Finally, whereas Protocol I is measured in terms of damage to the
"natural environment," ENMOD includes injury to economic resources
and other assets. That the ENMOD and Protocol I standards are, de-
spite being nearly identical in verbiage, distinct is suggested by the Un-
derstanding's disclaimer that "the interpretation set forth.. .is intended
exclusively for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the in-
terpretation of the same or similar terms if used in connection with any
other international agreement."
62
Although the threshold for violation appears much lower in
ENMOD than Additional Protocol I, the actual scope of ENMOD is
fairly narrow. It only extends to cases involving manipulation of natu-
ral processes, and then only when the damage occurs on the territory of
a State Party.' For instance, there is relatively universal consensus
that the Iraqi actions during the Gulf War did not violate its prohibi-
tions; the environment was a target of sorts, but its processes were not
manipulated such that it constituted a weapon.' In fact, environmental
manipulation is no longer viewed as a promising operational tech-
nique.' To the extent, then, that the convention has practical import, it
is in precluding weapons development, not limiting the scope of avail-
able military options.
Furthermore, ENMOD's enforcement mechanism is political in na-
ture - referral to the Security Council. Arguably, this adds little, for
the Security Council is already seised of actions involving a "threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" pursuant to Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter.' It is difficult to imagine a case of environ-
mental manipulation as a weapon that would not amount to a violation
of these jus ad bellum prescriptions. Similarly, creation of the war
crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrates that the Se-
curity Council may treat acts occurring during an armed conflict, i.e.,
violations of the jus in bello, as threats and/or breaches of the peace.67
62. Id.
63. The territorial limitation is contained in ENMOD, supra note 17, art. I, 1 1.
64. But see Luis Kutner & Ved Nanda, Draft Indictment of Saddam Hussein, 20
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 91, 95 (1991).
65. As an example of the absurd nature of some concepts, one involves melting the
Arctic ice cover in order to raise the level of the sea, thereby flooding coastal regions. See
Hans Blix, Arms Control Treaties Aim at Reducing the Military Impact on the Environ-
ment, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 703, 709
(Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984).
66. U.N. Charter, art. 39.
67. The authority of the Council to create such courts, even to deal with offenses dur-
ing non-international armed conflict, was upheld in by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32. See Leslie C. Green, Er-
demovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes
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Therefore, it is "criminalization" of the act, not the enforcement mecha-
nism, which enjoys normative meaning, albeit meaning of limited prac-
tical import.'
Statute of the International Criminal Court. The most recent work
in the field has been adoption of the ICC Statute provision granting the
Court jurisdiction over certain acts causing environmental damage. By
Article 8.2(b)(iv), the following act committed during international
armed conflict constitute war crimes.
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such an
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects or widespread, long term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 9
This provision is interesting for a number of reasons. First the
requisite mens rea is one of actual knowledge. For the purposes of the
Statute, "knowledge' means awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events." ° Thus, an ac-
tor who "should have known" that the prohibited environmental dam-
age would result from his or her actions would presumably be acquitted
absent evidence convincing the Court "beyond a reasonable doubt"" of
actual knowledge. This point is further clarified in the article on the
general principle of "Mental Element," which imputes intent to an actor
when he or she "means to cause [the required] consequence, or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events."72
Criminal responsibility in these cases extends to those who order
operations with the knowledge that widespread, long term, and severe
damage will occur. Pursuant to Article 28, a commander or superior
who "knew, or owing to the circumstances, should have known" that
those under his or her command and/or control were committing envi-
ronmental crimes and "failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commis-
sion" is subject to prosecution.74 Indeed, commanders or superiors will
be criminally responsible even if they merely fail to "submit the matter
Tribunal, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 313 (1997) (referencing the issue of jurisdiction of the
ICTY).
68. For example, the prohibition, as distinct from that contained in Protocol I, has
found its way into the German humanitarian law manual. See GERMAN MANUAL, supra
note 32, § 403.
69. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.2(b)(iv).
70. Id. art. 30.3.
71. Id. art. 66.3.
72. Id. art. 30.2(b).
73. Id. art. 25.3(b).
74. Id. art. 28.
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to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution."75 Thus,
the Statute adopts the principle of Command Responsibility that had
previously been recognized in such noted war crimes trials as Yama-
shita, 6 and subsequently by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
77Former Yugoslavia in the Celebici case.
As to the quantum of harm necessary to commit this war crime, the
Rome Conference adopted the "widespread, long term and severe" con-
junctive standard of Additional Protocol I. These terms were, as in the
Protocol, left undefined. Nor do the ENMOD definitions clarify mat-
ters, for recall that they are not directly applicable to other agreements.
However, delegates at the Rome Conference decided, upon the sugges-
tion of the United States, to develop elements of those offenses included
in the Statute. " Scheduled to be finalized by June 30, 2000, the ele-
ments may finally elucidate the meaning of this illusive environmental
standard. Of course, any resulting definitional formulae will not be di-
rectly binding on Parties to Additional Protocol I. Yet, because the ICC
verbiage mirrors the Protocol's, and because most Parties to the latter
are also signatories of the former (and likely to ratify it over time), the
elements will comprise (assuming they address the subject) powerfully
persuasive interpretive tools.
The ICC Statute also remedies what many have seen as a flaw in
the Additional Protocol I prohibitions by factoring in the military neces-
sity of the operation causing the damage.7 9 Article 35(3) of Additional
Protocol I simply set a level of maximum acceptable environmental
75. Id.
76. General Yamashita, who commanded Japanese troops in the Philippines during
WWII, was tried by a U.S. Military Commission with having "unlawfully disregarded and
failed to discharge his duty a commander to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
people of the United States and its allies, particularly the Philippines.. . ." United Na-
tions War Crimes Commission, 3 REPORTS OF TRIALS of THE WAR CRIMINALS 1, 3. Yama-
shita was convicted and executed, following an unsuccessful appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court primarily on the constitutionality and jurisdiction of the Military Commission.
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
77. Prosecutor v. Delalic (Celebici Camp Case), 1 333-42, IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998
(visited May 10, 1999) <://www.un.orJicty/celebici/iugement/main.htm>. Interestingly,
the Court found that the principle applied to civilians in positions of authority in addition
to military superiors. Id. 1 363. On command responsibility generally, see Leslie C.
Green, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Command Responsibility, NAVAL
WAR COLL. REV. 26 (1997); War Crimes, Extradition and Command Responsibility, in
LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR, ch. 10 (1 ed. 1973); W. Hays
Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973).
78. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/10, Annex I, Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (vis-
ited May 10, 1999) <http://www.un.or-/law/icc/statute/final.htm>.
79. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 72-73 (discussing a criticism of this approach).
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harm, whereas Article 55(1) characterized prohibited harm in terms of
its human consequences. Neither mandated any balancing against the
value of the military operation. Theoretically, then, military operations
that might garner significant, even determinative, results had to be for-
gone if the environment suffered the requisite degree of harm. This is
true even if the military gains would have otherwise alleviated human
suffering.
By the new ICC prospective prescriptive norm, the environmentally
damaging act will only be forbidden if it is intentional, causes wide-
spread, long-lasting and severe harm and that harm is excessive "in re-
lation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." This
latter element derives from Additional Protocol I codification of the pro-
portionality principle, discussed infra.8 ° Thus, Article 8 introduces the
first-ever balancing test into normative evaluation of environmental
damage caused by armed conflict. The acknowledgement of the need to
factor military considerations into attempts to preserve the environ-
ment may well explain the relative calm that surrounded inclusion of
the provision in the Statute.
Interestingly, such environmental harm would presumably already
be proscribed by Article 8's prohibition of "incidental.. .damage to civil-
ian objects... which would clearly be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."81 To fall within
this facet of the article, the environment must be characterized as a "ci-
vilian object." Although the term is not defined in the Statute, Addi-
tional Protocol I explicates it as "all objects which are not military ob-
jectives"8 2 "Military objectives" comprise "those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to mili-
tary action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutrali-
zation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military
advantage."83 While the environment might constitute a military objec-
tive, as in high ground, in most cases it is best characterized as a civil-
ian object.
That said, the environmental aspect of Article 8 does enjoy inde-
pendent normative valence because should characterization of the envi-
ronment as a civilian object be rejected in close cases, for example in
situations involving damage to the atmosphere or ozone layer, the envi-
ronmental specific prohibition would kick in to offer some degree of pro-
tection. Furthermore, even assuming a component of the environment
was a military objective, widespread, long-term and severe damage to it
would be forbidden if that damage outweighed any overall military ad-
80. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, arts. 5 1(5)(b) & 57(2)(a)(iii).
81. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.2(b)(iv).
82. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, art. 52, 1.
83. Id. art. 52, I 2.
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vantage accruing from the operation in question. This constitutes a
rather unique formula in humanitarian law. In most cases, once an ob-
ject is deemed military in nature there is seldom any inquiry into the
extent of damage to it; instead, the value of its destruction or neutrali-
zation is measured against incidental injury to civilians or collateral
damage to civilian objects (the proportionality principle). Yet, by the
ICC approach there is no requirement that the portion of the environ-
ment damaged be civilian in nature to be protected. The closest anal-
ogy in humanitarian law is perhaps the protection afforded dams, dikes,
and nuclear electrical generating stations, which, as discussed infra,
generated much controversy over the very issue of being shielded from
attack despite military utility to one's enemy.
Lastly, inclusion of an environmental provision in the ICC Statute
is significant if for no other reason than the fact that to push through a
statute creating the first permanent international criminal court, the
Conference necessarily had to limit its reach to those offenses that
would not generate widespread disagreement. As a result, in terms of
substantive law, the effort was limited to codifying existing customary
law and restating widely subscribed to conventional law norms." In-
deed, the subparagraph of Article 8 in which the environmental provi-
sion is located is styled "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and cus-
toms applicable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law." 5 That some 120 States signed the
Statute with its environmental provision, and only seven voted against
it (on other grounds), attests to the extent which environmental damage
during armed conflict has entered the normative consciousness of hu-
manitarian law."
B. Limits on Weapons Especially Likely to Cause Environmental Harm
Most weapons are capable of causing environmental harm of some
sort, even though environmental harm may not be intended. For in-
stance, during the First World War lead bullets imbedded in trees dur-
ing the fierce battles of that conflict poisoned forests. More recently, US
forces fired some 11,000 depleted uranium rounds from tanks and air-
craft during Operation DESERT STORM. Such munitions are particu-
larly valuable because of their ability to pierce armor. On the other
84. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Court, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 22, 29-36 (1999) (discussing the effort to forge consensus on the offenses to be
included in the Statute).
85. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.2(b).
86. The United States was one of the States opposing the Statute, primarily due to its
jurisdictional provisions. France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation sup-
ported it. For a discussion of the US rationale for opposition by the Ambassador who led
the US Delegation, see David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Crimi-
nal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999).
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hand, uranium is a radioactive heavy metal that poses risks to both the
environment and human beings.87 Although international humanitarian
law has yet to limit use of any weapon because of its environmental
consequences, it nevertheless provides de facto protection to the envi-
ronment though prohibition of certain weapons that would almost in-
evitably harm it."
The 1925 Gas Protocol. Building on previous condemnation of the
use of gas,89 and in light of the widespread chemical warfare of the First
World War, the 1925 Gas Protocol prohibited the use "asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and use of all analogous liquids, materials or
devices."' The agreement, which is generally considered declaratory of
customary international law, extends to both chemical and bacteriologi-
cal agents. It provides significant environmental protection, in part be-
cause of the persistency of some chemicals and because chemicals
spread easily across the environment though the food chain. Some have
even asserted that the prohibited agents should be defined in part by
their effect on the environment. Specifically, and in response to the US
employment of chemicals in Vietnam, the UN General Assembly sug-
gested that the Gas Protocol prohibits use of "any chemical agents of
warfare... which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects
on man, animals or plants" or "biological agents of warfare.. .which are
intended to cause disease and death in man, animals or plants, and
which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person,
animal or plant attacked."91 This interpretation would appear "politi-
87. Brigadier General Joseph G. Garrett, III, The Army and the Environment: Envi-
ronmental Considerations during Army Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
DURING ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 42.
88. For an excellent discussion of the current state of the law of weaponry, see Chris-
topher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium, in THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 185 (Michael Schmitt and Leslie Green
eds., 1998).
89. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lie-
ber Code), General Orders No. 100, art. 70, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 35, at 3, 13 (use of poison); Project of an International Declaration Concerning
the Laws and customs of War (Brussels Declarations), art. 13(a), Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 35, at 25, 29; Oxford Manual, art. 8(a),
Sept. 9, 1880, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 35, at 35, 38; Dec-
laration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 155
(Supp. 1907), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 35, at 105; The
Versailles Treaty, art. 171, June 28, 1919, available in The Yale Law School Avalon Pro-
ject Archive (visited May 10, 999) <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/menu.htm>;
Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare (Washington
Treaty), Feb. 6, 1922, art. 5, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (Supp. 1922), reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 35, at 877, 878.
90. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 14 I.L.M.
49 (1975).
91. G.A. Res. 2603A (XXCV), U.N. GAOR, 24' Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc.
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cally" motivated; there is no solid evidence the 1925 Gas Protocol was
meant to extend beyond human harm.'
The scope of the 1925 Gas Protocol proved uncertain in the after-
math of its adoption. Many countries ratified or acceded to the agree-
ment only after making a reservation that the prohibited agents could
be used if enemy States resorted to them first.93 This effectively trans-
formed the Protocol into a no first-use pact. Its applicability to the use
of riot control agents and herbicides also proved questionable.' Thus,
the United States issued an Executive Order upon its ratification of the
agreement in 1975. It generally renounced, as a matter of policy, their
first use in war, with the exception of instances in which National
Command Authority (NCA) approval has been secured. This general
rule did not apply to situations in which the chemicals were not being
used as a "method of warfare" (i.e., when the use was defensive). Ex-
amples include controlling riots, including rioting prisoners, rescuing
downed aircrew members, dispersing civilians used as human shields,
and protecting convoys in rear areas. Additionally, the Executive Order
permitted use of herbicides without NCA approval in two specific in-
stances: domestic use and use to control vegetation surrounding mili-
tary installations.95 Despite controversy over its reach, however, the
agreement clearly limits the use of many agents dangerous to the envi-
ronment.
The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. In 1972 the interna-
tional community expanded the prohibition on bacteriological weapons
found in the 1925 Gas Protocol through adoption of the Convention on
the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.'
Whereas the 1925 protocol only restricted use of such weapons, in the
1972 convention, Parties agree "never in any circumstances to develop,
A/7630 (1969).
92. Wil D. Verwey, Protection of the Environment n Times of Armed Conflict - Do We
Need Additional Rules?, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT,
supra note 2, at 559, 563.
93. The United States Reservation reads "The Protocol shall cease to be binding on
the government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poi-
sonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an
enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in
the Protocol." This and other reservations are reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 35, at 121-27.
94. For instance, the US position is that riot control agents only have a transient ef-
fect and, therefore, are not "incapacitating." Thus, the Convention does not address them.
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 7-13.
95. Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16, 187 (1975).
96. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 583, 11 I.L.M. 310 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
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produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" them.97 The Biological
Weapons Convention also requires destruction or diversion to peaceful
purposes of "all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of deliv-
ery," 8 and refraining from transferring them to others or assisting or
encouraging others to acquire biological weapons capability."0 Unlike
the 1925 Gas Protocol, reprisals with biological weapons are effectively
precluded, for States may neither retain nor develop them. The United
States ratified this Convention in 1975.
The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention. The Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap-
ons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or Have Indis-
criminate Effects originally consisted of the convention itself, which
simply expresses general principles regarding the use of conventional
weapons, and three protocols: Protocol I on non-detectable fragments;
Protocol II on mines, booby traps, and other devices; and Protocol III on
incendiary weapons. 'oo In 1995 a fourth protocol on blinding lasers was
added, '01 and in 1996 Protocol II was amended."0 The United States
ratified the Convention, Protocol I and Protocol II in 1995. It has not
ratified Protocol III, although it is considering doing so with a reserva-
tion that incendiaries can be used in areas with concentrations of civil-
ians when doing so will result in fewer incidental injuries than would be
the case with other types of weapons. As of March 1999, Amended Pro-
tocol II and Protocol IV have both been sent to the Senate for advice and
consent. The convention and its protocols only apply in situations of in-
ternational armed conflict. 10 3
The Conventional Weapons Convention does bear to some degree
on environmental damage during armed conflict. First, it includes a
preambular statement reaffirming the Additional Protocol I prohibition
on the use of methods or means of warfare "which are intended, or may
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.""° This led France and the United States to at-
97. Id. art. I.
98. Id. art. II.
99. Id. art. III.
100. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, Oct. 10, 1980, 9 I.L.M. 1524, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra
note 35, at 179 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention].
101. Additional Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention on
Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 12, 1995, U.N.
Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (1995), 35 I.L.M. 1218.
102. Amended Additional Protocol II, May 3, 1996, U.S.T. Doc. No. 105-1, 35 I.L.M.
1206 (1996).
103. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 100, art. 1.
104. Id. pmbl.
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tach a reservation and understanding respectively to the effect that the
verbiage only applied to States which were Party to Additional Protocol
V.05
Except, perhaps, for the purpose of arguing that the standard may
slowly be maturing into customary law, the heart of environmental pro-
tection in the Conventional Weapons Convention lies in Protocols II (as
amended) and III. It is well recognized that mines and similar devices
render extensive areas of land unusable, in addition to posing a direct
threat to humans and other living creatures. Landmines, according to
the International Committee of the Red Cross, are scattered across 70
countries and kill or injure some 2,000 people each month." The mag-
nitude of the landmine dilemma is, obviously, enormous.
Protocol II prohibits the indiscriminate use of "mines, booby traps,
and other devices." Indiscriminate use is use: "(a) which is not on, or
directed against, a military objective; or (b) which employs a method or
means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objec-
tive; or (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 7 As a general matter, such use would already
be prohibited by customary principles of international humanitarian
law and Additional Protocol I. However, Protocol II goes on to limit
employment in civilian population centers when combat is not ongoing
(with certain exceptions), restrict various uses of remotely delivered
mines, and require States to record and publish the location of mine-
fields and cooperate in their removal following the armed conflict."°
Due to the concern of many States that Protocol II had not gone far
enough, and in light of the continued widespread use of the mines in the
years following adoption of the Conventional Weapons Convention
mines protocol, the problem was readdressed at a Review Conference in
1995. The 1996 Amended Protocol that resulted added substantial ad-
ditional protection. Among the most important modifications were a
ban on the use of difficult to detect anti-personnel mines, self-
destruction and self-deactivation requirements, further restrictions on
the use of remotely delivered mines, and enhanced clearance obliga-
105. All declarations, reservations, and understandings are available at The ICRC
Treaty Data Base website (visited May 10, 1999)
<http://www.icrc.org/unicc/ihl eng.nsf/WEB?OpenNavigator> (including all signatures
and ratifications by State).
106. ICRC, Issues and Topics, Landmines, The Problem (visited May 10, 1999)
<http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/Doclndex/home eng?OpenDocument>.
107. Additional Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby
Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), art. 3.3, Oct. 12, 1995.
108. Id. arts. 4, 5, 7, & 9.
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tions.'O° When even these additional requirements were deemed insuffi-
cient by certain governments, an effort to ban anti-personnel mines al-
together was launched. The result, discussed infra, is the 1997 Ottawa
Treaty.
Also of environmental significance is Protocol III on incendiary
weapons. Article 2.4 provides that "[ilt is prohibited to make forests or
other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons
except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal, or cam-
ouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves mili-
tary objectives.""' Of course, fire can cause significant environmental
damage, both through direct destruction and by denying animal life its
habitat."' What is noteworthy is that this prescription takes military
concerns into account in much the same way the environmental war
crimes provision of the ICC Statute does. Thus, it is much more widely
palatable than absolute prohibitions such as that expressed in Article
35(3) of Additional Protocol I.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Nearly 60 years after
adoption of the 1925 Gas Protocol, the international community acted to
expand the prohibitions on chemical weapons in the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction."' Unfortunately, the ear-
lier agreement had not fully succeeded in removing such weapons from
the battlefield. They were used by both sides in the war between Iran
and Iraq and tragically targeted by Saddam Hussein's forces against
the Kurds of Northern Iraq in the 1980s.13  There is, of course, also
109. Amended Additional Protocol II, supra note 102, arts. 4, 5, 6, 10, & 11.
110. Additional Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons (Protocol III), art. 2.4, Oct. 12, 1995.
111. In 1973, the Secretary General of the United Nations noted that "[a]lthough there
is a lack of knowledge of the effects of widespread fire in these circumstances, such at-
tempts may lead to irreversible ecological changes having grave long-term consequences
out of all proportion to the effects originally sought. This menace, though largely unpre-
dictable in its gravity, is reason for expressing alarm concerning the massive employment
of incendiaries against the rural environment." U. N. DEP'T OF POLITICAL AND SEC.
COUNCIL AFFAIRS, NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR
POSSIBLE USE, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/8803fRev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.I.3 (1973).
112. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Chemical
Weapons Convention].
113. See Reports of Commission of Experts, U.N. Docs. S/17130 (Apr. 25, 1985),
S/17932 (Mar. 21, 1986) and S/18863 (May 14, 1987). See also Statement of the President
of the Security Council, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. SJPV.2667, reprinted in RESOLUTIONS
AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1946-92, 466 (Karel C. Wel-
lens ed., 1993); Julian Robinson & Jozef Goldblat, Chemical Warfare in the Iran-Iraq War,
SIPRI Fact Sheet, May 1984, <http://www.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984.html>. As
a result of these incidents, the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
adopted the Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons condemning the States
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speculation that they may have been used during the Gulf War in 1991.
The 1993 convention seeks to remedy this continued usage by im-
posing much more robust restrictions on chemical weapons. Indeed,
whereas the 1925 Gas Protocol was a true humanitarian law instru-
ment, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is perhaps better char-
acterized as a disarmament agreement. It provides that Parties must
refrain from any use, or military preparation for the use, of chemical
weapons, as well as undertake never to "assist, encourage, or induce, in
any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State
Party."14 Like the Biological Weapons Convention, it also obligates
Parties not to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire chemical weap-
ons,15 and they must destroy their stockpiles and production facilities.
6
Because of the difficulty of verifying State compliance, the agreement
establishes an intrusive on-site inspection and monitoring regime. '
The Chemical Weapons Convention came into effect in 1997; at that
time the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was es-
tablished in The Hague to implement it."' United States ratification
came in 1997 as well.
A number of provisions are especially noteworthy. First, the con-
vention bans use of chemical weapons "under any circumstances" and
does not admit of reservations; this effectively forbids the use of chemi-
cal weapons in belligerent reprisal."9 Additionally, the "any circum-
stances" language extends the convention's reach from international to
internal armed conflicts. 20 The 1925 Protocol, by contrast, was limited
to the former. Finally, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention evoked
questions regarding riot control agents. Recall that the United States
interpretation of the 1925 Gas Protocol was that it did not apply to such
use. The 1993 convention seemed to address this contention by disal-
lowing the use of "riot control agents as an instrument of warfare." 2'
However, in its Resolution of advice and consent to the agreement, the
Senate required the President to certify that the prohibition did not ap-
ply in peacekeeping under Chapter VI or peace enforcement under
that had chemical weapons them and renouncing their use. Final Declaration of the Con-
ference of the States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States on
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jan. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1020. See also The United
Kingdom Condemnation of the Use of Gas Against the Kurds, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 579
(1988).
114. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 112, art. 1.1.
115. Id. art. 1.1.
116. Id. arts. 1.2-4.
117. Id. arts. V & Verification Annex.
118. For information on the Convention, see the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) website available at <http://www.opcw.nl/ptshome.htm>.
119. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 112, arts. 1.1 & XXII.
120. See WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION 13 (1994).
121. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 112, art. 1.5.
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when the United States was not a party
to the conflict.122 It also required him to maintain Executive Order
11850. 123 Although the President complied with these requirements,
US use of riot control agents during an armed conflict which the United
States was participating in would be, at least from a political expedi-
ency perspective, questionable. Whatever the case, the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention certainly does comprehensively ban use of those
chemicals most likely to harm the environment.
1997 Ottawa Treaty. Although the 1996 Review Conference for the
Conventional Weapons Convention resulted in amendment of the 1980
mines protocol, a number of States remained dissatisfied with anything
short of a total prohibition on anti-personnel mines. Led by Canada,
they gathered at a series of meetings to draft a convention banning
them." The resulting Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction was signed by over 120 countries in Ottawa in December
1997.15 The treaty came into effect in March 1999, with nearly 70 rati-
fications deposited. Among the non-signatories was the United States,
which believes anti-personnel mines might be of use in certain scenar-
ios, such as stemming a numerically superior North Korean attack on
South Korea. 12 However, the United States did indicate that by 2003 it.
would not use anti-personnel mines outside Korea and would seek to
develop alternatives that allowed their removal from Korea by 2006. It
also announced its intention to continue pursuing limitations on anti-
personnel mines in the UN Conference on Disarmament.
127
122. S. Exec. Res. 75 - Senate Report, s3373, Apr. 24, 1997, § 2(26).
123. Id. § 2(26)(b).
124. See Stuart Maslen & Peter Herby, An International Ban on Ant-Personnel Mines:
History and Negotiation of the "Ottawa Treaty," INT'L REV. RED CROSS, Dec. 1998, at 693.
125. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507, reprinted
in INT'L REV. RED CROSS, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 563 [hereinafter Ottawa Treaty].
126. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: US Requirements
for Landmines in Korea, Sept. 17, 1997 (visited May 11, 1999)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/white-house-publications/1997109/1997-09-17-landmine-
fact-sheets.text>.
127. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: US Efforts to Ad-
dress the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines (visited May 11, 1999) <
http:/www.oub.whitehouse.gov/white-house-publications/1997/09/1997-09-17-1andmine-
fact-sheets.text>. For a survey of the land-mine issue, with emphasis on operational con-
cerns, see Andrew C.S. Efaw, The United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersec-
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Regardless of US nonparticipation, the Ottawa Treaty is now bind-
ing on its growing collection of Party States. Much like its biological
and chemical weapons brethren, the agreement is comprehensive. By
it, States undertake "never under any circumstances" to use, develop,
acquire, retain, or transfer anti-personnel mines, or to assist or encour-
age anyone else to do so. 12 8 Parties are further obligated to destroy their
existing stockpiles,12 9 and States needing assistance in demining opera-
tions are entitled to seek help from other Party States. 30 Reservations
to the treaty are impermissible."' Given its remedial and prohibitory
aspects, the Ottawa Treaty promises much in terms of safeguarding the
environment and remediating the harmful effects of anti-personnel
mines.
Nuclear Weapons. That the use of nuclear weapons poses extraor-
dinary risks to the environment is indisputable. As noted supra,132 the
legality of their use in armed conflict was brought into question by the
International Court of Justice's 1996 advisory opinion on the subject."=
Although the Court held that there is no per se prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons in either conventional or customary international
law,"M the threat or use of such weapons "would generally be contrary to
tion Between Tactics, Strategy, Policy, and International Law, 159 MIL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
128. Ottawa Treaty, supra note 125, art. 1.1.
129. Id. art. 1.2.
130. Id. art. 6.
131. Id. art. 19.
132. See generally GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
133. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32. On the case,
see VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT (1998);
Peter H.F. Bekker, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
126 (1997); Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A
Historic Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1997); John H. McNeill & Ronald D. Neubauer,
The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Cases (8 July
1996): A First Appraisal, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, No. 316, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 103; Schmitt,
supra note 36, at 91.
134. There are numerous instruments, however, that address such aspects as the ac-
quisition, manufacture, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons. Regarding acquisi-
tion, manufacture, and possession, see Peace Treaties of 10 February 1947 (Treaty of
Peace with Italy) 61 Stat. 1245; State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent
and Democratic Austria, May 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2369, 217 U.N.T.S. 223; Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 762; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Rarotonga), Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442 (1985), and its Protocols; Treaty on
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1187 (1990).
Regarding deployment, see Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71;
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weap-
ons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115. Regarding testing,
see Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
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the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in par-
ticular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.0' 35 At the same
time, though, the Court suggested that use might be legal by stating
that it could not "conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of the State would be at
stake.0"36 The advisory opinion also side-stepped the issue of employ-
ment of nuclear weapons in belligerent reprisal. 37
The opinion is, of course, only advisory, and a number of key
States, including the United States, oppose the Court's interpretation. 138
In particular, the opinion failed to fully consider scenarios in which the
use of nuclear weapons might, arguably, not violate humanitarian
norms. '39 Nevertheless, although its finding was merely persuasive in
normative effect, as the opinion of the ICJ it will enjoy great deference.
That the Court contemplated environmental harm in coming to its con-
clusion is clear. As it noted, nuclear weapons
Release not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also
powerful and prolonged radiation .... These characteristics render the
nuclear weapons potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of nu-
clear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have
the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the
planet.
140
C. Non-environmental Specific Humanitarian Law Treaty Norms
Although there is a relative paucity of environment specific norms
in humanitarian law, significant environmental protection for the envi-
ronment derives from provisions not originally conceived of as encom-
passing the environment. These facets of conventional law extend back
to the earliest treaties.
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. The Declaration Renouncing the
Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Test
Case].
135. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 32.
136. Id. The Court paid particular attention to the principles of distinction and un-
necessary suffering. Id. 78.
137. Id. f 46. Reprisals are unlawful acts committed by a State that has itself been
the victim of an unlawful act in order to compel the wrongdoer to desist.
138. See Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, June
20, 1995, Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 32.
139. For example, use of tactical nuclear weapons against armored forces in a remote
area or use of nuclear mines at sea.
140. Nuclear Weapons Test Case, supra note 136, 94.
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Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration)"' was the first modern treaty to
limit the use of a weapon during armed conflict. In the 1860s Russia
had developed an exploding bullet, primarily for use against ammuni-
tion wagons. However, in 1867, at Dumdum, India, it was modified to
explode upon hitting a soft surface, including a human body. Con-
cerned that such ordnance would be inhumane, and unwilling to face it
itself, Russia urged an effort to outlaw small exploding projectiles. The
ensuing St. Petersburg Declaration, which outlawed them, is most often
cited as illustrating the now universally accepted principle of humanity
and its prohibition on unnecessary suffering. It is also significant in its
articulation of the related principle that "the only legitimate object
which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken
the military force of the enemy."' Although the United States is not a
Party to the agreement, the latter principle is well-recognized as part of
customary international humanitarian law. By this principle, any de-
struction caused intentionally to the environment that did not reflect a
military purpose would be prohibited.
1907 Hague Convention IV, with Annex. The effort to limit the
means and methods employed in warfare continued as the 19' Century
came to a close. In 1899 the First Hague Peace Conference convened to
address the topic and build on earlier work in the field.' It enjoyed
greater success than previous efforts, adopting three conventions and
three declarations.'" Convention II, the most important of these, sets
forth general principles of land warfare.' The 1899 Final Act of the
Hague Peace Conference called for a follow-on conference "in the near
future" to address unresolved issues. However, due to the onset of the
Russo-Japanese War, the Second Hague Peace Conference, convened
upon the initiative of President Theodore Roosevelt, was delayed until
1907. It subsequently adopted thirteen conventions. Of these, the An-
nex to Hague IV, the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land," contains the majority of provisions relevant to envi-
141. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration), reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 96
(Supp. 1907).
142. Id.
143. In particular, that of the Brussels Conference of 1874, which had produced the
Project of an International Conference on the Laws and Customs of War, supra note 35.
That agreement was never ratified.
144. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 157 (Supp. 1907). The conventions concerned "peaceful adjustments of interna-
tional disputes," "laws and customs of war on land," and adaptation of the 1864 Geneva
Convention to maritime warfare. The declarations included a ban on launching projec-
tiles or explosives from the air, a prohibition on the use of projectiles containing asphyxi-
ating or deleterious gases, and a ban on bullets that expand or flatten in the body. Id.
145. Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (Supp. 1907).
146. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
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ronmental protection. In great part, it mirrors the annexed regulations
of the 1899 Hague II Convention. The United States has ratified both
the 1899 and 1907 agreements. Even had it not, Hague IV has been
recognized as customary international law since at least the Nuremberg
trials.
1 4 7
Of particular importance is Hague IV's restatement of the Martens
Clause found in its 1899 counterpart. 148 That provision, which was sub-
sequently incorporated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 49 Additional
Protocols 1150 & II,5 and the Conventional Weapons Convention 2 , pro-
vides:
Until a more complete code of laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
Considered a general principle of international law, the Martens
Clause acts to preclude those who violate accepted, albeit not codified,
prescriptive norms - customary law - from avoiding responsibility for
their actions. Thus, it helps effectuate those customary norms discussed
infra, as well as any emerging customary law on the subject of envi-
ronmental damage (recall, e.g., the discussion of the ICC Statute). In-
clusion of a Martens Clause in Additional Protocol II highlights its ap-
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV].
147. In response to the assertion that Hague IV was not applicable because it con-
tained an "all-participation" clause, the Tribunal stated:
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this question. The rules of land
warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing
international law at the time of their adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that
it was an attempt "to revise the general laws and customs of war," which it thus recog-
nized to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were rec-
ognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and
customs of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the Charter.
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946 (vis-
ited May 11, 1999)
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judlawre.htm>.
148. Hague IV, supra note 146. The clause is named after the Russian delegate, the
Livonian professor Friedrich von Martens, who proposed it at the 1899 Conference. See
Shigeki Miyazaki, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN
HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 433 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) (discussing the clause).
149. Geneva Convention I, supra note 43, art. 63; Geneva Convention II, supra note
43, art. 62; Geneva Convention III, supra note 43, art. 142; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 43, art. 158.
150. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, art. 1.
151. Additional Protocol II, supra note 43, pmbl.
152. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 100, pmbl.
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plicability to both non-international and international armed conflict.
Beyond the generality of the Martens Clause, Hague IV contains a
number of other articles that serve as de facto limits on environmental
harm during armed conflict. Article 22 provides that the "right of bel-
ligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.' 53
Among others, Geoffrey Best has cited this article as a conceptual basis
for restrictions on environmental destruction during hostilities." Arti-
cle 23(e) reiterates the premise first exemplified by the St. Petersburg
Declaration that employment of "arms, projectiles or material calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering" is forbidden." Despite assertions
to the contrary by certain commentators, 6 the unnecessary suffering
envisaged is limited to human suffering. Thus, environmental protec-
tion would be derivative, either based on environmental damage that
caused human suffering, or through employment of means (e.g., chemi-
cals) that harmed the environment in addition to causing humans un-
necessary suffering."7
By contrast, Article 23(g) offers direct protection to the environ-
ment through codification of the principle of military necessity, dis-
cussed infra. It disallows the destruction or seizure of the "enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war."" The adjective "enemy's" encompasses both
State-owned property and private property belonging to enemy citi-
zens. 59 "Property," however, proves a bit more terminologically elusive
when considered in the environmental context. Surely, there can be lit-
tle doubt that land, water supplies, animals, or crops qualify." ° But
what of the atmosphere? Can one argue, e.g., that Iraqi ignition of Ku-
waiti oil wells resulted in unnecessary damage to Kuwait's air? Might
153. Hague IV, supra note 147, art. 22.
154. Geoffrey Best, The Historical Evolution of Cultural Norms Relating to War and
the Environment, in CULTURAL NORMS, WAR, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18 (Arthur H. West-
ing ed., 1988).
155. Hague IV, supra note 147, art. 23(e).
156. For example, through reference to the French text of the article, one commentator
has argued that the provision applies to "property damage, environmental damage, or
damage to anything." Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New
Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 67, 100 (1992). This position is
particularly weak in light of Article 23(g).
157. Michael Bothe has argued that Iraqi action during the Gulf War violated Article
23(e). Michael Bothe, Environmental Destruction as a Method of Warfare: Do We Need
More Law?, 15 DISARMAMENT 101, 104 (1992).
158. Hague IV, supra note 146, art. 23(g).
159. This is the position taken by both the US Army and the ICRC. 2 Dep't of the
Army, International Law 174 (Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, 1962); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, IV COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 301 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter IV COMMENTARY].
160. For instance, following WWII, the War Crimes Commission charges ten German
administrators of Polish forests with violation of Article 23(g) for their unnecessary de-
struction of timber. See U.N. War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150-469 (1948).
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damage caused by oil releases to a straddling stock of fish or migratory
bird species constitute Article 23(g) property damage? How do concepts
of ownership, or even superior right to enjoyment (as in the exclusive
economic zone), play themselves out in terms of prohibited property
damage? Whatever the case may be, there is relative agreement that
the Iraqi actions during the Gulf War did violate Article 23(g).1
6 1
Hague IV also deals with the duties of occupiers. Of particular in-
terest in this regard is Article 55.
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and
usufructuary of the public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricul-
tural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied
country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and adminis-
ter them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.' 62
As a technical matter, the provision does not become operative until
a state of occupation occurs, i.e., when the area in question is placed
under the authority of enemy forces." Thereafter, occupying forces are
entitled to the enjoyment of the four categories of public property set
forth, but, as usufructuaries, may not permanently alter or destroy it.
Should the occupation end through the resumption of active hostilities
in the territory, Article 55 would yield to the Article 23(g) military ne-
cessity requirements. Other duties imposed by Hague IV that may in-
directly offer environmental protection include the duty to respect pri-
vate property and the prohibition on pillage.'
Geneva Convention IV. Following the carnage of the Second World
War, the international community again returned to the negotiating ta-
bles in search of new, and more responsive, normative structures for the
conduct of armed conflict. The result came in the form of four Geneva
Conventions, the fourth of which, the Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, relates to the issue at
hand. " Although some environmental protection will derive from sun-
dry Geneva IV provisions such as that prohibiting pillage, it is Article
53 that has the greatest impact. It provides that "[any destruction by
the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually
or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public au-
thorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military op-
161. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 625. See also War Crimes Documentation Cen-
ter, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, US Army, Re-
port on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) (unclassified version), Jan. 8,
1992, at 13 [hereinafter Army Report].
162. Hague IV, supra note 146, art. 55.
163. Id. art. 42.
164. Id. arts. 46 & 47.
165. Geneva IV, supra note 43.
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erations." '6
Like Hague IV's Article 55, the Geneva IV provision only applies in
occupied territory. This limitation was viewed as acceptable because
Hague IV's Article 23(g) would act to limit damage in situations not
amounting to occupation.167 Of course, occupied territory is particularly
susceptible to environmental damage not necessitated by military op-
erations. For instance, many argue that the Iraqi action in destroying
Kuwaiti oil wells and the intentional release of Kuwaiti oil into the Per-
sian Gulf in 1991 constituted a violation of Article 53.'
More problematic is the "absolutely necessary" language. The dan-
ger is two-fold. First, as noted by the author of the ICRC Commentary
to the convention, Jean Pictet, "[Ilt is to be feared that bad faith in the
application of the reservation may render the proposed safeguards val-
ueless; for unscrupulous recourse to the clause concerning military ne-
cessity would allow the Occupying Power to circumvent the prohibition
set forth in the Convention. "'69 His proposed remedy is reasonably in-
terpreting the standard so as to evidence a "sense of proportion in com-
paring the military advantages to be gained with the damage done."'
70
The dilemma lies in the fact that those who are "unscrupulous" are
least likely to engage in reasonable interpretation. By the same token,
acknowledgment that harm can be justified by military necessity is
positive in the sense that it makes Article 53 militarily acceptable; but
for such a limitation, this provision of humanitarian law risks desue-
tude as an impractical aspirational norm.'
166. Id. art. 53.
167. IV COMMENTARY, supra note 159, at 301.
168. See, e.g., Kutner & Nanda, supra note 64, at 93. In Charge I, Specification 10, the
Iraqis were charged with having "destroyed the real and personal property of protected
persons and the State of Kuwait; this destruction was not absolutely necessary to military
operations and occurred for the most part after military operations had ceased .. " See
also FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 625; Army Report, supra note 161, at 13; John H.
McNeil, Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict: Environmental Protection in
Military Practice, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
18, at 536 & 540; Adam Roberts, Environmental Issues in Armed Conflict: The Experience
of the 1991 Gulf War, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra
note 18, at 222 & 250.
169. IV COMMENTARY, supra note 159, at 302.
170. Id.
171. The relevance of military necessity was illustrated in the case of the German re-
treat from Norway. General Rendulic, who ordered a form of "scorched earth" operation as
the Germans withdrew in the face of Russian advances, was acquitted on the basis of his
(reasonably mistaken) belief that the actions were necessary to slow the Russian pursuit.
See Hostage Case (U.S. v. List), 11 T.W.C. 759 (1950); see also High Command Case (U.S.
v. Von Leeb), 11 T.W.C. 462 (1950) (involving destruction in the Soviet Union). The ICRC
Commentary noted that:
[a] word should be said here about operations in which military considerations require
recourse to a 'scorched earth' policy, i.e., the systematic destruction of whole areas by oc-
cupying forces withdrawing before the enemy. Various rulings of the courts after the Sec-
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A final article of environmental import is Article 147. It extends
"grave breach" status to "extensive destruction.. .of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.'
7 2
Thus, once the quantum of damage violative of Article 53 reaches the
"extensive" level, all Parties to Geneva IV must search out and try of-
fenders or turn them over to another State for prosecution. They must
also criminalize the offense through domestic legislation, 173 an obliga-
tion the United States complied with in 1996.7 Again, it has been sug-
gested that Iraqi Gulf War environmental destruction breached the Ar-
ticle 147 threshold.' A modicum of offshoot environmental protection
is also afforded by Article 147's characterization of "willful killing [and]
willfully causing great suffering or serious bodily injury to body or
health" as a grave breach; again, the chemical weapons example is ap-
ropos.
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention. In 1954 the Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization. '76 Although the bulk of the protec-
tions contained therein pertain to objects that are not environmental in
nature, broad destruction of the environment could place protected ob-
jects at risk. For instance, the Convention obligates Parties to safe-
guard and respect "movable or immovable property of great importance
to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architec-
ture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archeological sites;
groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic inter-
ond World War held that such tactics were in practice admissible in certain cases, when
carried out in exceptional circumstances purely for legitimate military reasons. On the
other hand the same rulings severely condemned recourse to measures of general devas-
tation whenever they were wanton, excessive or not warranted by military operations.
IV COMMENTARY, supra note 159, at 302.
172. Geneva IV, supra note 43, art. 147.
173. Id. art. 146. A party is simply required to take measures necessary for the sup-
pression of a simple breach.
174. United States War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104, 18 USC.
2401, 35 I.L.M. 1539. This act grants Federal Courts jurisdiction over grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Protocols. Until this time, the presumption was that any grave breaches
would be tried as violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in military courts-
martial. Note that active and passive jurisdiction (US actor/victim) are the bases for ju-
risdiction, not universal (all States) jurisdiction. The following year the Act was expanded
to cover various violations of the 1907 Hague Regulations, common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions (dealing with non-international armed conflict), and, when ratified,
Protocol III (mines) to the Conventional Weapons Convention, as amended in 1996. Ex-
panded War Crimes Act of 1997 (Section 583 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998), Pub. L. 105-118.
175. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 625; Army Report, supra note 161, at 13
176. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 216.
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est; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, his-
torical or archeological interest; as well as scientific collections and im-
portant collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the prop-
erty defined above. 177  The United States has not ratified the
Convention, but ratification with minor understandings is currently
under consideration.
Additional Protocol I. As noted earlier, Additional Protocol I is
noteworthy for containing the key provisions of humanitarian law spe-
cifically addressing the environment. Joining these are a number of
additional articles which offer further, albeit non-specific, protection.
Many restate principles expressed elsewhere in the law. For instance,
Article 35(1) mirrors the St. Petersburg Declaration and Hague IV in
reiterating the principle that "the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited. 1  Similarly,
Article 35(2) prohibits the causation of superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering, and, as noted, the Martens Clause is found in Article I of
Additional Protocol 1.179
Certain axial customary principles that enjoy environmental conse-
quence have been codified in the protocol. In great part, these reflect
the principle of discrimination, which unifies a number of related but
distinct sub-principles, and which exists as the principle of customary
or conventional humanitarian law with greatest normative valence.
The first sub-principle is distinction. Article 48 expresses the basic
rule: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popu-
lation and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and be-
tween civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall di-
rect their operations only against military objectives.' 80 Article 52 fur-
ther restates the prohibition against attacking civilian objects. Thus, to
the extent the environment, or a portion thereof, constitutes a civilian
object, it may not be directly targeted and combatants must seek to dif-
ferentiate between it and legitimate targets." ' Of course, as noted in
the context of the ICC Statute, it is not entirely clear whether all as-
pects of the environment are fairly characterized as civilian, let alone as
"objects."182
The principle of discrimination also includes the sub-principle of
proportionality. In the context of civilian objects, Articles 57.2(a)iii and
57.2(b) express its requirements.
177. Id. arts. 1(a) & 2.
178. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, art. 35(1).
179. Id. art 35(2).
180. Id. art. 48.
181. Id. art. 52.
182. See ICC Statute, supra note 1.
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Article 57.2(a)iii
[Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall] refrain from decid-
ing to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combi-
nation thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
Article 57.2(b)
[An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection
or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected.
A similar prohibition is contained in Article 51.5(b) vis-h-vis injury




Assuming that the environmental damage unintentionally (not the
objective) but knowingly (foreseeable collateral damage) caused com-
prises damage to a civilian object, it will be balanced against the mili-
tary advantage resulting from the operation. Before any balancing oc-
curs, however, the military advantage sought must reach the "concrete
and direct" threshold. The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I
indicates that the "expression... was intended to show that the advan-
tages concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that ad-
vantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only ap-
pear in the long term should be avoided.""'
Beyond codifying broad preexisting norms of customary interna-
tional law, Additional Protocol I includes various articles of narrower
scope which also safeguard components of the environment. Article
54(2), for example, provides that:
[I]t is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless ob-
jects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
food-stuffs, agricultural areas for production of food-stuffs, crops, live-
stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works,
for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to
the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive,
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or
for any other motive."5
Obviously, much of the environment (farmlands, water supplies,
etc.) would fall within the ambit of potentially protected objects. Since
183. Id. art 57.1.
184. PRoTocoLs COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 684.
185. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, art. 54.2.
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the items cited in the article's text are merely illustrative of those which
may qualify, so too would certain others. For instance, fuel oil, electric-
ity, and lines of communication could be essential to providing the civil-
ian population sustenance and might be targeted so as to deny it to
them. While none of these target sets are themselves components of the
environment, attacks thereon might well risk environmental harm.
The article would also prohibit use of the environment as a weapon in
various circumstances. For instance, altering weather or climate could
severely affect food production.
It is important to understand, though, that the protection only op-
erates upon existence of a particular mens rea - the desire to deny sus-
tenance. There are two exceptions. Even though the requisite state of
mind may be missing, if the result of an attack is to cause starvation
among the civilian population or cause it to move, Article 54 prohibits
the operation.186 Additionally, if the sustenance denied is used solely for
an opponent's armed forces, then the objects that provide it are ex-
empted from the prohibition. 187 Finally, the article's restrictions are
inapplicable when the destruction is conducted by a Party to the conflict
on its own territory and is motivated by "imperative military neces-
sity."'8  By these standards, Article 54 generally outlaws the type of
scorched earth tactics witnessed in the Second World War unless con-
ducted defensively on one's own territory.
From a humanitarian point of view, the weakness in the article lies
in its intent element. Unless the attacker harbors the desire to deny
sustenance, the prescriptive norm does not apply, absent a resultant ef-
fect so severe as to occasion starvation or forced movement. Of course,
the prohibition on targeting civilian objects moderates this stricture, for
the only intent necessary to violate it is that the civilian object be di-
rectly struck. Effectively, then, the sole permissible attack on objects
contributing to other than solely military sustenance occurs when the
military advantage that accrues outweighs the impact on the civilian
population and the underlying goal of the operation is unrelated to sus-
tenance. Attacks resulting in civilian starvation would never meet the
threshold, except, possibly, when conducted on one's own territory.
As noted, the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I;
however, it has no objection to any of the articles cited immediately
above. It does object, for reasons to be described, to Article 56, a com-
plex effort to provide protection to dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical
generating stations.
Clearly, an attack on the enumerated facilities might pose severe
186. Id. art. 54.3(b).
187. Id. art. 54.3(a).
188. Id. art. 54.5.
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environmental risks through release of flood waters or radioactivity. 8 9
The core prescriptions are as follows.
Article 56 - Protection of works and installations containing dan-
gerous forces
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the
object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located
at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the
object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population.
The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall
cease:
for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal func-
tions and in regular, significant and direct support of military opera-
tions and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such sup-
port;
for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric
power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations
and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these
works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and
direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only fea-
189. The ICRC recounts numerous historical uses of the release of forces which caused
environmental damage:
[I]n the seventeenth century the Dutch, despite protests from the peasants, did not hesi-
tate to flood part of their cultivated land by breaching the dykes in order to prevent the
advance of adverse troops. In 1938, the Chinese authorities breached the dykes of the
Yellow River near Chang-Chow to stop the Japanese troops, resulting in extensive losses
and widespread damage. In 1944, again in the Netherlands, German troops flooded many
thousands of hectares of agricultural land with sea water to prevent the advance of the
enemy.
It was also during the Second World War that deliberate attacks were mounted against
hydro-electric dams. The best known are those which destroyed the dams in the Eder and
the Mohne in Germany in May 1943. These operations resulted in considerable damage:
125 factories were destroyed or seriously damaged and in addition 3,000 hectares of culti-
vated land were lost for the harvest of that year, 1,300 persons were killed, including
some deported persons and allied prisoners, and finally, 6,500 head of livestock were lost.
During the war in Korea aircraft attacked dams used for irrigation in the north of the
country. In the Viet Nam War attacks were mounted against dams and dykes, though the
United States declared that the damage caused, insofar as this was established, was acci-
dental or secondary.
PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 667.
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sible way to terminate such support.
* . . If the protection ceases and any of the works, installations or
military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical
precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of dangerous forces.
It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military
objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisal.
•.. [I]nstallations erected for the sole purpose of defending the pro-
tected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not
themselves be made the object of attack, provided they are not used in
hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks
against the protected works or installations and that their armament is
limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the
protected works or installations.
Several points about the formula are worthy of mention. First, a
similar provision exists in Additional Protocol II. Therefore, the de-
rivative environmental protection of these restrictions would apply in
both international and non-international armed conflict. Second, al-
though the article is styled "works and installations containing danger-
ous forces," the ICRC Commentary makes clear that protected objects
include only those detailed in paragraph 1. 191 Thus, even though
strikes against targets such as oil storage facilities, wells, or tankers
would, as glaringly demonstrated during the Gulf War, also release
dangerous forces, they would not violate Article 56.'9 Third, despite
utilization of the term "severe" again, the threshold for prohibited dam-
age is actually lower than might appear at first blush. The ICRC
Commentary describes "severe losses" as "important" or "heavy." An-
ticipating criticism regarding the subjectivity of such non-quantifiable
and difficult to predict standards, the Commentary cautions that "this
concept is a matter of common sense and it must be applied in good
faith on the basis of objective elements such as proximity of inhabited
190. Additional Protocol II, supra note 43, at 15.
191. This issue has caused some confusion. For example, Greenpeace has asserted in
the context of Iraqi actions during the Gulf War that "[iut is unclear whether oil wells con-
stitute installations containing 'dangerous forces.' The examples given in Protocol I... are
not meant to be exhaustive, and a liberal construction could say that the release of the
force of the oil fires and spills is covered." WILLIAM M. ARKIN ET AL., ON IMPACT: MODERN
WARFARE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE GULF WAR 140 (1991). However,
the ICRC Commentary demonstrates that this contention is incorrect: "According to some
amendments, the list which is given should have been merely illustrative. However, as
the Rapporteur indicated, it was only after it was decided to limit the special protection
granted by the article to dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations and other
military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations, that it was
possible to draw up a text which was generally acceptable." PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY,
supra note 3, at 668.
192. The ICRC Commentary cites the example of attack on a factory manufacturing
toxic products that, if released as a gas, could endanger entire regions. Id. at 668.
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areas, the density of population, the lie of the land, etc. 193
Fourth, and most importantly, the article admits of a number of ex-
ceptions. Before dams and dikes may be stuck, they must meet each of
three criteria: 1) use for other than their intended purpose; 2) regular,
significant and direct support of the enemy war effort;194 and 3) attack
must be the only option available for denying the enemy that support.
Examples might include a dike forming a part of a system of fortifica-
tions or a road across a dam that is integral to the enemy's logistics sys-
tem. 95 Military objectives in the vicinity of dams, dikes and nuclear
electrical generating stations enjoy identical protection if an attack on
them might risk severe losses from the release of the "dangerous
forces." Nuclear electrical generating stations, given the critical role
electrical generation plays in a war effort, need not meet the first of
these criteria. Defensive emplacements at these locations employing
only armament capable of defensive purposes are not subject to attack.
If used offensively, or capable of offensive use, they still benefit from the
greater than normal protection extended to military objectives near pro-
tected works and installations. Finally, reprisal attacks against the
enumerated objects are proscribed.
As should be apparent, the protection afforded these three types of
facilities is substantial. Moreover, even if the criteria for exception are
met, other humanitarian norms, particularly the proportionality princi-
ple, could act to immunize the targets. The United States objects to Ar-
ticle 56 because it "create[s] a standard that differs from the customary
definition of a military objective as an object that makes 'an effective
contribution to military action."'19 Specifically, concern exists that at-
tacks would be forbidden against highly valuable targets even if the re-
sulting military advantage outweighed the severe losses. In addition,
the difficulty of determining the end use of electricity produced in an
integrated power grid triggers US anxiety about the provision. 97 De-
193. Id. at 669-70.
194. The ICRC Commentary attempts to objectify some of the subjectivity inherent in
the terms, albeit from a military officer's point of view without much success. It begins by
noting that the "terms merely express common sense, i.e., their meaning is fairly clear to
everyone." Id. at 671. It goes on to explain that "regular" implies a time standard and is
not "accidental or sporadic." "Significant" is more than "negligible" or "merely an inciden-
tal coincidence." "Direct" is explained as "not in an intermediate or roundabout way." Id.
195. Id.
196. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 7-10.
197. Judge Abraham Soafer, then Legal Adviser at the Department of State, expressed
the U.S. concern over this point in 1987.
[PIrotection can only end if [a protected work or installation] is used in "regular, signifi-
cant, and direct support of military operations."" In the case of a nuclear power plant, this
support must be in the form of "electric power." The negotiating history refers to electric
power for "production of arms, ammunition, and military equipment" as removing a power
plant's protection, but not "production of civilian goods which may also be used by the
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spite objections, works and installations covered by Article 56 were not
struck during Operations DESERT STORM, DESERT FOX, OR
ALLIED FORCE." Given the nature of combined operations,'" in
which US forces operate with Coalition allies that are Parties to Addi-
tional Protocol I, this should come as no surprise. Indeed, guidance is-
sued by the US Army to its legal advisers states that while Article 56 is
not "US law," it "should be considered because of the pervasive interna-
tional acceptance of [Additional Protocol] I. ' m
Like Geneva Convention IV, Additional Protocol I provides for a
grave breach regime. While violation of neither of the two environment
specific articles constitutes a grave breach in and of itself, making the
civilian population the object of attack, launching an indiscriminate at-
tack against civilians or civilian objects, and striking works or installa-
armed forces." The Diplomatic Conference thus neglected the nature of modern inte-
grated power grids, where it is impossible to say that electricity from a particular plant
goes to a prticular customer. It is also unreasonable for article 56 to terminate the protec-
tion of nuclear power plants only on the basis of the use of their electric power. Under
this provision, a nuclear power plant that is being used to produce plutonium for nuclear
weapons purposes would not use its protection.
Abraham D. Soafer, The Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements,
2 AM. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 460, 470-71 (1987). Arguably, he goes too far. By its own terms,
the article only prohibits attacks on nuclear electrical generating facilities. Facilities that
use electricity generated to directly produce other products, such as plutonium, would ap-
pear to fall outside its scope altogether; even if they did not, the targets could be struck
based upon the regular, significant and direct exception. Moreover, the use of electricity
produced is not restricted to military uses; instead, a facility is a valid target so long as
the electricity is used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations, re-
gardless of how else it might be used (assuming proportionality requirements are met).
The term "only" is more logically interpreted to bear on the "regular, significant and di-
rect" criteria, rather than "electric power." The reference to electrical power would seem
to make clear that the facility can be struck even if it is engaged in its intended purpose,
the production of electricity, because dams and dikes used for their intended purpose are
immune. For an excellent discussion of attacks on electrical grids, see James W. Craw-
ford, The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power
Systems, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Summer/Fall 1997, at 101.
198. The Gulf War offensive operations by Coalition forces, the 1998 attacks on Iraq in
response to Iraqi interference with the UN weapons inspection program, and the NATO
air campaign against the Yugoslavia, respectively. Note that US aircraft have attacked
Iraqi nuclear facilities, but not nuclear electrical generating stations. See Jozef Goldblat,
Legal Protection of the Environment Against the Effects of Military Activities, 22 BULL.
PEACE PROPOSALS 399 (1991) (discussing a critical approach regarding attacks on such
facilities).
199. "Joint" operations include forces of more than one service. "Combined" operations
include forces of more than one State.
200. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 7-10. The issue of targeting nu-
clear facilities was raised at the 1990 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The Hungarian and Dutch delegates, with support from several
other delegations, suggested an international agreement to address the topic. The US
Delegation did not respond to the proposal. David Fischer & Harald Muller, The Fourth
Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1991 STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RES. INST. Y.B. 555,
566.
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tions containing dangerous forces can all amount to one if the acts are
willful and death or serious bodily injury results.
20'
Customary Humanitarian Law Norms
The final body of humanitarian law governing environmental dam-
age during armed conflict consists of customary humanitarian law
norms. To achieve the status of customary international law, a norm
must be evidenced by both consistent and widespread state practice and
opinio juris vel necessitatis, a conviction that the practice is legally
obligatory. 02 In many cases, treaties may codify existing customary
law; in others, treaty obligations, over time, mature into customary law.
A number of the conventions discussed supra have achieved this status.
For instance, when forwarding his Report on the Statute for the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations noted:
That part of conventional international humanitarian law which
has beyond doubt become part of international criminal law is the law
applicable in armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Conven-
tion (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Regu-
lations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948;
and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August
1945.2
The Report was unanimously approved by the Security Council, in-
dicating its concurrence with the premises contained therein.2
201. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, arts. 85.3(a)-(c).
202. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines custom as "a general
practice accepted by law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1977,
art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052. The Re-
statement notes that custom "results from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, § 102(2) (1987). See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 ("Not only must the acts concerned amount to settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it."); The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed 320 (1900); The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10(1927); Asylum Case (Col. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266;
Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6.
203. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), 35, May 3, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159,
1170, cited with approval in Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 32, 81.
204. Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, SC Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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Underlying the vast proportion of conventional law are four cus-
tomary principles which enjoy further independent normative valence:
chivalry, humanity, military necessity, and discrimination. °5 Of these,
the principle of chivalry, with its focus on perfidy, possesses little rele-
vance to environmental destruction.
Humanity. The principle of humanity forbids the causation of un-
necessary suffering, including, according to US Army publications, un-
necessary damage to property.2  Although formulations of the principle
are generally expressed along these lines, were this to be the limit of
the humanity, it would add little beyond the principles of military ne-
cessity and discrimination.
The inherent autonomy of the principle is not to be sought in the ef-
fect of the act in question, but rather in its nature, and is usually ex-
pressed in specific restrictions on methods and means of warfare. Thus,
there are restrictions found on weaponry ranging from poison 2 8 to
chemical, biological, and blinding weapons. With the exception of poi-
Customary law did form a basis for prosecution or war crimes in the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg specifically noted
that, "All the defendants committed War Crimes.. .[pursuant to] a Common Plan or Con-
spiracy.... This plan involved.. .the practice of 'total war' including methods of combat
and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war" (emphasis
added). Indictment, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1 T.M.W.C. 42 (1947).
Today, this premise is itself accepted as a principle of customary international law
205. The form in which the core principles are expressed often varies. For instance,
the Air Force version employs the categories of military necessity, humanity, and chiv-
alry, with proportionality folded into necessity, whereas the Navy uses necessity, propor-
tionality and chivalry. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (AFP 110-31), Nov. 19, 1976, IT 1-3; NWP 1-14M,
§§ 5-2. In substance and application, though, the principles are identical across the mili-
tary services. This article employs the typology of discrimination adopted by Christopher
Greenwood. Greenwood, supra note 88, at 199-202.
206. The principle of chivalry is particularly important in undergirding the prohibition
on perfidious acts such as misuse of protective emblems. See, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I,
supra note 14, art. 37.
207. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 7-4. Among the first formal ex-
pressions of the principle is the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868. The Declaration pro-
vided:
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much
as possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate objet which States should endeavor to accomplish during War is
to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggra-
vate the sufferings of disabled men, or renders their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would therefore be contrary to the laws of human-
ity....
St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 141, at 95.
208. Burrus Carnahan has accurately noted that the prohibition poison weapons is one
of the oldest in humanitarian law. Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red
Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 705, 714.
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son, use of such weapons is generally not perfidious. Further, examples
of use that would comply with the principles of necessity and discrimi-
nation are easily imagined in each case. As an example, tear gas or
blinding lasers can be employed for perimeter defense of a fixed instal-
lation distant from a civilian population. Defense of military facilities
in armed conflict certainly meets the military necessity criterion, and
given the importance of this task, the military advantage accrued may
well outweigh possible incidental injury. Of course, the fact that the
weapons are "less-lethal"2 would offer additional support for their use.
Yet, in both cases the prohibition imposed on their utilization as a
means of warfare is absolute. Why?
The common thread is not that the forbidden acts, albeit possibly in
compliance with the other principles, are inhumane. Rather, it is that
they are inhuman. There seems to be a sense that despite both military
logic and the acceptability of methods and means of greater harm, de-
cent human beings simply do not commit certain acts. Arguably, these
are the acts that, in the terminology of the Martens Clause, violate the
"dictates of public conscience." As technology advances, and the dic-
tates evolve, further categories seen as inhuman may emerge.
In the context of the environment, the principle offers protection in
two ways. First, certain specific humanity prohibitions remove poten-
tially deleterious weapons or tactics from the battlefield. As an exam-
ple, the prohibition on the use of poisons would preclude poisoning an
enemy's water supply. Similarly, the proscription of biological and
chemical weapons affords the environment protection already de-
scribed.
A second "benefit" lies in the principle's prospective application. To
the extent it tracks evolving "public conscience," it may well develop an
environmental component. For instance, although humanity has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a brake on human suffering, the US Army ex-
plicates its scope as including "property suffering. 21 0 If the environ-
ment qualifies as property (ascertaining the reach of the juridical
concept of property as it relates to the environment poses its own prob-
lems), it benefits from such extensions. Environmental attacks during
the Gulf War offer an apt illustration. The official Department of De-
fense (DOD) report on the war opined that the level of destruction
caused by the Iraqi environmental oil attacks probably did not violate
the Additional Protocol I restrictions in Articles 35 and 55.211 However,
the immediate public reaction to them was vociferous; President Bush
209. A term of art used to indicate weapons with an intended purpose, or likely result,
of not causing death or serious bodily injury.
210. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 7-4.
211. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 625.
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labeled the actions "environmental terrorism, 2  even though positing
an Iraqi military motivation was not beyond credulity."' Thus, we may
be seeing a twinkling of an emerging norm, based in the humanity prin-
ciple, that precludes extensive environmental damage as a method or
means of warfare - because decent human beings simply do not engage
in such acts.
Military Necessity. The principle of necessity disallows the use of
force beyond that required for the partial or complete submission of the
enemy.2 14 It was articulated by the International Military Tribunal fol-
lowing the Second World War in an oft cited passage from the Hostage
Case.
[Military necessity] does not permit the killing of innocent inhabi-
tants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The
destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of
international law. There must be some reasonable connection between
the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.
215
This seemingly simplistic proposition is relatively difficult to apply
except at the margins. It would seldom be the case that the actual de-
gree of force employed against a valid military objective would, in and of
itself, be questioned (beyond compliance with the principle of propor-
tionality). Instead, the linchpin issue is generally that of motive. Why
did the actor destroy the object? Was the motive simply wanton de-
struction? Was the motive other than military in nature, such as ter-
rorizing the civilian population? In the post-WWII war crimes trials,
certain scorched earth operations were deemed legitimate as necessary,
whereas others were labeled wanton.16 Despite the similarity of de-
struction, the rationale varied. If it can be demonstrated that the actor
harbored a determinative subjective intent unrelated to advancing, in a
direct way, his or her military situation, the act in question will be
unlawful.
212. Address Before a joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 74, 79 (1991). One commentator suggested that among the possible motives was
"ecological terrorism in retaliation for the bombing." Robert McFadden, Oil Threatens
Fishing and Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at 4.
213. For example, and very theoretically, the purpose of the release of oil into the Gulf
may have been to foil Coalition amphibious operations, whereas the igniting of the oil
wells might have occurred to create an obscurant, thereby shielding Iraqi forces from Coa-
lition air and ground attacks. Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, Greenpeace
posed a number of possible military explanations for the Iraqi actions. PROTOCOLS
COMMENTARY, supra note 187, at 141.
214. See Hilaire McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity,
30 REVUE DE DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 216 (1991) (regarding military
necessity).
215. Hostage Case, supra note 171, at 1253-54.
216. See IV COMMENTARY, supra note 159, at 302.
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The practical problem is ascertaining state of mind. Given the im-
possibility of doing so with certainty, the objective circumstances sur-
rounding the act must generally be evaluated before impugning intent.
Can an "imperative demand" for the destruction be expressed in the
context of the conflict as it stood at the moment of the act (or as the con-
flict could reasonably be predicted to unfold)? Would a similarly situ-
ated reasonable actor have included the act among possible actions nec-
essary to overcome enemy forces? Returning to the environmentally
destructive acts of the Iraqis during the Gulf War, the DOD has opined
that even assuming one purpose was to obscure potential Coalition tar-
gets, that purpose could well have been accomplished by simply opening
the valves to the wells and igniting the resulting oil spill. To have ac-
tually destroyed the wells suggests, instead, a punitive motive. 27 Re-
gardless of this proposition's persuasiveness, or lack thereof, it illus-
trates the type of reasoning required to apply the principle of necessity
in close cases, especially those involving acts directly harmful to the en-
vironment.
Discrimination. The principle of discrimination, which is well rep-
resented in conventional law such as Additional Protocol 1,218 includes
limits on both indiscriminate weapons (or techniques of warfare), i.e.,
those incapable of discriminating between legitimate military targets
and civilians or civilian objects, and indiscriminate use of weapons oth-
erwise capable of discrimination. Most existing methods and means of
warfare incapable of adequate discrimination and likely to harm the
environment have already been prohibited through conventional law.
Biological weapons, chemical weapons and environmental modification
are examples. Nevertheless, should future weaponry indiscriminately
endanger the environment, a civilian object, its employment in armed
conflict would be forbidden.
Greater protection is found in the latter aspect of discrimination,
indiscriminate use. There are three components of this principle: dis-
tinction, minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury, and pro-
portionality. Distinction forbids directly targeting objects protected un-
der humanitarian law, particularly civilians and civilian objects."9
Therefore, unless the environment constitutes a military objective, it
may not be directly targeted.220
Minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury requires those
conducting military operations to forgo causing that which is reasona-
217. FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 625-26.
218. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, pt. IV.
219. Id. arts. 48 & 51, 4.
220. See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of Military Objective in the Law of
Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 195 (Michael Schmitt ed., 1998)
(discussing military objectives).
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bly avoidable, even if the intended target is a military objective, the de-
struction of which would otherwise be justified by the military advan-
tage likely to accrue to the attacker.22' By this principle, military opera-
tions must seek to avoid harm to the environment when operationally
feasible. In the oil fire smoke as an obscurant example cited in the
DOD Gulf War Report, even if the Iraqis had intended to frustrate Coa-
lition target acquisition, they could have done so by continuously spill-
ing and igniting the oil instead of destroying the wellheads themselves.
Destroying them made it necessary to undertake the complicated task
of capping the wells, a task that occupied much time and allowed oil
and oil fires to continue despoiling the environment long after any pos-
sible military benefit was acquired.
Finally, discrimination includes the principle of proportionality.
2 2 2
Proportionality, codified in Articles 51 and 57 of Additional Protocol I,
prohibits acts likely to bring about collateral damage or incidental in-
jury that is disproportionate to the military advantage reasonably an-
ticipated from the operation. Damage to the environment would be fac-
tored into the balancing against military advantage, assuming, as
discussed supra, that the component of the environment suffering the
harm qualifies as a civilian object.
The dilemma is that performing proportionality calculations re-
quires valuation of both the military advantage and the collateral dam-
age/incidental injury. Understandably, this injects significant subjec-
tivity into the process, not only because value may shift relative to the
context in which a proposed action takes place, but also because differ-
ent individuals will often arrive at very different conclusions as to the
(negative) value to attribute to the unintended harm caused.
ASSESSING THE NORMATIVE ENVIRONMENT
While it is only the purpose of this article to catalogue norms of in-
ternational humanitarian law most relevant to protection of the envi-
ronment in armed conflict, several brief comments on the adequacy of
that corpus of law may serve to encourage further reflection. In any
such assessment, humanitarian law must be tested against its two
foundational objectives - separating non-participants and non-
participant objects from the effects of a conflict and limiting the scale
and quality of violence, even that involving combatants. Discrimination
exemplifies the former, unnecessary suffering the latter. With one ex-
ception, a shallow textual analysis would suggest that existing norms of
221. See also ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 14, art. 57.
222. See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in In-
ternational Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993) (discussing the general subject of propor-
tionality).
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humanitarian law meet these needs vis-A-vis the environment. Assum-
ing the environment is characterized as a civilian object, and it would
be wrong for it not to be, the various principles appear to set, in theory,
an appropriate level of protection. In particular, the codified and cus-
tomary iterations of the principles of military necessity and proportion-
ality impose sensible standards disallowing both direct targeting of the
environment in most cases, and collateral damage thereto unless out-
weighed by military advantage. Other limitations, ranging from spe-
cific weapons prohibitions to the Martens Clause, further strengthen
the regime.
The exception is Article 35 of Additional Protocol I. Whereas other
norms are either specifically posed in the context of human suffering,
such as the Article 55 requirement that environmental damage be as-
sessed relative to its prejudicial effect on the health or survival of the
population, or logically interpreted in that fashion, as with the propor-
tionality principle's weighing of all collateral damage and incidental in-
jury against military advantage, Article 35's prescription operates in a
contextual vacuum.' Only environmental damage is measured to as-
sess compliance. Thus, whereas the greater part of humanitarian law
appraises the environment anthropocentrically, Article 35 treats it as
possessing intrinsic value (value not measured by its contribution to
humankind) that is autonomous to some degree.
This reality has two dramatic consequences. First, it is possible to
conceive of a situation in which a particular tactic, target or weapon is
unavailable because the resulting environmental harm would breach
the "widespread, long-term and severe" threshold. This may force
planners and commanders to turn to alternatives that generate greater
civilian casualties or damage to civilian property than would otherwise
be the case, but that would nevertheless comport with proportionality
mandates. It is, of course, certainly appropriate to view the environ-
ment as enjoying independent, and truly unique, value - value which
often exceeds that of other civilian objects. After all, human beings and
the environment comprise an interconnected and interdependent eco-
system. The general irreplacibility of the environment exacerbates this
dependency relationship. Yet, to elevate the environment over human
well-being without considering the contextual milieu then holding
would seem the height of folly.
It is equally foolhardy to ignore, as Article 35 type intrinsic value
formulae do, the military advantage anticipated from the environmen-
tally destructive operation in question. Military advantage is not a
morally neutral phenomenon, nor does the destruction that results from
armed conflict necessarily represent a negative in net humanitarian
223 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 1, supra note 14, arts. 35 & 55.
2000
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLWY
calculations. On the contrary, military operations often serve positive
humanitarian ends and advance morally worthy causes. Self-defense
against aggression, for instance, is universally accepted as justified.
Similarly, humanitarian intervention in the face of the horrendous vio-
lence that so tragically (and frequently) characterizes human interac-
tion may well alleviate - when proportional, necessary, and wisely exe-
cuted - great suffering. Standards of environmental protection that
fail to take considerations of military advantage into account risk fail-
ure to see the forest for the trees.
In an optimal normative edifice, such standards would discount
military advantage that did not serve just ends. Yet to do so would se-
verely test the humanitarian rationale underpinning the distinction be-
tween the morally hued jus ad bellum and the morally neutral jus in
bello. Relativity threatens, for very practical reasons, the willingness of
belligerents and combatants to uniformly apply the latter body of law.
This being so, prescriptive norms which acknowledge the need to factor
in military advantage, as the ICC Statute's Article 8 does and Addi-
tional Protocol I's Article 35 does not, evince a grasp of war's realities."
Thus, they run the greatest chance of adherence by all participants.
Although the textual norms, and standard recitations of customary
humanitarian law, generally take the right conceptual approach to
safeguarding the environment, to be fully effective they must be com-
prehensible to those engaging in armed conflict, capable of application
on the battlefield, and politically and judicially enforceable. Do those
described in this article achieve these sine qua non criteria?
At the extremes, they do. Certain acts of violence and destruction
during armed conflict are on their face wanton, spasmodic, or malevo-
lent and would clearly breach the normative sea walls. They exhibit res
ipsa loquitor quality.
In most cases, however, acts harmful to the environment enjoy less
normative clarity. For instance, recall the definitional legerdemain
characterizing each of the environment specific prescriptions. What is
meant by "widespread, long-term and severe," the standard of choice for
all such formulae? Though developed contemporaneously, ENMOD and
Additional Protocol I lead those engaged in interpretation on divergent
journeys. This being so, applicability on the battlefield for those forces
bound by Additional Protocol I, will inevitably be limited to cases of ex-
treme destruction that all reasonable actors would agree upon. Of
course, benevolent policy decisions may lower the bar of acceptable
harm, but beyond the most aggravated cases autointerpretation will be
the rule. This conundrum will equally occupy attempts at enforceabil-
ity.
224 ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8; ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 1, supra note 14, art. 35.
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The environment specific provisions are not alone in lacking clarity.
What does the Hague IV, Article 23(g) phrase "imperatively demanded"
mean in practice? The Hostage Case's explication of the standard as a
"reasonable connection between the destruction and overcoming the en-
emy" would seem less stringent than the plain meaning of the phrase.
Likewise, when is damage to real property in occupied territory "abso-
lutely necessary" in the Geneva IV, Article 53 context? What is the na-
ture and scope of the threat that rises to the level of absolute necessity?
Such imprecision is hardly new to humanitarian lawyers or military of-
ficers; yet, it would be a disservice to fail to recognize that it exists
when judging the adequacy of the relevant law.
Even if terminological precision existed, the nascent state of scien-
tific knowledge regarding the environmental impact of specific military
operations complicates application of most of the instruments and cus-
tomary norms discussed. The Gulf War illustrates the problematic sci-
entific lacuna on the subject. When Saddam Hussein threatened to de-
stroy Kuwaiti oilfields if Coalition forces carried out their threat to
expel him from occupied territory,22 reputable scientists predicted that
igniting the oilfields could generate smoke equal to that of a nuclear ex-
plosion. The smoke would, according to these experts, be sufficient to
blot out sunlight, thereby causing temperatures to drop by as much as
68 degrees, a phenomenon that would have reverberating effects on air
currents.2 6 Wholesale destruction of ecosystems and severe human
health problems also topped the list of likely outcomes. Of course, noth-
ing of the sort happened despite Iraqi ignition of over 500 wellheads.
The environment, with significant human help, revived with unex-
pected vigor."l
225. On September 23, 1990, the Iraqis released a statement following the joint meet-
ing of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council and the regional command of the Arab So-
cialist Baath Party, chaired by Saddam Hussein. It read, in part, that "(t)he oil, its areas,
and Israel will be transformed into something different from what they are now. Thus
will be the deluge .... The oil areas in Saudi Arabia and in other parts of the states of the
region and all the oil installations will be rendered incapable of responding to the needs of
those who came to us as occupiers in order to usurp our sovereignty, dignity and wealth."
Partial Text of Statement by Iraq's Revolution Command, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 1990, avail-
able in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. See also Nora Boustany, Saddam
Threatens Mideast's Oil Fields: "Choking" Embargo Cited as Justification, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 1990, at Al. The threat appeared credible. That month the Iraqis detonated six
oil wells to practice for later operations. Arkin, supra note 18, at 119.
226. Scientists Warn of Environmental Disaster from a Gulf War, REUTERS, Jan. 2,
1991, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File. See also Experts Warn of
Global Fallout from Warfare: Environment; Scientists Say that Smoke from Blazing Ku-
wait Oil Fields Could Affect the Climate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1991, at AS.
227. See State of the Environment: Updated Scientific Report on the Environmental
Effects of the Conflict Between Iraq and Kuwait, 17th Sess., at 12-13, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC.17/Inf.9 (1993), at 12-13. See also United Nations Environment Program, Re-
port on the Inter-Agency Plan of Action for the ROPME Region, U.N. Environment Pro-
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Thus, definitional issues aside, scientific uncertainty would con-
tinue to frustrate both efforts to shape conduct to the normative
boundaries and attempts to impugn knowledge (knew or should have
known) to those who create environmental harm during their opera-
tions. Without understanding the science, how can one appraise de-
struction against, for instance, the "imperatively demanded" standard
of Hague IV, Article 23(g), the "in the knowledge that such attack will
cause" criterion of ICC Statute, Article 8, or the prevailing "widespread,
long-term and severe" verbiage? Along these same lines, the greater
the difficulty of anticipating likely collateral damage to the environ-
ment, the more imprecise the proportionality calculation. If one cannot
measure likely harm, there is no reliable value against which to weigh
the value of anticipated military advantage.
Valuation difficulties engendered by the state of the science are
compounded by the existence of disparate, and possibly discordant,
valuation paradigms. Consider the value-laden principle of proportion-
ality. While the norm is easily articulated, its exercise in the morally,
politically, and viscerally charged morass of modern combat proves elu-
sive. Recall the recent furor over collateral damage and incidental in-
jury of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Few can harbor doubts that the de-
struction of a passenger train, refugee convoys, or the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade were anything but accidental; and accidents are an unfor-
tunate - and inevitable - by-product of armed conflict. Yet, their ac-
cidental nature does not excuse them unless either absolutely unfore-
seeable despite reasonable care in planning and executing a mission2
or foreseeable (in either a specific or general sense), but outweighed by
the military advantage likely to accrue the attacker by striking the in-
tended target. The enigma lies in the weighing process.
Since proportionality employs a balancing test, it is necessary to
conceptually quantify the values being compared. Yet, the values in-
volved in proportionality - collateral damage and incidental injury
versus military advantage - are of a differing nature. How does one
weigh the military value of destroying a bridge along a line of communi-
cation, for instance, against the value to the civilian population of using
the same route for transport of purely civilian commerce or even relief
supplies? The difficulty arises because values are being calculated from
within disparate valuation paradigms.
Now factor in the environment as a subject of collateral damage.
What if, as discussed above, protection of the environment comes at a
cost to civilians or civilian objects? Even if it does not, different indi-
gramme, Oct. 12, 1991, reprinted in IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR
AFTERMATH 339 ( Mark Weller ed. 1991).
228. The principle was enunciated in the case of General Rendulic. Hostage case, su-
pra note 171.
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viduals view the environment, and thereby value it, differently. The
anthropocentric-intrinsic value distinction is one illustration of how
value may be conceptually determined. It may also be culturally de-
termined. Different cultures (or States) attribute different value to the
environment. A distressed State will understandably be less likely to
value environmental health than a 1' tier State, not because it is in fact
less valuable, but because other concerns facing the distressed country,
including survival, dominate its own cognitive paradigm."s Finally,
value may be temporally determined. The rise of normative environ-
mental consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s tracked a broader trend
towards environmental sensitivity. Inclusion of environmental harm as
a war crime in the ICC Statute demonstrates that this consciousness
has achieved a degree of maturity. As the global community struggles
to stem growing environmental risk factors, this trend can be expected
to continue. Valuation of the environment will continue to evolve with
it, thereby complicating reliable proportionality calculations.
A more lengthy and robust analysis would be needed to identify
further faultlines in the protection of the environment during armed
conflict and fully develop those cited. However, the discussion should
suggest that the law lacks a certain degree of clarity, a fact exacerbated
by insufficient scientific knowledge. These two realities will make it
difficult for policy makers, field commanders, legal advisers, and those
charged with enforcing humanitarian law to reliably and consistently
apply it.
But the sky is not falling. Environmental "Chicken Littles" are
unlikely to foster enhanced protection of the environment; indeed, they
risk distorting its appropriate place (as with intrinsic value standards)
in the normative architecture. Humanitarian law does extend measur-
able safeguards and the International Criminal Court is likely to help
address what many see as the seminal problem, enforcement. Most im-
portantly, the issue of environmental damage has finally made it into
the operational calculations of a number of militaries.
CONCLUSION
Then what is to be done? A convention addressing the issue, or at
229. Note that the issue here is not context (beyond cultural context). For example, a
field of corn is of greater value in a starving society than a well-fed one. The difference is
contextual; it is not the society that drives the distinction, but rather the relative degree of
hunger. Culturally disparate valuations of the environment, on the other hand, are driven
by cultural perspectives. One group of people may simply be more sensitive to the envi-
ronment than another, whether due to uniform education, common upbringing, reliance
on the environment for well-being, dominant religious affiliation, shared experiences and
needs, etc. See Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment, ARCHIV DES
VOLKERRECHTS, Mar. 1999, at 25, 48-56 (discussing valuation paradigms).
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least greater development of the subject in broader instruments, would
surely help. However, the time is not ripe. The controversy that
erupted over the Ottawa Treaty and ICC Statute hardly make this a
propitious time to take on such a complex topic; the political wounds
that resulted from those affrays need time to heal before any enterprise
could possibly hope to avoid stillbirth. Moreover, much additional sci-
entific work needs to be done before standards that reliably reflect State
expectations can be crafted.
Until the political and scientific foundations for such a convention
exist, a number of interim measures are certainly possible.230 First, sig-
nificant resources should be dedicated to exploring the environmental
consequences of armed conflict. To hope to protect the environment
without understanding the dynamics of the risks it faces is a pipe
dream. Second, additional emphasis needs to be placed on the subject
when training military operators and humanitarian law attorneys.
Some progress is being made in this field, but more is merited. In par-
ticular, judge advocate schools, war colleges, service academies, and in-
ternational courses such as those held at the Institute for International
Humanitarian Law, should seriously reassess their curricula to ensure
adequate attention is being paid to exploring the topic's normative and
operational dynamics. Similarly, the prospect of environmental damage
should be made a regular component of war gaming and military exer-
cises. Third, the fact the key military players, in particular the United
States, are not Party to certain of the most important agreements regu-
lating environmental harm during armed conflict frustrates the inter-
national effort to avert it (and isolates non-Parties politically). Non-
Party States should be encouraged to reassess their non-participation
when the circumstances that motivated it evolve. Finally, additional
thought needs to be devoted by legal scholars and practitioners to vari-
ous related, and relatively unexplored, topics - peacekeeping/peace en-
forcement and the environment, protecting the environment in non-
international conflict, environmental terrorism, investigation of envi-
ronmental destruction during armed conflict, remediation, etc.
Ultimately, of course, success will depend on internalizing envi-
ronmental values, but only while maintaining humanitarian perspec-
tive. Whether the appropriate balance will be maintained as this in-
creasingly important area of humanitarian law evolves remains to be
seen.
230. Among the best practical recommendations to date are Professor Adam Roberts'.
See
Adam Roberts, The Law of War and Environmental Damage, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2.
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APPENDIX
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY MANUALS AND
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICTr1
I. Preliminary Remarks
(1) The present Guidelines are drawn from existing international
legal obligations and from State practice concerning the protection of
the environment against the effects of armed conflict. They have been
compiled to promote an active interest in, and concern for, the protec-
tion of the environment within the armed forces of all States.
(2) Domestic legislation and other measures taken at the national
level are essential means of ensuring that international law protecting
the environment in times of armed conflict is indeed put into practice.
(3) To the extent that the Guidelines are the expression of interna-
tional customary law or of treaty law binding a particular State, they
must be included in military manuals and instructions on the laws of
war. Where they reflect national policy, it is suggested that they be in-
cluded in such documents.
II. General Principles of International Law
(4) In addition to the specific rules set out below, the general prin-
ciples of international law applicable in armed conflict-such as the
principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality-provide
protection to the environment. In particular, only military objectives
may be attacked and no methods or means of warfare which cause ex-
cessive damage shall be employed. Precautions shall be taken in mili-
tary operations as required by international law.
G.P.I. Arts. 35, 48, 52 and 57
(5) International environmental agreements and relevant rules of
customary law may continue to be applicable in times of armed conflict
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of
armed conflict.
231. U.N. GAOR, 49 'b Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 139, at 49-53, U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994),re-
printed in Hans-Peter Gasser, For Better Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: A
Proposalfor Action, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 637, 641-43 (1995).
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Obligations relating to the protection of the environment towards
States not party to an armed conflict (e.g., neighboring States) and in
relation to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (e.g., the
High Seas) are not affected by the existence of the armed conflict to the
extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of armed
conflict. (6) Parties to a non-international armed conflict are encouraged
to apply the same rules that provide protection to the environment as
those which prevail in international armed conflict and, accordingly,
States are urged to incorporate such rules in their military manuals
and instructions on the laws of war in a way that does not discriminate
on the basis of how the conflict is characterized.
(7) In cases not covered by rules of international agreements, the
environment remains under the protection and authority of the princi-
ples of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.
H.IV preamble, G.P.I Art. 1.2, G.P.II preamble
III. Specific Rules on the Protection of the Environment
(8) Destruction of the environment not justified by military neces-
sity violates international humanitarian law. Under certain circum-
stances, such destruction is punishable as a grave breach of interna-
tional humanitarian law.
H.W.R. Art. 23(g), G.IV Arts. 53 and 147, G.P.I Arts. 35.3 and 55
(9) The general prohibition to destroy civilian objects, unless such
destruction is justified by military necessity, also protects the environ-
ment.
H.IV.R Art. 23(g), G.IV Art. 53, G.P.I Art. 52, G.P.II Art. 14
In particular, States should take all measures required by interna-
tional law to avoid:
(a) making forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to
cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or
are themselves military objectives;
CW.P.III
(b) attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas or drinking water in-
stallations, if carried out for the purpose of denying such objects to the
civilian population;
G.P.I Art. 54, G.P.II Art. 14
(c) attacks on works or installations containing dangerous forces,
namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, even
where they are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release
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of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population and as long as such works or installations are entitled to
special protection under Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions;
G.P.I Art. 56, G.P.II Art. 15
(d) attacks on historic monuments, works of art or places of worship
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.
H.CP, G.P.I Art. 53, G.P.II Art. 16
(10) The indiscriminate laying of landmines is prohibited. The loca-
tion of all pre-planned minefields must be recorded. Any unrecorded
laying of remotely delivered non-self-neutralizing landmines is prohib-
ited. Special rules limit the emplacement and use of naval mines.
G.P.I Arts. 51.4 and 51.5, CW.P.II Art. 3, H.VIII
(11) Care shall be taken in warfare to protect and preserve the
natural environment. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
G.P.I Arts. 35.3 and 55
(12) The military or any other hostile use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as
the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party is
prohibited. The term "environmental modification techniques" refers to
any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of
natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth,
including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of
outer space.
ENMOD Arts. I and 11 (13) Attacks against the natural environ-
ment by way of reprisals are prohibited for States party to Protocol I
additional to the Geneva Conventions.
G.P.I Art. 55.2
(14) States are urged to enter into further agreements providing
additional protection to the natural environment in times of armed con-
flict.
G.P.I Art. 56.6
(15) Works or installations containing dangerous forces, and cul-
tural property shall be clearly marked and identified, in accordance
with applicable international rules. Parties to an armed conflict are en-
couraged to mark and identify also works or installations where haz-
ardous activities are being carried out, as well as sites which are essen-
tial to human health or the environment.
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e.g. G.P.I Art. 56.7, H.CP. Art. 6
IV. Implementation and Dissemination
(16) States shall respect and ensure respect for the obligations un-
der international law applicable in armed conflict, including the rules
providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict.
G.IV Art. 1, G.P.I Art. 1.1
(17) States shall disseminate these rules and make them known as
widely as possible in their respective countries and include them in
their programmes of military and civil instruction.
H.IV.R Art. 1, G.IV Art. 144, G.P.I Art. 83, G.P.II Art. 19
(18) In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or method of warfare, States are under an obligation to
determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances,
be prohibited by applicable rules of international law, including those
providing protection to the environment in times of armed conflict.
G.P.I Art. 36
(19) In the event of armed conflict, parties to such a conflict are en-
couraged to facilitate and protect the work of impartial organizations
contributing to prevent or repair damage to the environment, pursuant
to special agreements between the parties concerned or, as the case may
be, the permission granted by one of them. Such work should be per-
formed with due regard to the security interests of the parties con-
cerned.
e.g. G.IV Art. 63.2, G.P.I Arts. 61-67
(20) In the event of breaches of rules of international humanitarian
law protecting the environment, measures shall be taken to stop any
such violation and to prevent further breaches. Military commanders
are required to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report
to competent authorities breaches of these rules. In serious cases, of-
fenders shall be brought to justice.
G.IV Arts. 146 and 147, G.P.I Arts. 86 and 87
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING
THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN TIMES OF ARMED
CONFLICT
1. General principles of law and international customary law
2. International conventions
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Main international treaties with rules on the protection of the envi-
ronment in times of armed conflict:
Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, of 1907 (H.IV), and Regulations Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land (H.IV.R)
Hague Convention (VIII) relative to the Laying of Automatic Sub-
marine Contact Mines, of 1907 (H.VIII)
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, of 1949 (GC.IV)
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, of 1954 (H.CP)
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques, of 1976 (ENMOD)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I), of 1977 (G.P.I)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), of 1977 (G.P.II)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Ceitain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injuri-
ous or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, of 1980 (CW), with:
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby Traps and Other Devices (CW.P.II)
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INTRODUCTION
I am delighted and highly honored to deliver the McDougal Lecture
here at the University of Denver College of Law. I must also say that I
feel quite humbled. I could never hope to do justice to the work of the
late Professor Myres S. McDougal, after whom this lecture is named.
Professor McDougal was one of the great legal minds of the past cen-
tury, and probably the century's most original thinker in the field of in-
ternational law. Anyone who tries for the first time to understand Pro-
fessor McDougal's terminology and approach - an approach that has
come to be known as the "Yale School" - should be prepared to come
away with a headache. Or, at least with that feeling that comes from
thinking about something, viewing something, in a radically different
way - like seeing a Picasso for the first time.
Now, I never felt that I fully comprehended McDougal's approach,
even by the time I had the great fortune of becoming a member of the
International Law Commission of the United Nations. You can imagine
my surprise, therefore, when the member of the Commission from Su-
dan, Chief Justice EI-Rasheed, in commenting upon a statement I had
made, called it a "McDougalian analysis." I wasn't sure whether he was
complementing me on the incisiveness of my remarks, or suggesting
.Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law. Member of the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC),
1982-1991, and special rapporteur for the ILC's draft articles on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
- This article is a transcript of the McDougal Lecture given by Professor McCaffrey
at the University of Denver Sutton Colloquium, on February 27, 1999.
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that they were impenetrable! (He later assured me that he was an ad-
mirer of McDougal.)
But today my subject is quite down-to-earth. I want to talk to you
about the global fresh water shortage, which in all probability will
reach crisis proportions in the first decades of the next century. This
subject is convenient, not only because it is near and dear to my heart,
but also because it ties together the great state of Colorado and interna-
tional environmental law, the theme of this colloquium.
THE HARMON DOCTRINE
I start this story in the last century, just over one hundred years
ago, in the Rockies not too far west of here. It was there that actions of
farmers and ranchers in the 1880s and 1890s touched off a controversy
between the United States and Mexico that produced a legal theory
which has become famous--or, more accurately, infamous-throughout
the world. In a nutshell,' these Colorado farmers and ranchers began
diverting so much water from the headwaters of the Rio Grande to irri-
gate the San Luis Valley that their counterparts in Mexico noticed a
substantial drop in the flow of the river; a drop that was so great, that
they feared their communities would be "annihilated," in the words of
the Mexican Minister in Washington at the time, Matias Romero.' In-
deed, a U.S. Army general responsible for Texas reported that the Colo-
rado diversions had left the Rio Grande a dry bed for five hundred
miles.3
After a series of diplomatic communications on the issue between
the two countries, the American Secretary of State, Richard Olney, re-
ferred the matter to Attorney General Judson Harmon. As an aside,
you may think it rather odd that the State Department would ask the
Justice Department for advice on international law. But at that time,
the State Department did not yet have its own legal adviser's office - it
was not established until 1931.' Specifically, Secretary Olney asked
whether Mexico's claims to Rio Grande water are supported by interna-
tional law.
The views expressed in the Attorney General's response have be-
1. For a detailed discussion, see Stephen McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One
Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 965 (1996).
2. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Gresham (Oct. 12, 1894), reprinted in
FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S. 395 (1894).
3. Report of General Stanley to Secretary of War, Sept. 12, 1889, quoted in "Irriga-
tion of Arid Lands-International Boundary-Mexican Relations," H.R. REP. NO. 490A-
51, 1st Sess. 3 (1890).
4. An Act for the grading and classification of clerks in the Foreign Service of the
United States pf America, and providing compensation therefor. of 23 Feb. 1931, Pub. L.
No. 71-715, 46 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2654 (1988)).
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come known as the "Harmon Doctrine." In essence, what Harmon said
was that we could do anything we wanted within our territory, irrespec-
tive of any consequences that may befall others, because of what Profes-
sor Louis Henkin has called "the 'S' word": sovereignty.5 (Does this
sound familiar?) Specifically, Harmon declared, "[t]he fundamental
principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation,
as against all others, within its own territory."6 As support for this
proposition he relied on an opinion by none other than Chief Justice
John Marshall, in which the great jurist intoned: "The jurisdiction of
the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself."7  This led
Harmon to conclude that while "considerations of comity" may lead to a
different answer, "the rules, principles, and precedents of international
law impose no liability or obligation upon the United States."
Now, whenever you hear someone make a statement about the law
that is this, well, absolute, you tend to want to examine its foundations
a little more closely. And in fact, when you do so, you find that
Harmon's conclusions were not supported, much less compelled, by the
law as it existed at the time.9 Take, for example, Chief Justice Mar-
shall's ringing declaration about the exclusivity and absoluteness of ter-
ritorial sovereignty. This dictum was uttered in a case involving, not an
international river, but whether a ship, the schooner Exchange, was en-
titled to sovereign immunity. Far from deciding that the vessel could
not enjoy immunity because it was in an American port, and thus under
the exclusive, absolute jurisdiction of the United States, the Court con-
cluded that the Exchange was, in fact, entitled to immunity. The jus-
tices, under Marshall's wise guidance, thus recognized that there are
limitations to the concept of "absolute" sovereignty-limitations that
apparently escaped Attorney General Harmon.
You are probably asking yourselves, what does all this have to do
with international environmental law, or even with the subject of my
remarks? The answer is, everything. Because if a country really is ab-
solutely sovereign, in the sense that it is not responsible for the conse-
quences outside its territory of actions within it, the countries affected
by those consequences would have no legal recourse-they would have
to try to persuade the source state to agree to abate the interference.
Thus, the only binding source of international environmental law would
5. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, 1 ASIL NEWSL., Mar.-May 1993, at
7.
6. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 (1895) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Harmon Doc-
trine].
7. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812), quoted in 21 Op.
Att'y Gen. 274, 281.
8. Harmon Doctrine, supra note 6, at 283.
9. See McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 973-985.
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be treaties, and even those would be very difficult to negotiate, given
that the point of departure for negotiations would be the freedom of
states to impose externalities on other states and on areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
In fact, Harmon's opinion has a certain resonance with the first
clause of what perhaps today may be described as the "venerable" Prin-
ciple 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment.'0 That clause tells us that "States have, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law,
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies." Fortunately, in a clear repudiation of the
Harmon Doctrine, the second clause of Principle 21 tells us that this
"sovereign right" of states is tempered by "the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction." Thus, the United States does have to be mindful of
the effects in other countries-such as Mexico-of acts within its terri-
tory. Because like the United States, Mexico is also sovereign over its
territory, its sovereignty too must be respected.
This principle does not apply only to rivers, of course. It applies
much more broadly, to everything from desertification and biological di-
versity to climate change and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.
Though now nearly thirty years old, Principle 21's continued vitality is
demonstrated by its inclusion, virtually verbatim, in the 1992 Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development as Principle 2, and by its
recitation in a variety of recent treaties and other instruments."
But what of the dispute between the United States and Mexico in
the 1890s? Were Mexico's polite entreaties met with all the subtlety of
a sledgehammer in the form of Harmon's stark dictum? Initially, yes.
But the controversy ultimately was resolved in a 1906 treaty entitled
the Convention Concerning the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of
the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes." This was in fact the very first
treaty concluded by the United States dealing exclusively with interna-
10. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 at 3 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
11. See, e.g., The Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/AC.241]15/Rev.3, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1332 (1994) (referring to Prin-
ciple 2 of the Rio Declaration); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); The Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
pmbl., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); and Statement of Principles for a Global Consen-
sus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of For-
ests, princ. 1(a), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992).
12. The Convention Concerning the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, T.S. No. 455 (emphasis added).
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tional watercourses. The agreement essentially allocated half of the
flow of the Rio Grande to each country-an allocation, which, though
rather crude by today's standards, was evidently accepted as being "eq-
uitable" by both of them. That the two countries were able to reach this
agreement shows that no matter what states may say-perhaps in or-
der to stake out a negotiating position-they tend ultimately to resolve
actual controversies in a way that takes the interests of other affected
states into account, as is counseled by the second clause of Principle 21.
The next question, then, is what bearing does this have on the scar-
city of fresh water? To answer that question, let's first review a few
facts about the global water supply.
THE GLOBAL WATER SUPPLY
The absolute quantity of water on Earth does not change apprecia-
bly. It is thought to have been about the same for billions of years.
'
3
But ninety-seven percent of all water is salt water. It is undrinkable
unless passed through expensive and energy-intensive desalination fa-
cilities. That leaves only three percent of all the water on Earth as
fresh water. But there's a catch here, too, because most of that three
percent is locked in polar ice caps, glaciers, and deep underground aqui-
fers. It is effectively beyond human reach. ' What this means is that of
the total fresh water reserves on Earth, only three-tenths of one percent
is found in rivers and lakes. Rivers, which have been the focus of inter-
national legal regulation, contain a scant .004 percent (four-
thousandths of one percent) of the world's fresh water. The largest
share of fresh water that is available to humans is not on the surface at
all, but underground. Groundwater constitutes about thirty percent of
global fresh water reserves - and yet nearly all of the rules of interna-
tional law concerning shared freshwater resources were developed to
govern surface water, the veritable tip of the iceberg of the world's
freshwater supply.
Now, I have said that the quantity of fresh water on Earth does not
change on an absolute basis. How then, can I maintain at the same
time that there is growing scarcity? The answer is that the amount
available to each individual changes with the growth of the human
population. It is now a commonplace that while it took all of human
13. It was only recently discovered that Earth has been bombarded, for millennia, by
small balls of ice from space. N.Y. TIMES, 29 May 1997, at 1. These "space snowballs"
may add an inch of water to Earth's surface every ten to twenty thousand years. This is
not an insignificant amount, but offers little hope to humans in the next several centuries.
Id.
14. Peter Gleick, An Introduction to Global Fresh Water Issues, in WATER IN CRISIS, 3
(P. Gleick ed.. 1993) thereinafter Global Fresh Water.).
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history up to the year 1950 for Earth's population to reach two and a
half billion, it took less than forty years for it to double, to five billion.
And by the year 2000-next year-it will have topped the six billion
mark. If present trends continue, the United Nations estimates that
after 2100 the world's human population will stabilize at around twelve
billion. 5 And, "[olver 90% of all future population increases will occur
in the developing world." 6
What does this mean in terms of the availability of fresh water?
"In 1850, the average amount of water available per person worldwide
was 43,000 cubic meters per year; today it is under 9,000-a change
brought about only by increases in population." 7 Experts believe that,
solely because of population growth, in thirty years over thirty coun-
tries will be under water "stress," defined as between 1,000 and 17,000
cubic meters of available fresh water per capita; and that more than
thirty countries will be under conditions of water "scarcity," meaning
that they will be unable to provide one thousand cubic meters of water
per person per year.' In some countries the situation is much worse.
In 1990 there were twelve countries in which water availability was
less than five hundred cubic meters per person per year; this number is
projected to increase to nineteen countries by 2025.19 Put another way,
by the year 2025, thirty-five percent of the global population will live in
some fifty-two countries suffering from water stress or chronic water
scarcity." By contrast, in 1990 a mere six percent of the world's popula-
tion were living under these conditions.'
UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION
But the mushrooming human population does not by itself mean
there is insufficient fresh water to go around. If you took the total
15. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIVISION, LONG-RANGE WORLD POPULATION
PROJECTIONS: TWO CENTURIES OF POPULATION GROWTH, 1950-2150 (United Nations, New
York 1991).
16. Peter Gleick, Water in the 21st Century, in WATER IN CRISIS, supra note 14, at 105
[hereinafter Water in the 21" Century].
17. Peter Gleick, Water Resources: A Long-Range Global Evaluation, 20 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 141, at 143 (1993) (footnote omitted).
18. Water in the 21" Century, supra note 16, at 105-106.
19. Ibid., 106. Most of these countries are in Africa and Asia. Gleick notes that 500
m3 per person per year "might suffice in a semi-arid society with extremely sophisticated
water management, as in Israel, but even here water resources scarcity is already causing
political and social stresses." Ibid.
20. ISMAIL SERAGELDIN, TOWARD SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
2 (monograph, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1995); Review of Sectoral Clusters,
First Phase: Health, Human Settlements and Freshwater, Freshwater Resources, Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/1994/4 (1994)
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
21. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at 3.
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available water supply and divided it by the number of people on the
planet, there would be plenty of water to go around. The problem is it's
in the wrong places. 2 Turkey's got a lot; the Middle East has very little.
British Columbia has an abundance; southern California is arid. This
is the natural state of affairs. But it has proven to be a challenge to
human ingenuity. You may have heard of some of the fantastic
schemes for bringing water to areas under water stress or scarcity.
Thus we have the "Peace Pipeline," through which Turkey proposes to
bring water, on commercial terms, to water-short countries of the Mid-
dle East and Persian Gulf.2 Then there is the spectacle of icebergs be-
ing towed from the seas off Antarctica, in twelve-mile-long "trains," to
water-starved regions -for a price, of course. Water may be shipped
not only in tankers, which has not yet proved commercially viable,' but
also, as envisioned by would-be entrepreneurs, in so-called "Medusa
Bags", over half a kilometer long, from Turkey to countries in the Mid-
dle East. 6 Likewise, British Columbia has discovered a market for its
excess water in southern California,27 setting up a battle between free-
trade advocates under the banner of NAFTA and Canadian federal and
provincial governments, which have halted bulk exports for the time be-
ing at least.a
22. See, e.g., R. C. WARD, PRINCIPLES OF HYDROLOGY, 24-25 (2d ed. 1975).
23. For a general description, see Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water, Politics and Interna-
tional Law, in WATER IN CRISIS, supra note 14, at 92, 94.
24. A 1973 RAND Corp. report indicated that icebergs could be towed to needy areas
in twelve-mile-long "trains." "According to researchers John Hult and Neill Ostrander,
the trains would be driven by electric propellers, nudged by ice-breaking ships and es-
corted by a floating nuclear power plant." Stephen Braun, A Deluge of Drought Solutions,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1990, at 1, col. 1. See also, Iceberg Water Project Promoted, APS
DIPLOMAT RECORDER, ARAB PRESS SERV. ORG., Feb. 19, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2227379.
25. See the proposal prepared by James Cran, cited in the following footnote, at 11
(referring to the "vain efforts... to develop water markets for surplus supertankers in the
mid-1980's.")
26. Under the principal proposal, water would be transported from the Manavgat
River in "Medusa bags," very large (660 meters long ), slow moving, flexible barges, to
Haifa and Gaza. Four deliveries would be made per year, each of 500 million cubic meters
of water. The water would be then be supplied to Gaza, Israel and the Egyptian Sinai,
and would make other water, currently pumped from the Sea of Galilee to Haifa, avail-
able for delivery to Jordan. Deliveries to such water-short areas as Cyprus, Malta, and
the Greek Islands would also be possible. James Cran, THE SUPPLY OF WATER TO
JORDAN, ISRAEL, GAZA AND EGYPT FROM TURKEY BY MEDUSA BAG (Oct. 15, 1993) (on file
with author). "Paper studies showed that a bag with the content of five supertankers
could be constructed for about 1/80 the cost." Id., at 11.
27. See Heather Scoffield, B.C. Water Export Ban Brings U.S. Lawsuit, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Dec. 9, 1998, at B1.
28. See id.; Colin Nickerson, Water-Rich Canada Shuts the Spigot, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 4, 1999, at Al; and Anthony DePalma, Free Trade in Fresh Water? Canada Says No
And Halts Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at Al.
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CONFLICTS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
Unfortunately, grandiose schemes such as these have not solved,
and probably will not solve, the world's major water problems. It has
been said that "water flows uphill to money," but the reality is that
most water-scarce areas of the world are poor. 9 More importantly for
our purposes, water is often unevenly distributed as between different
countries within the same watershed. International drainage basins-
those that include parts of the territories of more than one country-
constitute nearly half of Earth's land area and some 60 percent of both
Africa and Latin America. 30
If we look at these drainage basins, we find that the upstream ar-
eas are often "humid," being blessed with ample rainfall, while the
downstream regions are more arid. Growing crops in arid regions
means irrigation, and historians tell us that in ancient times, develop-
ment of irrigation gave rise to the so-called "hydraulic civilizations" of
Egypt and Mesopotamia."1 Yet the same thing generally did not happen
in the upper basin countries, and this is understandable when you
think about it. Either these countries did not need to develop irrigation
because they did not need to irrigate-there being plenty of rain wa-
ter--or their topographies were so mountainous that they were un-
suited to this form of agriculture. Another important factor, of course,
is that it was only relatively recently that humans developed the capa-
bility to build large dams that can provide water for large-scale irriga-
tion, as well as serving other purposes.
But what happens when conditions change and the upstream coun-
tries decide they want to develop their water resources, as Turkey has
and Ethiopia would like to, for example? What happens is a situation
that is very similar to the one between Mexico and the United States
that I described at the outset: irrigation and other uses that have been
established in downstream countries for centuries, or even millennia,
may be threatened. This presents an apparent dilemma: If the Harmon
Doctrine prevails, upstream countries may develop their water re-
sources without regard to the consequences in the downstream states.
But if we tell the upstream countries, "No, don't touch the water flowing
through your territory, because downstream country X will be injured,"
that doesn't seem altogether fair, either.
Here international water law has borrowed a page from the United
29. A common cliche. E.g., it was used by Guy Le Moigne, Senior Water Resources
Advisor, World Bank, at the Freshwater Consultative Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, De-
cember 13-16, 1993. Sometimes a political element is added: "Water flows uphill to
money and power."
30. Global Fresh Water, supra note 14, at 9.
31. See, e.g., LUDWIKA. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAw 15 (1967).
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States, but fortunately it is not the page that the Harmon Doctrine is
written on. No, it is the page, or pages, of the opinions of the United
States Supreme Court in which the doctrine of equitable apportionment
was developed in interstate apportionment cases. The idea is based on
something that countries, like children, don't like to do: compromise.
What constitutes an "equitable apportionment," or "equitable utiliza-
tion," in a given case depends upon an evaluation of all relevant factors,
including, yes, existing uses; but also including alternatives to those
uses; potential water conservation measures that may be taken; the im-
portance or necessity of the new, upstream use; its efficiency; geo-
graphic and climatic considerations; and so on.32 After all these factors
have been weighed, it may-and usually will-be possible to strike a
balance which would permit both the upstream and the downstream
state to utilize the river, albeit probably not in the precise way in which
they would have if they could have made the decision unilaterally.
SHARING THE RAIN
But even if we assume that the doctrine of equitable utilization will
come to the rescue in some disputes over international rivers, we are
still left with many serious-almost hopeless-cases of severe water
shortages. I referred earlier to the fact that by 2025 there will be some
fifty-two countries-that's around a fourth of all the countries in the
world-accounting for thirty-five percent of the world's population, that
will suffer from water stress or chronic water scarcity. Many of these
countries do not share a river with another country. So, for them, re-
fusal to share water equitably is not the problem. Instead, the problem,
as I indicated earlier, is uneven distribution.
Now, all water in the seas, rivers, lakes and even most aquifers is
in constant motion as part of the hydrologic cycle. Simply put, water
evaporates from the sea, condenses in the air, falls to Earth as rain, and
flows back to the sea again. The question I would like to put to you is,
In view of the fact that water is constantly in motion in the hydrologic
cycle, can we really say that any one country "owns" the water in its
territory? The virtually universal rejection of the Harmon Doctrine
suggests a negative answer to that question. But can we go further?
The water is there only temporarily, after all, and even while in the
country, much of it evaporates to start the cycle all over again. Does
the international community not have an interest in the hydrologic cy-
cle, in much the same way that it has an interest in the protection of
the climate system or of the high seas? Is the water moving through
32. See The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, art. 5 and 6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/51/229, reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 700 (1997).
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the hydrologic cycle res communis, something belonging to all, so that it
is subject to regulation by the international community? Or is it res
nullius, something belonging to nobody, like abandoned property, so
that countries may dispose of it however they please? Our international
legal system seems to have treated water more as res nullius than res
communis until now. But can that regime endure?
You are probably thinking that it is fanciful to regard water as
something "extraterritorial," something that states don't have absolute
rights to dispose of as they see fit. But, of course, this is one of the les-
sons of the Harmon Doctrine-and, indeed, of Principle 21. The fact
that a state is sovereign over its territory doesn't mean it has no re-
sponsibilities toward other states, especially with regard to shared
natural resources. And water, especially when viewed in the context of
the hydrologic cycle, would seem to be the quintessential "shared natu-
ral resource." As such, all fresh water should be shared equitably by all
states.33 The scope of application of the principle of equitable allocation
should not be confined to states that share terrestrial elements of the
hydrologic cycle, such as an international watercourse.
I therefore wonder whether the day is really so far away when wa-
ter-short states begin to assert a "right" to a portion of the water that
evaporates from areas of the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.3 The high seas, by definition, are not under the jurisdiction of any
state. They are a "commons," an area that can only be regulated and
administered by, or on behalf of, the entire international community.
Certainly the amount of water that evaporates from the high seas could
be calculated. The actual and projected water usage by states is al-
ready known, at least approximately." The amount of water needed by
water-short countries could be determined on the basis of minimum
daily water requirements.6 This water could then be provided through
a mechanism administered by an appropriate United Nations agency.
33. See the 'UNEP Guidelines on Shared Natural Resources," Principles of Conduct
in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Har-
monious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, Principle 1,
United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council Decision, May 19, 1978, G.A.
Res. 3129 (XXVIII), reprinted in 17 ILM 1097 (1978).
34. I am grateful to Dr. Malin Falkenmark, whose question "who owns the rain"
asked at the Freshwater Forum, held at Geneva, December 13-16, 1993, opened my mind
to the need to think in new ways about rights in the world's fresh water resources. See
generally United Nations, Freshwater Consultative Forum, First Session, Report of the
Meeting (1994).
35. See, e.g., the tables in part II.H, Water and Human Use, in WATER IN CRISIS, su-
pra note 14, at 373, 373-430.
36. See Peter Gleick, Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic
Needs, 21 WATER INT'L 83 (1996) (recommending a basic water requirement of 50 liters
per person per day). Gleick demonstrates "the current failure of many nations to provide
even this basic level of clean water to their citizens" id.
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The water itself could be procured in a variety of ways, such as dona-
tions by water-rich countries, as part of their foreign-aid programs, or
purchases from countries that may be water-rich but in need of devel-
opment assistance; extractions from icebergs; and desalination of sea-
water, to name a few.
While such a system might seem far-fetched at first blush, this
would not be the first time international law recognized rights of states
in natural resources located in "the commons" because those states
were geographically disadvantaged. As is well known, such rights were
conferred upon landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in
respect of the living resources of the sea by the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3 7 For example, Article 70, para-
graph 1, of UNCLOS provides:
Geographically disadvantaged States shall have the
right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploi-
tation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal
States of the same subregion or region, taking into ac-
count the relevant economic and geographical circum-
stances of all the States concerned and in conformity
with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and
62.m
Articles 61 and 62 concern, respectively, conservation and utiliza-
tion of living resources. The expression "geographically disadvantaged
states" is defined as:
[C] oastal States,... whose geographical situation
makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the liv-
ing resources of the exclusive economic zones of other
States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies
of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations
or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no
exclusive economic zones of their own.39
These provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention recognize rights
in states for which geography has caused hardships. This is, of course,
precisely the case with regard to the arid states of the world. The rights
the Convention recognizes are in fact entitlements to an equitable share
of natural resources that would otherwise be under the jurisdiction of
other states. The fact that the international community has accepted
37. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), articles 69 ("Right of land-locked States") and
70 ("Right of geographically disadvantaged States").
38. Id.
39. Id at art. 70(2).
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such rights represents a recognition that states should not have to suf-
fer geographically-caused hardships alone. Rather, other states that
are more fortunate may be called upon to share their resources, on an
equitable basis, with those that are disadvantaged, as matter of inter-
national solidarity. The same principles would seem to apply with
equal or greater force to the sharing of fresh water.
Implementation of such a right would not be a simple matter, but
neither would it be impossible. The machinery created in Part XI of
UNCLOS for allocation of the resources of the deep seabed, as modified
by the 1994 Implementation Agreement,0 could provide a model. Al-
ternatively, would it be out of the question to entrust the presently qui-
escent United Nations Trusteeship Council with the responsibility to
determine, say, the equitable share of hydrologically-disadvantaged
states in this water on the basis of a number of factors? Such factors
could include the available indigenous water supply, human need, effi-
ciency of use of indigenous water, availability of water from other coun-
tries-even on the same international watercourse-or from icebergs
calved by Antarctica, and so on. After all, what we are faced with is not
a problem of global water shortage per se, but one of many severe re-
gional and local water shortages. Perhaps part of the solution, then,
could lie in this kind of redistribution based on the theory that at least
the water that evaporates from the high seas is res communis and
should be allocated equitably among the peoples of the world.
To be sure, certain safeguards would be appropriate to prevent
abuse and to discourage undue escalation of demand. For example,
since the problem of scarcity is caused or exacerbated in part by popula-
tion growth, provision of additional water supplies could be accompa-
nied by education programs and measures to empower women.
Large scale water transfers are also seen by some specialists as
leading to unsustainable development. The American West is an oft-
cited example.4 ' Care would therefore have to be taken to ensure that
water supplied under such a program would be used only to satisfy
minimum per capita water requirements, and not for unrelated devel-
opment projects.
With safeguards such as these in place, I believe a system of equi-
40. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1311 (1994).
This agreement cleared the way for the United States and other industrialized states that
had objected to Part XI to accept the Convention. It was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in G.A. Res. 48/263 (July 28, 1994); the Agreement, which is annexed
to the resolution, was opened for signature the following day, and it has been signed by
virtually all industrialized states. Id.
41. See Malin Falkenmark & Gunnar Lindh, Water and Economic Development, in
WATER IN CRISIS, supra note 14, at 80, 87.
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table sharing of the water in the hydrologic cycle could work. This, or
something like it, will have to work if we are to avoid the "water wars"
that some have predicted in the next century. 2
Now, Attorney General Harmon most assuredly would not have
embraced these ideas, and I'm not sure what Myres McDougal would
have thought of them, either. But I hope that at least they might
serve-even at this early hour-as food for thought for some of you who
were good enough to come this morning. Thank you for your kind at-
tention.
42. See, e.g., Joyce Starr, Water Wars, 82 FOR. POLY 17 (1991).
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